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This dissertation contests indiscriminate valorization of “difference” and its 
cognates in postcolonial discourse by shifting attention to the ontological 
“impossibility of difference” of postcoloniality and to the ethical demand born of such 
an ontological consideration. The study begins with an analysis of Charles 
Baudelaire’s treatment of the ethos of sameness in his lesbian poems. My argument is 
that at a time when the conceptualization of difference is assuming formative 
importance in modernity’s political philosophy, cultural imaginary, and epistemology, 
Baudelaire’s work is already undermining the Self-Other demarcation. The reason for 
my extending the scope retroactively to European modernity is that Baudelaire’s time, 
as I view it, marks a historical juncture where the Self-Other dynamic begins to 
materialize a certain episteme by assuming a material “content.”  
Then, spanning the work of writers from a wide range of areas including 
Salman Rushdie (Indian British), Theresa Hak Kyung Cha (Korean American), and 
Dancing Crane (Taiwanese), this study examines, in particular, the way in which these 
writers approach the impossibility of difference by problematizing the concept and 
praxis of writing. That is, writing assumes a quasi-ontological status and functions as 
the site where the postcolonial subject materializes his/her conception of 
“community.” The governing argument of the study is that the singular reliance on the 
singularized Self-Other model in the construction of postcolonial theory risks 
neglecting the relationship between the self and the collective, which too constitutes a 
crucial portion of the subject’s ethico-political experience. Secondly, since the Self-
Other model is conventionally premised on a power relation, sanctification of this 
model as the prominent language in postcolonial theory risks losing sight of 
postcolonial theory’s own limitations, especially the confinement of political idioms. I 
argue that to consider postcoloniality in light of “community” is to configure 
postcoloniality not merely as a historical juncture but as a futurist episteme 
anticipating an emancipatory agenda that can break out of the dilemma of the idiom of 
difference and difference-driven identity politics. Theorists discussed in this study 
include Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Emmanuel Levinas.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Writing and Difference, Postcolonial Style 
 
Iterability: the working out of the logic that ties repetition to 
alterity. 
    --Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc. 
 
In his attempt to dismantle metaphysics, Jacques Derrida recovers the originary 
place of “writing” by showing that writing, topographically and tropologically, points 
to the constitutiveness of différance (the temporal and referential “imprecision” of 
signification) in the configuration of being. In this dissertation, writing too plays an 
originary role, but it is deployed to contest the primacy of the idiom of difference in 
postcolonial discourse. 
Difference, to be sure, has been a predominant conceptual axis along which the 
discursivity of postcolonial considerations is established. Frantz Fanon, for instance, 
famously unearths the mechanism of desire in colonialist racial differentiation (Black 
Skin, White Masks). Edward Said takes issue with the ideology of difference in the 
two-way transaction between knowledge and power in Orientalist narratives 
(Orientalism). On the other hand, Homi Bhabha construes cultural difference as a 
universal ambivalence and ambivalent universal (Location of Culture), while for 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, the difference figured in the sexed/racialized subaltern 
subject names the aporia of representation (A Critique of Postcolonial Reason).  
To be crudely strategic here, I argue that these prominent theorists’ work has 
inspired and developed into two major trajectories of postcolonial theory. The first one, 
to a great extent, has absorbed the momentum of previous “empowering discourses” 
(feminism, ethnic studies, minority discourse) and foregrounds an identity politics
  1
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facilitated by the idiom of difference and its cognates including heterogeneity, 
diversity, plurality, locality, and specificity.1 Despite repeated criticism against the 
homogenizing tendency of postcolonialist practices (see, for example, McClintock 294, 
302-303; and Shohat), numerous postcolonial-theory practitioners still posit the 
rhetoric of difference (heterogeneity of identity, plurality of subject-positions, geo-
political and historical specificity) as the foremost paradigm in postcolonial 
considerations.2
The other major trajectory is primarily predicated upon the overdetermination 
of postcoloniality by the colonial experience, the culture of imperialism, or, in 
Bhabha’s words, “the affect of hybridity” (120). As Spivak suggests in a double move 
which defines both postcoloniality and globality, “Post-colonial pedagogy must teach 
the overdetermined play of cultural value in the inscription of the socius. Such 
unacknowledged appropriative overdeterminations are the substance of contemporary 
globality” (“Foundations” 165). 
Such a distinction, however, is not tantamount to suggesting that these two 
trajectories do not intersect. For one thing, the idiom of difference in effect also plays 
                                                 
1 On postcolonialism’s self-claimed congeniality to minority discourse, see, for example, Homi K. 
Bhabha’s consideration of the necessary performativity of postcolonial struggles pivoted upon minority 
differences: “The representation of difference must not be hastily read as the reflection of pre-given 
ethnic or cultural traits set in the fixed tablet of tradition. The social articulation of difference, from the 
minority perspective, is a complex, on-going negotiation that seeks to authorize cultural hybridities that 
emerge in moments of historical transformation. The ‘right’ to signify from the periphery of authorized 
power and privilege does not depend on the persistence of tradition; it is resourced by the power of 
tradition to be reinscribed through the conditions of contingency and contradictoriness that attend upon 
the lives of those who are ‘in the minority’” (2; emphasis in the original). Or, see Stuart Hall 
(“Culture”) and R. Radhakrishnan (“Ethnic”; “Postcoloniality”) for their argumentations on the politics 
of identity in relation to the postcolonial. Both, for instance, conceptualize affirmative postcolonial 
identities as ethnicity-informed identification; both emphasize the productive and creative aspects of 
identity formation. Radhakrishnan, in particular, emphasizes a relationship of continuity between 
colonialism and nationalism, and between nationalism and its “significant Other,” namely the disapora 
(753). Also see Ruth Frankenberg and Lata Mani; Linda Hutcheon, “Circling”; Vijay Mishra and Bob 
Hodge 407-408; and Masao Miyoshi.  
2 See, for example, Deepika Bahri 53, 55; David Theo Goldberg; Ania Loomba xvi, 14-19; 
Catherine Hall 76; Lawson and Tiffin 230-35; Mijay Mishra 42-43; Padmini Mongia, Introduction 1-3; 
R. Radhakrishnan, “Postcoloniality” 753; Sangeeta Ray and Henry Schwarz 150. 
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a decisive role in the second trajectory wherein the Derridean difference translates into 
key notions such as hybridity and radical singularity. Furthermore, although my 
working division-definition, for the sake of clarity, pins down the first trajectory as if 
it pivoted merely around a commonplace sense of “difference,” I concede that 
progressive minority-discourse practitioners have begun to adjust their identity politics 
in accordance with the Derridean signature notion—that is, they acknowledge the 
incommensurability of identity and seek a shift from conventional identity politics of 
authenticity and representativeness to a politics of heterogeneity (see, for example, R. 
Radhakrishnan, “Ethnic”; and Asian American critics discussed in Chapter Four). It 
can even be argued that the real “mainstream” postcolonial theory prevailing at 
present is nothing other than a syncretism. Aijaz Ahmad, for example, has noted that 
the predominant tendency in cultural criticism of today, which he finds problematic, is 
“to waver constantly between the opposing polarities of cultural differentialism and 
cultural hybridity” (“Politics” 289). From a more sympathetic perspective, on the other 
hand, Stuart Hall combines the two trajectories in his deliberation on the past, present, 
and future of postcoloniality: 
. . . while holding fast to differentiation and specificity, we cannot 
afford to forget the over-determining effects of the colonial moment, 
the “work” which its binaries were constantly required to do to re-
present the proliferation of cultural difference and forms of life, which 
were always there, within the sutured and over-determined “unity” of 
that simplifying, over-arching binary, “the West and the Rest.” . . . We 
have to keep these two ends of the chain in play at the same time—
over-determination and difference, condensation and dissemination—if 
we are not to fall into a playful deconstructionism, the fantasy of a 
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powerless utopia of difference. (“When” 249; emphasis in the 
original)3
Nevertheless, my point of making the division while noting the popular 
syncretism is to draw attention to the fact that the idiom of difference, in the final 
instance, remains a definitive pivotal point in most critical paradigms in postcolonial 
theory. I argue that this conflation of different ramifications under the generic term 
“difference” only defuses the urgency of several critical problems that postcolonial 
theory has yet to resolve. First of all, the rhetoric of difference (especially that in use 
in difference-driven identity politics) oftentimes only ends up entrenching a subject-
object dichotomy and mistaking this dichotomy for a power unevenness that can be 
redressed by an act of renaming (to name someone/something a “subject” is to allocate 
him/her/it a power-position). Second of all, some discourses of difference 
emphatically invoke deconstructionist resonance while at the same time still operating 
within conventional identity politics, the kind of subject-object dichotomy mentioned 
just now being a telling example. Thirdly, the idiom of difference, for the most part, is 
deployed to serve discourses and practices of politics, that is, power relations 
involving negotiations and contestations for sites of signification. As a result, critical 
paradigms centered around the rhetoric of difference in postcolonial theory tend to 
neglect any non-political parameters. Or, due to the pre-history of postcolonial theory 
vis-à-vis the faulty universalism of Eurocentric mechanisms, postcolonial theory has 
fostered a repugnance for anything associated with universality. 
These concerns constitute the departure point for my inquiry. To be brief, I 
contest indiscriminate valorization of “difference” and its cognates in postcolonial 
discourse, and I approach this issue by shifting attention to the ontological aspect of 
                                                 
3 Throughout the dissertation, all the ellipsis points in quotations indicate my own omissions unless 
otherwise noted.  
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postcoloniality (“ontological” in its general sense) and the ethical demand born of 
such an ontological consideration. My argumentation may resemble Spivak’s and 
Bhabha’s in that we all conceptualize postcoloniality as being overdetermined by the 
culture of imperialism or the colonial experience.4 Yet I depart from them by 
postulating the valence of the concept of “community” in the postcolonial condition: 
“community” not as a concrete group-scape prescribed and delimited by any political 
identification, but as an ethical intersubjective possibility insofar as the ethical 
experience inscribes a non-“Self-consolidating” relationship with the other(s); 
“community” not in the sense of an imagination, which Benedict Anderson famously 
suggests (Imagined Communities), but in the sense of “being-with” that Jean-Luc 
Nancy puts forward.  
Nancy’s notion of community is predicated upon an ontological understanding 
of beings in a political collective—that is, their mutual exposure to the alterity 
inscribed in each being grounds their commonality; finitude is what they share. If 
identity politics is concerned with the play of power and negotiation of social 
resources (what Nancy terms la politique or “politics”), Nancy’s proposition engages 
with what is at stake in the very fact of being in common (le politique or “the 
political”). To incorporate such pre-subjective ontological thinking as Nancy’s into 
                                                 
4 I appropriate the term “overdetermination” in its general sense, in the sense in which postcolonial 
theorists Bhabha and Spivak have used them. Bhabha’s propositions on hybridity and ambivalence, for 
instance, emphatically foreground the mutual complicity of the colonial subjectivity and the colonized 
subjectivity. Spivak, who describes imperialism as a structure which “one critiques yet inhabit 
intimately,” has pointed out that “the everyday here and now named ‘postcoloniality’” articulates the 
same experience of inhabiting-critiquing (“Foundations” 158). In my project, I define postcolonial 
overdetermination as the condition wherein the postcolonial subject’s self formation is constantly 
confronted with an intense matrix of cultural and linguistic codes related to the colonial heritage. On the 
other hand, I also draw on one particular aspect of Louis Althusser’s famous proposition on 
overdetermination, that is, the overdetermination of the real relationship (between men and their 
conditions of existence) by the imaginary relationship and of the imaginary by the real (233-34). My 
conception of an overdetermined postcoloniality, thus, also refers to the network of cultural and 
linguistic codes that is  imagined to constitute postcolonial reality and postcolonial cognition of history, 
often with “national allegory” as the epitome of such a coding. The latter point will be elaborated in 
Chapter Three. 
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postcolonial studies, then, is to clear open a space in any consideration of politics (la 
politique) as a reminder of the latter’s constitutive limitation. This move is significant 
if we wish to consider postcoloniality not merely as a historical juncture but as a 
futurist episteme anticipating an emancipatory agenda. For one thing, the attention to 
the question of community can redress the problem caused by the singular reliance on 
the singularized Self-Other model in current postcolonial theory, which risks 
neglecting the relationship between the self and the collective. Second of all, the Self-
Other model long sanctified in postcolonial studies is premised primarily on power 
relations (la politique) and therefore risks losing sight of postcolonial theory’s own 
limitations. Propositions like Nancy’s remind postcolonial-theory practitioners of the 
necessity of heeding questions beyond the political parameters. 
In my opening chapter, I will examine the work of Nancy together with the 
ethical proposal put forward by philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, proposing to span 
their thinking with postcolonial inquiries. I will also provide an overview of the issues 
I wish my project to be conversant with. I organize these issues in the form of a few 
polarities: specificity versus singularity, universality versus particularity, hybridity 
versus diversity, and ethics versus politics. As mentioned above, since postcolonial 
discourse arises out of a critique of Eurocentric universalism, postcolonial discourse 
tends to resist certain vocabulary such as universality and ethics. By examining current 
propositions regarding universality, singularity, particularity, and ethics, I suggest 
reopening discussions on some of the ordained “dos” and “don’ts” in postcolonial 
studies in order to reevaluate the place of the field in relation to other critical inquiries 
in the humanities. 
This dissertation project spans the work of writers from a wide range of areas 
in the spirit of comparative case-studies, including the work of Salman Rushdie, 
Theresa Hak Kyung Cha, and Taiwan writer Wu He (denoting “Dancing Crane,” 
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pseudonym of Chen Guocheng). These writers form a conceptual framework for me 
not only because they all happen to configure postcoloniality as an overdetermined 
inscription, but also because, significantly, they all approach this question of 
overdetermination by problematizing the concept and praxis of writing. That is, 
writing assumes a quasi-ontological status and emerges as the site where the 
postcolonial subject performs and contests his/her conception of “community.” I focus, 
henceforth, on the relationship between the material characteristics of writing and the 
historical impulse articulated by this materiality. In Rushdie, for instance, proliferated 
allegorical determinants name the very symptom of postcoloniality’s 
overdetermination. Yet Rushdie, as I will demonstrate, eventually undoes the 
pedagogical violence of an overloaded language and an overloaded history—not by 
resisting or ignoring these allegorical determinants, but by treading through them. In 
Cha, I examine how her treatment of a haunted history is reflected in a narrative 
haunted by the most radical Other, namely death. Like Rushdie, her proposition is not 
to posit an antagonistic stand or to exorcise the ghostly unknown Other, but to live 
with the haunting and also to live with the others in the community whether or not the 
latter are graspable within parameters of conventional representation. In Dancing 
Crane, I examine the way in which his writing demonstrates a possible ethical 
experience through a writing of simultaneity, a writing of a community not predicated 
upon any identifiable category. 
Yet in order to foreground the significance of contesting the primacy of 
“difference” epistemo-ontologically and ethically, I begin my textual study with an 
analysis of Charles Baudelaire’s treatment of the lesbian subject. The reason for my 
extending the scope retroactively to European modernity is that Baudelaire’s time, as I 
view it, marks a historical juncture where the Self-Other dynamic begins to materialize 
a certain episteme by assuming a material “content.” The capitalist desire that 
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Baudelaire addresses within a domestic context has not only a metaphoric but also a 
metonymic relationship with the European colonialist desire spreading abroad. More 
significantly, at a time when the conceptualization of difference is assuming formative 
importance in modernity’s political philosophy, cultural imaginary, and epistemology, 
Baudelaire’s work, at the forefront of high modernity, is already undermining the Self-
Other, subject-object demarcation. In his poems on heterosexual love, the collapse of 
the subject-object line is tinged with the male poetic persona’s desire-charged 
ambivalence and manipulation. In the Lesbian Poems, however, the male persona 
boldly announces his identification with the female homosexual other. Baudelaire’s 
evocation of sameness, I will propose, figures as an ethical possibility wherein the self 
attends to the radical other for the sake of the other. 
 
 
  
  
CHAPTER ONE 
Postcolonial Intersections1
  
What cannot be treated, what is not manageable once and for 
all, and what is forgotten by political treatment in its 
constitution of a “commonality” of humans by dint of their 
belonging to the same polis, is the very thing that is not 
shareable among them, what is not communicable or communal 
or common at all. Call it birth and/or death, or even singularity. 
 --Jean-François Lyotard, “A l’insu (Unbeknownst)” 
 
 In the first half of this chapter, I examine the conceptual fundamentals 
underlying the work of four theorists, Peter Hallward, Ernesto Laclau, Homi Bhabha, 
and Gayatri Spivak, holding that their theoretical apparatuses posit important 
questions pertinent to the future of postcolonial theory. If anything, these theorists all 
address the efficacy of universals vs. particulars in cultural critique. Hallward and 
Laclau, employing very different idioms, both argue for the valence of universalism 
associated with political modernity. On the other hand, Bhabha’s and Spivak’s now 
canonized writings also exude an openness to some sort of universality in their 
privileging of radical difference (either as hybridity or as the subaltern subjectivity). 
To gauge the limits of the vocabulary of difference in current postcolonial studies, I
                                                 
1 This title is inspired by a chapter title in Peter Childs and Patrick Williams’ An Introduction to 
Post-Colonial Theory, “Post-colonial Intersections,” where they examine the contact points between 
postcolonial theory and other critical practices on issues of language, gender, race, and nationalism 
(185-226). Also see Bart Moore-Gilbert (185-203) for his discussion of postcolonial theory’s interface 
with other critical positions. Moore-Gilbert proposes a Spivakian “strategic essentialism” (which he 
believes can avoid subordinating any critical discourse to any other in the struggle for cultural 
decolonization) coupled with a spirit of alliance among different political movements. 
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argue, is to reconsider the validity of those theoretical terms tabooed in the field, such 
as universality. 
 In the second half of the chapter, I proceed to explore the work of Jean-Luc 
Nancy and Emmanuel Levinas. As argued in the Introduction, the communitarian 
configuration they put forward can help bring into light the conceptual other of 
postcolonial theory at two fronts: the Self-Other dynamic and the problematic of 
representation.  
 
I. The Specific vs. the Singular; the Specific vs. the Specified 
 Among recent critiques of postcolonial theory, Hallward’s 2001 book, 
Absolutely Postcolonial: Writing between the Singular and the Specific, presents a 
forceful argumentation on the formal foundations of the discipline. Hallward takes 
issue with the tendency of “singularization” in contemporary postcolonial theory, 
which he defines as a mode of thinking that operates in accordance with its self-
created logic and acts in the absence of any external criteria for its self-configuration. 
It is, henceforth, an epistemo-ontological condition inapplicable to other historical 
circumstances: “Singular configurations replace the interpretation or representation of 
reality with an immanent participation in its production or creation” (xii; emphasis in 
the original). 
 In a slightly confusing way, what is generally termed “specific” in other 
critical paradigms belongs to the singular mode in Hallward’s system while the 
alternative he posits is categorized as the “specific.” His specific mode operates 
“through the active negotiation of relations and the deliberate taking of sides, choices 
and risks, in a domain and under constrains that are external to these takings” (xii). 
Simply put, the specific mode of historical cognition is informed and constituted by 
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certain external principles that one takes in consciously. The specific is relational 
while the singular is self-generating.  
 Behind Hallward’s adamant distinction between the specific and the singular 
lies his belief in certain “external” criteria that any historical cognition ought to reach 
and establish formal relationships with. These criteria include freedom from 
determination, the ability to think, and the ability to make genuine decisions—in a 
word, the process of becoming a subject in the rational logic of modernity. To attain 
genuine emancipatory political goals, according to him, is to arrive at this genuine 
stage of subject-formation. To achieve this subjectivity qua rationality, furthermore, is 
to think relationally and universally. Born of the “relational” dimension is the tenet of 
“the specific” as opposed to the singular. Born of the “universal” dimension, on the 
other hand, is a resistance to “the specified,” which Hallward defines as a historical 
determination that objectifies the otherwise potential subject by pinning down the 
latter within terms of a specifying and essentializing category, such as class, race, 
gender, or nation (48-50). Any particular political claim can transform into true 
emancipation, Hallward maintains, only when the claim has established a universality 
applicable to everyone. It is also in this spirit that Hallward finds inadequate current 
postcolonial theory’s tendency of over-contexualization and its religious fetishization 
of particularity: “That everything exists as specific to a situation does not mean that its 
significance and complexity is reducible to a function of (or in) that situation; that 
every event has its specific occasion does not mean that its significance is exhausted 
by that occasion. . . . [T]he mere insistence on particularity (on the this-ness of things) 
cannot resolve any theoretical question whatsoever” (39; emphasis in the original). 
 So, according to Hallward, what is epistemologically productive in historical 
cognition is neither the singularity-eyed self-invention nor an authenticity-based 
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essentialism of any specific analytical category, but a “specific relationality” that 
privileges the relations among different groups: 
The specific is always specific-to, in the constrained freedom opened 
by a distance from (rather than absence of) the object. . . . [E]very 
speaking I is specific to a you, without thereby being specified as a 
particular person with particular attributes. More generally, we are 
always specific to but not specified by our situation, at the apparent 
limit of that relation whereby the actions of any complex organism are 
specific to its environment, but not determined by it. (49; emphasis in 
the original)  
 Hallward’s caution against theoretical trivialization (i.e. over-
contextualization) and against obsession with authenticity (i.e. fetishization of the 
same conceptual axes for discursive practice such as race, gender, and class) is 
commendable. His reading in Absolutely Postcolonial also provides an acute view of 
the position of postcolonial theory in relation to other concerns in the humanities. If 
anything, his ultimate goal is not so much to find fault with postcolonial theory as to 
propose a more productive way to philosophize politics. Among the critics that he 
appreciates for their “relational” theory are Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau, whose 
recent project is to reconsider the valence of universality in political thinking (which I 
will get to in a moment).  
 A fatal problem with Hallward’s argumentation, however, is that he configures 
postcolonial theory as exclusively a legacy of Deleuze’s thinking: “it is no coincidence 
that several of the most distinctive and certainly the most widely read contributions to 
postcolonial theory are all more or less enthusiastically committed to an explicitly 
deterritorialising discourse in something close to the Deleuzian sense—a discourse so 
fragmented, so hybrid, as to deny its constituent element any sustainable specificity at 
   
    13
all” (22; emphasis in the original). This reading is fallible because, to say the least, 
identity-politics-driven propositions in effect constitute a significant portion of 
postcolonial discourse, which, according to Hallward’s system, should belong with the 
“specified” mode rather than the Deleuzian or “singular” mode. 
 Another problem with Hallward’s argumentation lies in his singular confidence 
in the universal valence of the rational subject. It seems that his deliberation on 
postcolonial theory can make sense only when the most significant contribution of the 
discipline is airbrushed. That is, what the putative postcolonial stance sets out to 
dismantle—the “naturalization of colonialism as History,” so to speak (Prakash, 
“After” 5)—is precisely what Hallward intends to resuscitate. Hallward’s admirable 
knowledge of debates and theses in postcolonial theory is accompanied by little 
appreciation of the greatest strength of the theory, that is, the interrogation of the 
fundamentals of rational modernity. In addition, he has also neglected the fact that 
some postcolonial discursive practices, rather than invent a narcissistic singular self-
image, do pay attention to the interconnections and interdependencies played out in 
imperial histories and postcolonial moments. 
 
II. The Universal vs. the Particular 
In a series of multilateral dialogues with Judith Butler and Slavoj Žižek on the 
use of universalism and “hegemony” in emancipatory politics, materialized into a 
book published in 2000, Laclau sets out to engage in the following inquires in 
particular. First of all, amid the burgeoning proliferation of multiculturalism and 
pluralism, should one assume that multiculturalism embraces nothing but a 
particularistic logic and rejects anything in the vicinity of universality? Or, is 
universalism conceivable only as a foundationalism or essentialism and therefore 
outmoded? Secondly, one predominant feature of the “increasing fragmentation of 
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contemporary societies” is that pluralized identity politics is espoused by a “discourse 
of rights” such as rights of the minorities, which assumes a certain kind of universality 
beyond any contextualization. Is this assertion of universal rights compatible with the 
assertion of communitarian specificity? Laclau further asks: if the two are 
incompatible, “is not this incompatibility positive, as it opens the terrain for a variety 
of negotiations and a plurality of language games which are necessary for the 
constitution of public spaces in the societies in which we live?” (Butler, Laclau, and 
Žižek 7).2
Laclau’s stance here, for the most part, is consistent with what he and Chantal 
Mouffe laid out in their pathbreaking work, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: 
Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, some fifteen years earlier—that is, to deepen 
the Gramscian theory of hegemony, a theory that Laclau believes can resolve the tug-
of-war between universalism and particularism. Like Hallward, he views relations 
between groups as relations of power (“each group is not only different from the 
others but . . . each constitutes such difference on the basis of the exclusion and 
subordination”). To let each group stick to its particularity, then, will only perpetuate 
the status quo in terms of the power relationship between groups (“Universalism” 88). 
To achieve genuine democratic politics (that is, to achieve a radical hegemony), a 
certain universalism has to be added to the equation. Laclau differs from Hallward, 
however, in the sense that Laclau does not conceive the universality in question as a 
                                                 
2 Laclau’s explication of the proliferation of political identities taps into the “the death of the 
subject” doxa: “[T]he possibility of the subject/object destination results from the impossibility of 
constituting either of its two terms. I am a subject precisely because I cannot be an absolute 
consciousness, because something constitutively alien confronts me. Thus, once objectivism 
disappeared as an epistemological obstacle, it became possible to develop the full implications of the 
death of the Subject. At that point, the latter showed the secret poison that inhabited it, the possibility of 
its second death: the death of the death of the Subject, the reemergence of the subject as a result of its 
own death; the proliferation of concrete finitudes whose limitations are the source of their strength; the 
realization that there can be subjects because the gap that the Subject was supposed to bridge is actually 
unbridgeable” (“Universalism” 83-84).  
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fullness or a static ideal. For Laclau, universalism should not be regarded as a 
predestined norm, but as “the symbol of a missing fullness”; not as a principle 
underlying a particularity, but as “an incomplete horizon suturing a dislocated 
particular identity” (89).  
His reasoning seems to proceed as follows. First of all, unevenness of power is 
constitutive of political reality, and hegemonic logic is the best possible way to ensure 
emancipatory politics. Second of all, the universality-particularity dichotomy will be 
displaced in a hegemonic relation, for universality can exist only when it is 
concretized in a certain particularity, while a particularity is political insofar as it 
attains some universalizing effects. The universal, henceforth, needs to be conceived 
at all times as a constitutive lack, an object of necessity and impossibility—hence, as 
“the symbol of a missing fullness.” This entails the third dimension of the hegemonic 
logic, that is, the universal must maintain the incommensurability between itself and 
particulars and at the same time allows the latter to assume a representation of itself. If 
he emphasizes contingency and articulatory relations as the conditions of possibility 
for hegemony in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau now foregrounds the 
relations of representation as central to the hegemonic logic. This, however, is not 
tantamount to saying that his theoretical grounding has shifted drastically. Quite the 
contrary, the centrality of representation as a necessity, along with the non-normative 
emptiness that constitutes the locus of representation (“The universal is an empty 
place, a void which can be filled only by the particular, but which, through its very 
emptiness, produces a series of crucial effects in the structuration/destructuration of 
social relations” [“Identity” 58]), only brings into relief the governing claim in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, that is, the contingent nature of hegemony as 
articulatory or complementary relations between players in the field of social 
discursivity. 
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Nevertheless, even though his insistence on the valence of the concept of 
hegemony has not changed, the idioms Laclau deploys are different—for instance, 
from “partial fixations [of meanings]” (Laclau and Mouffe 102) to the representational 
relationship between universals and particulars, and from “the social” as an object of 
necessity and impossibility” to “the universal” as an object of necessity and 
impossibility. Moreover, the non-totalitarian hegemony of contingent relations in 
effect borders on ethics now precisely because of the centrality of universality in the 
new configuration: 
All these demands [for improvements in working conditions, for 
instance] can be seen as aiming at particular targets which, once 
achieved, put an end to the movement. But they can be seen in a 
different way: what the demands aim for is not actually their concretely 
specified targets: these are only the contingent occasion of achieving 
(in a partial way) something that utterly transcends them: the fullness of 
society as an impossible object which—through its very 
impossibility—becomes thoroughly ethical. The ethical dimension is 
what persists in a chain of successive events in so far as the latter are 
seen as something which is split from their own particularity from the 
very beginning. Only if I live an action as incarnating an impossible 
fullness transcending it does the investment become an ethical 
investment; but only if the materiality of the investment is not fully 
absorbed by that act of investment as such—if the distance between the 
ontic and the ontological, between investing (the ethical) and that in 
which one invests (the normative order) is never filled—can we have 
hegemony and politics (but, I would argue, also ethics). (“Identity” 84; 
emphasis in the original) 
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The ethical moment, for Laclau, names the impossible, full emancipation that 
radical politics aims for. A genuine democratic community is one where “everything 
turns around the possibility of keeping always open and ultimately undecided the 
moment of articulation between the particularity of the normative order and the 
universality of the ethical moment” (86). 
While his ethical turn resembles the ultimate concern in my project, Laclau’s 
ethics, in the final analysis, has a definite name: democracy. This delimitation also 
determines his consideration of representation in the hegemonic logic, which, I argue, 
is the weakest link in Laclau’s otherwise powerful argumentation. First of all, Laclau 
apparently only focuses on political representativeness or the vertreten aspect of 
representation (which involves the distribution of interests and rights, decision-making, 
and concretization of common goals) while ignoring the mutual inscription, mutual 
implication, and mutual displacement between vertreten and the other aspect of 
representation, namely darstellen or re-presentation—something Spivak has astutely 
elaborated in her “Can the Subaltern Speak?” essay. 
Furthermore, Laclau shows tremendous confidence in representation because 
he is convinced that the double movement in the process of representation (from the 
represented to the representative and, conversely, from the representative to the 
represented) attests to a process of universalization and, hence, the “fairness” of 
representation (“Structure” 211-12). This configuration, however, neglects the 
possibility that the act of representation very often already inscribes the presence of an 
a priori hegemony, a power group that operates and defines the very mechanism of 
representation—in this case, no contestation among signs seems possible to begin with, 
even if the arena is wide open. In other words, the openness itself can be a result of 
manipulation or a preliminary fixation of meanings. Butler has voiced similar doubts:  
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Why should we conceive of universality as an empty “place” which 
awaits its content in an anterior and subsequent event? [note: Butler is 
referring to Laclau’s conception of universality as an “empty but 
ineradicable place.”] Is it empty only because it has already disavowed 
or suppressed the content from which it emerges, and where is the trace 
of the disavowed in the formal structure that emerges? The claim to 
universality always takes place in a given syntax, through a certain set 
of cultural conventions in a recognizable venue. Indeed, the claim 
cannot be made without the claim being recognized as a claim. But 
what orchestrates what will and will not become recognizable as a 
claim? (“Restaging” 34-35) 
That Butler finds the figurativeness of “empty place” problematic is not a 
tenuous argument. In fact, Laclau and Mouffe’s earlier theorization of hegemony also 
stumbles over their choice of metaphor. When elaborating on the incomplete character 
of “the social,” they contend that it is the irreconcilable gap between interior and 
exterior that renders impossible the imagination and practice of a fullness of meaning: 
“There is no single underlying principle fixing—and hence constituting—the whole 
field of differences. The irresoluble interiority/exteriority tension is the condition of 
any social practice: necessity only exists as a partial limitation of the field of 
contingency. It is in this terrain, where neither a total interiority nor a total exteriority 
is possible, that the social is constituted” (Laclau and Mouffe 111). 
The thing is, the interior-exterior distinction is perhaps no longer the most 
telling metaphor in theorizing the issue in question. Take postcoloniality, for instance. 
The kinds of temporal, spatial, formal, and ontological tropes that can be evoked in the 
conceptualization of the overdetermination of the postcolonial (Bhabha’s notion of 
hybridity being a good example), to be sure, have superseded the idioms of the inside-
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outside demarcation and, henceforth, invite a more sophisticated comprehension of 
our historical cognition. 
 
III. Hybridity vs. Diversity 
Bhabha’s theoretical paradigm always appears to pivot around the idiom of 
difference construed as ambivalence. His now popularized terms (hybridity, 
dissemination, and liminality) are predicated primarily upon a paradoxical move, that 
is, the doxa of difference is mobilized to such a radical extent that difference 
eventually has to be conceived as a universal ambivalence and an ambivalent universal 
as well. Take, for example, his concept of the uncanniness of the migration-metropolis 
dynamic. The diasporic or immigrant subject’s intervention into the narrativity of the 
metropolis takes place as a creation of an otherness in the metropolis; hence the 
uncanny feeling:  
If the immigrants’ desire to “imitate” language produces one void in the 
articulation of the social space—making present the opacity of 
language, its untranslatable residue—then the racist fantasy, which 
disavows the ambivalence of its desire, opens up another void in the 
present. The migrant’s silence elicits those racist fantasies of purity and 
persecution that must always return from the Outside, to estrange the 
present of the life of the metropolis; to make it strangely familiar. (166) 
At first sight, Bhabha’s idiom of ambivalence and mutual implication between 
cultures points unmistakably towards a configuration of the postcolonial as an 
overdetermination by an impossibility of difference. A closer look, however, will 
expose the entrenched uncertainty of positionality on the part of Bhabha, that is, a 
wavering between “the opposing polarities of cultural differentialism and cultural 
hybridity” (Ahmad, “Politics” 289). This swaying is puzzling when one recalls that 
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Bhabha himself has painstakingly made numerous terminological and conceptual 
distinctions in order to foreground his configuration of the postcolonial 
overdetermination. These distinctions, as it turns out, only lead his theoretical 
paradigm back to the same axis of difference that he has tried to depart from. One 
prominent example lies with his famous distinction between cultural diversity and 
cultural difference. The former, for him, denotes an object of empirical knowledge, a 
set of recognized cultural contents and norms: “the representation of a radical rhetoric 
of the separation of totalized cultures that live unsullied by the intertextuality of their 
historical locations” (34). In other words, cultural diversity is what regular identity 
politics and politics of difference view as “cultural difference.”  
Bhabha’s “cultural difference,” on the other hand, is intended to encompass all 
the senses of universal ambivalence mentioned above. It is, epistemologically, an 
otherness that points to the hybridity of all parties involved: “The subject of the 
discourse of cultural difference is . . . constituted through the locus of the Other which 
suggests both that the object of identification is ambivalent, and, more significantly, 
that the agency of identification is never pure or holistic but always constituted in a 
process of substitution, displacement or projection” (162). Yet as a matter of fact, 
Bhabha’s notion of cultural difference also taps into the same momentum as identity 
politics: “[C]ultural difference is the process of the enunciation of culture as 
‘knowledgeable,’ authoritative, adequate to the construction of systems of cultural 
identification. . . . [C]ultural difference is a process of signification through which 
statements of culture or on culture differentiate, discriminate and authorize the 
production of fields of force, reference, applicability and capacity” (34; emphasis in 
the original).  
Or, when drawing on Fanon to articulate his point, Bhabha in effect 
emphasizes the necessity of difference as negation, instead of as his signature notion 
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of ambivalence, in an ethical colonial encounter (and his collapsing of the colonizer 
and the colonized here is just superfluous): “What is denied the colonial subject, both 
as colonizer and colonized, is that form of negation which gives access to the 
recognition of difference. It is that possibility of difference and circulation which 
would liberate the signifier of skin/culture from the fixations of racial typology, the 
analytics of blood, ideologies of racial and cultural dominance or degeneration” (75; 
emphasis in the original). It is therefore questionable whether Bhabha’s valorization of 
flux, ambiguity, and undecidability, after all, is not meant to serve the idiom of 
difference, which may or may or border on the “difference” in identity politics. 
Furthermore, Bhabha’s scheme also falls short in negotiating two ostensibly 
different frameworks he promotes: one is undecidability or supplementarity while the 
other is a clear-cut antagonism—two frameworks that can further translate into 
polarities such as the performative versus the pedagogical, counter-narrative versus 
grand narratives. Or, in another troubled moment of straddling two opposing stances, 
Bhabha “simultaneously acknowledges the legitimacy of the language of political 
economy and economic exploitation and yet rejects the language of economic 
determination, class struggle, and historical truth as inadequate, immature, and proto-
totalitarian” (Resch 109). 
In yet another instance, Bhabha’s appropriation of Walter Benjamin, again, 
reveals his wavering positionality. On the one hand, Bhabha draws attention to the 
incommensurability that names the experience with language per se, the foreignness of 
language in itself that Benjamin has brought into light: 
This space of the translation of cultural difference at the interstices is 
infused with that Benjaminian temporality of the present which makes 
graphic a moment of transition, not merely the continuum of history; it 
is a strange stillness that defines the present in which the very writing 
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of historical transformation becomes uncannily visible. The migrant 
culture of the “in-between,” the minority position, dramatizes the 
activity of culture’s untranslatability. (224; emphasis in the original) 
 Bhabha seems interested in according the migrant figure the same kind of 
symptomatic status that, say, the flâneur represents for Benjamin. What the migrant 
subject signifies for Bhabha, to be sure, is an in-between being that not only performs 
but also dramatizes the untranslatability of cultural difference. Yet Bhabha neglects 
the distinction between “the migrant’s performing the untranslatability of cultural 
difference” and “the migrant’s dramatizing the untranslatability of cultural 
difference”—with the former, he appears to grant an activeness to the migrant subject 
whereas with the latter, he is attempting to articulate a relatively objective fact for the 
observer.  
The notion of culture’s untranslatability is a translation of Benjamin’s theory 
of language. For Benjamin, every human language inscribes a foreignness in itself, 
and the purpose of translation is not so much to reach the signification of the other 
language as to seek to decipher the foreignness of the translator’s own language. 
Untranslatability, for Benjamin, reveals more of the inherent otherness in cultural 
encoding than of the differences between cultures (“Translator”). 
 When Bhabha stresses the untranslatability in cross-cultural transactions, one 
risk is that this inter-cultural untranslatability can become an alibi for ignoring the 
untranslatability inside the “original” culture itself before culture ever starts its 
crossing enterprise (crossing the ocean, crossing national boundaries, etc.). In other 
words, the burden of the pedagogical code that is handed down to the subject as 
“culture” should not be neglected. I argue that what causes anxiety for the postcolonial 
migrant subject, more often than not, is not really the power imbalance between 
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his/her original culture and the adopted culture or the ensuing sense of loss, but culture 
as the sign per se or the process of coding culture as a master sign.  
 When Bhabha suggests matter-of-factly how the migrant dramatizes the 
untranslatability of cultural difference, he has forgotten that, in effect, the postcolonial 
migrant sometimes does need to perform a cultural identity—not to celebrate identity 
fluidity in a postmodernist fashion, but to diminish the unbearable uncanniness of 
culture. In the immigrant community in London portrayed in Salman Rushdie’s The 
Satanic Verses, for instance, each immigrant seeks to mark his/her difference by 
lodging him/herself into a cultural ideology: for example, pluralism (or, in a more 
delicious form, “gastronomic pluralism” [246]), assimilation, nativism, and 
metropolitanism. Yet, at the same time, all these lodgings turn out to be anything but 
homey. 
 Put otherwise, Bhabha’s deployment of Benjaminian terms bypasses the fact 
that what is untranslatable is in effect the empty yet loaded warehouse of signs that is 
called cultural identity (what constitutes the overdetermination of postcoloniality, so to 
speak). What is un-homey is the need to respond to the call of culture itself—the need 
to display cultural difference not as a locus of incommensurability, but as “an object of 
empirical knowledge.” I will address this issue more elaborately in my discussion of 
Rushdie. 
 
IV. The Ethical vs. the Political 
Spivak’s notion of postcoloniality bears a resemblance to Bhabha’s concept of 
ambivalence in the sense that postcoloniality is considered, first and foremost, as an 
overdetermined inscription. As Bhabha painstakingly foregrounds the ambivalence in 
postcolonial experience, Spivak views postcoloniality as a manifestation of “the 
irreducible margin in the center” (“Foundations” 161). This configuration also defines 
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Spivak’s self-positioning in her equating the postcolonial critical positionality with 
that of deconstruction. That is, postcoloniality is a condition where one inhabits the 
imperialist heritage and yet cannot but have to critique this heritage. The postcolonial- 
deconstructionist position, then, is intended to subsume the model of resistance or 
revolution. 
 Spivak’s theory is also conversant with Laclau’s in her acknowledgement of 
the necessity of universality (Post-colonial 11) and her ethical thinking. As Laclau’s 
radical politics (that is, ethics) is inscribed in the impossible, Spivak’s ethics also calls 
attention to the impossibility of naming, presenting, and representing what is inscribed 
in the aporetic area of difference, usually figured in the subaltern woman. The 
difference between them is that for Laclau, that impossibility has a definite name 
(democracy) even though some critics have contended that, for Laclau (and Mouffe), 
it is impossible to know what democracy precisely is (Chow 46). For Spivak, on the 
other hand, all naming is catachrestical, yet her (deconstructionist) ethics can proceed 
alongside nothing other than this catachrestism: “The subaltern is all that is not elite, 
but the trouble with those kinds of names is that if you have any kind of political 
interest you name it in the hope that the name will disappear. That’s what class 
consciousness is in the interest of: the class disappearing. What politically we want to 
see is that the name would not be possible” (Post-colonial 158).  
 Rey Chow has sharply detected Spivak’s ethical appeal in the latter’s 
catachrestical perception of history and the constant dilemma that confronts Spivak 
vis-à-vis the choice between strategic essentialism and anti-essentialism (Chow 39-47). 
Chow has also pointed out the generalizing tendency in Spivak’s thinking—that is, 
Spivak extends the postcolonial condition ontologically to the point of resembling the 
condition of all human language. I am, however, baffled by Chow’s conclusion that 
“in spite of [Spivak’s] careful articulations of the way language works, when it comes 
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specifically to naming, Spivak, like Žižek, becomes strangely ‘antiessentialist,’ thus 
letting poststructuralism’s discursivism, of which both of them are otherwise so 
astutely critical, gain the upper hand” (Chow 47).  
Spivak’s deployment of the catachresis as an exemplar of postcoloniality, in 
effect, is not tantamount to what Chow describes as naming a centered grounding for 
subjectivity or mounting an “essentialist” act. If anything, this generalized application 
of catachresis only brings into relief Spivak’s locating of ethics in the impossible (the 
impossibility of seeing the name of the subaltern disappear and, at the same time, the 
impossibility of not hoping so). Moreover, the grounding of Spivak’s contention is an 
universalization of ontological intervention: “Postcoloniality as agency can make 
visible that the basis of all serious ontological commitment is catachrestical, because 
negotiable through the information that identity is, in the larger sense, a text—a socio-
semiotic labyrinth shading off into indefinite margins not fully accessible to the 
‘individual’” (“Foundations” 162; emphasis in the original). 
 Aside from this configuration of postcoloniality as catachresis and hence a 
universal condition of human language, Spivak’s generalizing schema, as a matter of 
fact, is already detectable in her naming of the postcolonial critical position as a 
deconstructionist one. Her understanding of postcoloniality as “the overdetermined 
play of cultural value in the inscription of the socius” (“Foundations” 165) is another 
locus where she thinks analogously. Postcoloniality qua overdetermination, for 
instance, instantiates what constitutes contemporary globality (165). Moreover, in a 
provocative moment, Spivak forcefully argues for the analogy between the 
postcolonial and the literary, between the postcolonial and the hermeneutic. In 
addressing the figure of the Rani of Surmir, Spivak, modeled on Paul de Man’s 
conception of literary history as literary interpretation, repeatedly emphasizes that this 
figure comes to the historian in a literary mode and is decodable only via a literary 
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interpretation (Critique 245, n73). Above all, Spivak seems to suggest that treating 
such an elusive figure in a literary fashion is the only ethical way to show the 
historian’s responsibility: 
I attend to these figures [subaltern women] because they continue to 
impose the highest standards on our techniques of retrieval, even as 
they judge them, not in our rationalist mode. In fact, since they are 
outside of our efforts, their judgment is not intended. Following a 
certain statement of Derrida’s, perhaps we should rather say: they are 
the figures of justice as the experience of the impossible. (245-46) 
 
What emerges on the figure of the Rani is interpretation as such; any 
genealogy of that history can see her as no more than an insubstantial 
languaged instrument. She is as unverifiable as literature, and yet she is 
written in, indeed permits the writing of, history as coloniality—so that 
the postcolonial can come to see his “historical self-location” as a 
problem. (246, n74) 
 While Spivak “offers cultural translation as both a theory and practice of 
political responsibility” (Butler, “Restaging” 36), the conclusion in Spivak’s effort of 
cultural translation often rests with the opacity of the radical Other. Her locating the 
ethical enterprise in such opacity marks arguably one of the most sensible and lucid 
deliberations on the problematic of representation in postcolonial theory. There is, 
however, a twofold risk. One is her overt essentialism, which is not so much 
“strategic” as unpredictable or fraught with a double standard.3 The other is the silence 
                                                 
3 Spivak has suggested the use of  “strategic essentialism” earlier on (Post-colonial 45, 108-09). 
She has also voiced distrust of first-world feminists’ comprehension of the third world when, for 
instance, she critiques the fallacy of her white student’s deployment of “irony” in explicating a Tamil 
peasant woman’s doggerel (“Imperialism” 235). The irony is that Spivak herself has also resorted to 
“irony” for her reading of historical events. For example, when she learned that the descendent of the 
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afterwards. What comes after the unspeakability, for instance, of the self-immolated 
sati, of the Rani of Sirmur, or of new subaltern women caught in the “globe-girdling 
struggles” now that the critic has come to realize that “the strongest assertion of 
agency, to negate the possibility, cannot be an example of itself” (Spivak, Critique 276, 
292)? I doubt that the answer lies in what Asha Varadharajan suggests, that is, to 
regain the power of the production of knowledge by valorizing the resistant object 
following Adorno’s dialectical scheme—a proposal that aims at political purchase as 
the ultimate goal of critical practices.  
 My argument is that, one major contribution of postcolonial theory to 
contemporary cultural critique is nothing other than the radicalization of the 
problematic of the Other, difference, and representation on a global scale. Therefore, 
one should take advantage of these insights and extend them in epistemo-ontological 
as well as ethico-political dimensions of cultural inquiries. That is, if the postcolonial 
critic has brought into light the limit of knowledge or the danger of “translation-as-
violence” (Spivak, “Imperialism” 235), one cannot not heed this warning. 
In this dissertation, I propose an “other-than-political” project, that is, a 
thinking at the limit of difference-grounded identity politics within postcolonial 
contexts. Positing postcoloniality as an inherently political category, to be sure, has 
been a sanctioned practice in postcolonial theory. It is generally assumed that, as the 
postcolonial experience involves injustice inflicted upon the erstwhile marginalized or 
subaltern subjects, contestation for political visibility becomes the primary agenda. 
Even when critics acknowledge the radical alterity of the subaltern subject or the 
                                                                                                                                            
girl who killed herself in Calcutta in 1926 presumably for causes related to national liberation had 
immigrated to the United States, Spivak told a family member of that girl that their ancestor “hanged 
herself in vain” (Critique 311). 
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absolute heterogeneity of the postcolonial subject, their ultimate call, more often than 
not, points to a political project.4   
Spivak’s consistent call for attention to the subaltern subject as the aporia of 
cultural discourse marks a prominent model of ethical imperative in postcolonial 
thinking.5 Her acknowledgement of the absolute singularity of the subaltern resonates 
with ethical proposals of philosophers such as Levinas, Nancy, and Derrida and 
departs from the notion of difference in regular identity politics in the sense that such 
singularity is not necessarily lodged in a definite category—although Spivak also 
approaches the subaltern from the angle of class and gender politics, her ultimate 
concern, I argue, points to the radical alterity figured in the subaltern. From the 
positionality she provides, I would like to push the envelope and engage with issues as 
to what may come afterwards. With the understanding of each subject’s singularity, is 
it possible and effective to conceive a community? If so, how can such a configuration 
of community and such a configuration of singularity inform each other productively? 
In addition, can the conception of the “postcolonial community (of singularities)” 
advance reconsiderations of the negotiation between ethical imperative and political 
teleology? If Laclau is right that the current proliferation of identities is born of an 
epistemological play with “the death of the death of the Subject” doxa or “the 
proliferation of concrete finitudes whose limitations are the source of their strength” 
(see note 2 above), can we refuse to be delimited by these concrete finitudes while 
attending to another finitude such as pre-subjective, pre-identitarian finitude? 
 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Stephen Slemon, “Scramble” 25-26, 31-32; “Modernism’s” 3; Vijay Mishra 42-
43; Simon During; Linda Hutcheon, “The Post”; Helen Tiffin. 
5 For other more-or-less ethical proposals in relation to the condition of postcoloniality, see 
Deepika Bahri 54; and Maureen Moynagh. Or, appeals for “reconciliation” (between, for instance, the 
current hegemony and the aborigines in Canada and Australia) in recent years can also be considered as 
an ethical approach to postcoloniality. See, for example, Pal Ahluwalia; Wendy Brown; David Lloyd; 
and John K. Noyes. 
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V. Towards an Ethical Community 
In these pages, I will look at Levinas’s ethical thinking and Nancy’s theory of 
community to assess their validity for postcolonial theory. The ethical experience in 
question is not or everyday morality or justice, but an affective responsibility towards 
alterity prior to the consideration of the self. Its departure point, put simply, is a 
questioning of the self due to the presence of the other. Levinas in Totality and Infinity, 
for instance, defines ethics as a “calling into question of my spontaneity by the 
presence of the Other” (43). This self-questioning, moreover, does not lead directly to 
antagonism or resistance against the other; rather, it suggests a non-totalizing, non-
dialectical, and responsible relationship with the other. There is no space to discuss 
Levinas’s ethics in its entirety here, yet I would like to focus on the “cause” that 
necessitates the sense of responsibility in his ethics, namely, a more sympathetic view 
of the modern subject as a traumatized subject (“modern subject” is apparently a 
redundant term since “subjectivity,” arguably, is a modern invention so to speak).  
This conception of the subject in effect echoes that in Freudian and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis at several fronts.6 Lacan’s Seminar VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 
touches upon the subject’s experience with das Ding (“the Thing”) or the “Real.” The 
object-like exteriority that is prehistoric and outside of the realm of signification posits 
itself as an Other only to be revealed eventually as a reminder of the otherness in the 
subject itself: “Das Ding is that which I will call the outside-of-the-signified. It is as a 
function of this beyond-of-the-signified and of an emotional relationship to it that the 
                                                 
6 Prominent Lacanian critic Žižek, in comparison, usually places emphasis on the equally troubled 
big Other and aims to find ways for the subject to survive in its recognition of the big Other’s 
incompleteness: “the big Other, the symbolic order itself, it also barré, crossed-out, by a fundamental 
impossibility, structured around an impossible/traumatic kernel, around a central lack. Without this lack 
in the Other, the Other would be a closed structure and the only possibility open to the subject would be 
his radical alienation in the Other. . . . The lack in the Other gives the subject—so to speak—a breathing 
space, it enables him to avoid the total alienation in the signifier not by filling out his lack but by 
allowing him to identify himself, his own lack, with the lack in the Other” (Sublime 122). 
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subject keeps its distance and is constituted in a kind of relationship characterized by 
primary affect, prior to any repression” (54). Lacan’s brilliance rests in his association 
of the Thing with desire, especially when the Thing later is incorporated into the 
notion of objet petit a as the primary instigator of desire in the subject. Moreover, 
while configuring the Thing as being outside of the signified, Lacan at the same time 
delimits the scope of the Thing as articulatable solely in the word: “the Thing only 
presents itself to the extent that it becomes word [qu’elle fait mot], hits the bull’s eyes 
[fait mouche] as they say” (55). Lacan, however, further explains that this mot in effect 
indicates muteness as opposed to that which is spoken. For someone who has 
stipulated that the structure of the unconscious is tantamount to that of language, 
Lacan’s association of the Thing with the word bespeaks not so much his ignorance of 
the linguistically unrepresentable as his awareness of the impossibility of addressing 
the non-verbal.7
While Lacan’s thesis in Seminar VII is illuminating on the ethical dimension 
of psychoanalysis, the scope of his argumentation seems to be intelligible only in the 
field of psychoanalysis. Levinas, on the other hand, proposes to put primacy on ethical 
thinking as the first philosophy. His most important thesis on ethics is predicated upon 
his configuration of the subject-other relationship: 
It is only in approaching the Other that I attend to myself. This does not 
mean that my existence is constituted in the thought of the others. An 
existence called objective, such as is reflected in the thought of the 
others, and by which I count in universality, in the State, in history, in 
the totality, does not express me, but precisely dissimulates me. The 
face I welcome makes me pass from phenomenon to being in another 
                                                 
7 See Simon Critchley, Subjectivity 198-216, for an acute rendition of Lacan’s ethical move in 
comparison with Levinas’s ethics, including the stakes of Lacan’s privileging of tragedy as the 
mechanism of sublimation in the face of the absolute Other. 
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sense: in discourse I expose myself to the questioning of the Other, and 
this urgency of the response—acuteness of the present—engenders me 
for responsibility; as responsible I am brought to my final reality. This 
extreme attention does not actualize what was in potency, for it is not 
conceivable without the other. Being attentive signifies a surplus of 
consciousness, and presupposes the call of the other. (Totality 178)8
The face [visage] becomes one of the two major interrelated image-concepts 
(the other being language) employed by Levinas to elaborate his ethics in the early to 
middle stages of his career. Derived from the architectural notion of façade, the face 
figures as the exposure of the thing which discloses its secret in its myth. Not a 
negation of me nor a violence imposed upon me, the face of the exposed other founds 
and justifies me in the sense of calling me to take up responsibility, calling me to 
respond to the revelation of this otherness qua the unknown (192-97).  
On the other hand, it is by way of language that the ethical experience is 
rendered exigent. Language, for Levinas, presupposes the commerce between 
interlocutors and, henceforth, presupposes a plurality. Furthermore, the kind of 
relationship inscribed in the transaction of language implies “transcendence, radical 
separation, the strangeness of the interlocutors, the revelation of the other to me” (73). 
Levinas even names the relationship in language the experience (“the experience of 
something absolutely foreign, a pure ‘knowledge’ or ‘experience,’ a traumatism of 
astonishment”) as opposed to ordinary experience insofar as the latter refers to 
“experience in the sensible sense of the term, relative and egoist” (193; emphasis in 
the original). Eventually, in effect, language becomes the materialization of the visual 
image of the face and articulates the revelation of the face upon the self. 
                                                 
8 Levinas sometimes uses small-lettered “the other” and at other times “the Other”; at one point he 
explicates the Other to be “the absolutely other” (Totality 197). 
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 In his later works, Levinas further concretizes the ethical subject as a subject in 
hostage, a subject of pity, compassion, pardon, and religiosity. Levinas emphasizes 
that this kind of religious attentiveness to the other takes place prior to the ego and 
consciousness: “The self is through and through a hostage, older than the ego, prior to 
principles” (Otherwise 117). In a move of substitution or transference, the subject of 
hostage is to put itself in the place of the other, to move from the principle of “by the 
other” to that of “for the other.” In other words, the Levinasian ethical subject 
eventually turns into an other in opposition to the ego which exerts auto-affection all 
the time (113-18). Levinas at one point even terms this experience as traumatisme 
assourdissant (“deafening trauma”) (111), which critic Simon Critchley astutely 
associates with the phrase “la rue assourdissante” in Baudelaire’s “A une passante,” a 
poem delineating the new and nearly traumatic experience of encountering crowds in 
nineteenth-century Paris (Critchley, Subjectivity 190).9   
 Levinasian ethics, like psychoanalysis, foregrounds dimensions of the subject 
that the subject itself cannot access. On the other hand, both Levinas and Lacan insist 
on the primacy of language in the configuration of the subject’s ethical experience. 
But instead of confining a priori their analytic of the ethical to the linguistically 
representable, they focus on language with a particular understanding of language vis-
à-vis human experience—that is, language names the human attempt at cognizing and 
representing experience insofar as language also lays bare materially the impossibility 
of a full representation. My configuration of ethics in the postcolonial condition is 
primarily pivoted on such a constitutive limitation of language—the limitation of 
language in the constitution of human experience. In my discussion of Taiwan 
literature in Chapter Five, this question shall linger around to invite further 
                                                 
9 Critchley basically suggests that this traumatic experience constitutive of the Levinasian subject 
echoes psychoanalytical configuration of the subject even though Levinas himself lacks particular 
enthusiasm for psychoanalysis (Subjectivity 183-97). 
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considerations: questions regarding the stakes of including or excluding preverbal or 
nonverbal experience in understanding ethics, especially in one’s encounter with the 
trope of death. 
Levinas painstakingly warns of rejoining the ontological tradition as the latter, 
for him, is predicated upon the reduction of the absolute other to the self or to what he 
calls the Same. Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophy of community, on the other hand, seeks 
to resuscitate ontology by grounding ethical thinking in a “relational ontology.” To be 
more specific, Heidegger’s Mitsein is furthered by Nancy into a consideration of 
Being, first and foremost, as a “being-with,” namely a relationship with fellow beings: 
“Being cannot be anything but being-with-one-another, circulating in the with and as 
the with of this singularly plural coexistence” (Being 3; emphasis in the original).  
While dozens of philosophers have attempted to thematize the self’s 
relationship with society or the community, few of them have foregrounded the “with” 
as the very essence of Being or as the source of ethics—even Heidegger falls short in 
this respect as he sees the “with” as secondary in the originary character of Dasein 
(Nancy, Being 30-31, 34-35; Inoperative 9-12). For Nancy, the “being-with” or 
“being-in-common” dimension has an originary status in ontological thinking—that is, 
the dimension of “in-common” is not as much an addition to the dimension of “being-
self” as being co-originary and coextensive with the latter (Inoperative xxxvii). 
Seemingly less shocking or traumatic as Levinas’s and psychoanalytical conceptions 
of subjectivity, Nancy’s relational ontology (or “social ontology” as Critchley calls it 
[Subjectivity 240]) locates the singularity of being in nothing other than plurality. His 
invention Être singulier pluriel (“Being singular plural”) configures the mutual 
generativeness between meaning and being, between singularity and commonality:  
Being singular plural: in a single stroke, without punctuation, without a 
mark of equivalence, implication, or sequence. A single, continuous-
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discontinuous mark tracing out the entirety of the ontological domain, 
being-with-itself designated as the “with” of Being, of the singular and 
plural, and dealing a blow to ontology—not only another signification 
but also another syntax. . . . Because none of these three terms precedes 
or grounds the other, each designates the coessence of the others. 
(Being 37) 
Nancy sees the relationship between these terms as both a coexistence and a 
division insofar as the division constitutes the coexistence and vice versa. Just as his 
use of partager suggests—the French word denoting both “to share” and to “divide”—
the “being-with” of Being puts primacy on plurality precisely because of the absolute 
singularity of each being. Instead of canceling off or contradicting with each other, 
sharing and dividing—being-in-common and being-separated—in effect illuminate 
each other.  
 Writing in the wake of the defeat of the left, Nancy seeks a consideration of the 
political not in light of social contract, communion, or Marxist communism, but, 
rather, in light of pre-subjective ontology. One radical statement of his declares that 
“‘left’ means, at the very least, that the political, as such, is receptive to what is at 
stake in community” (Inoperative xxxvi; emphasis in the original). The traditional 
conception of subject, according to him, prescribes a relation of representation, and 
representation inevitably prescribes a power relation. In contrast, his configuration of 
the political, namely his notion of community, is inscribed in an understanding of 
finitude qua singularity grounded in plurality: “The singular is an ego that is not a 
‘subject’ in the sense of the relation of a self to itself. It is an ‘ipseity’ that is not the 
relation of a ‘me’ to ‘itself.’ It is neither ‘me’ nor ‘you’; it is what is distinguished in 
the distinction, what is discreet in the discretion” (Being 32; emphasis in the original). 
One major task of Nancy’s is to posit a non-dialectical thinking in a similar fashion as 
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Blanchot’s thinking. For the latter, a dialectical relation indicates a manipulation of the 
other in the interest of the self, including turning the other into the big Other:  
In a dialectical relation, the I-subject, either dividing itself or dividing 
the Other, affirms the Other as an intermediary and realizes itself in it 
(in such a way that the I is able to reduce the Other to the truth of the 
Subject). In this . . . relation the absolutely Other and Self immediately 
unite: this relation is one of coincidence and participation, sometimes 
obtained through methods of immediation. The Self and the Other lose 
themselves in one another: there is ecstasy, fusion, fruition. But here 
the “I” ceases to be sovereign; sovereignty is in the Other who is the 
sole absolute. (Infinite 66; emphasis in the original) 
For Nancy, who rarely thematizes the big Other, a community of finitude 
manifests itself in the mutual exposure of beings in the community—that is, the 
coexistence of fellow beings only brings into light for the self the exteriority of its own 
being: “The being-communicating (and not the subject-representing), or if one wants 
to risk saying it, communication as the predicament of being, as ‘transcendental,’ is 
above all being-outside-itself” (Inoperative 24; emphasis in the original). Extending 
the meaning of the word comparution (“appearance”) into com-parution (“co-
appearing” or “appearing-with”), Nancy stresses the aspect of the co-existence in 
being-in-the-world insofar as the latter also inscribes a mutual exposure. 
 It is, however, not an exposure to a common substance or essence. Nancy 
meticulously stipulates that singularity is not an identity and that exposure takes place 
prior to any identification (“Being-in-Common” 7). To be in a community, then, is to 
be exposed to others who are exposed as well, that is, exposed to the otherness that 
constitutes Being: “Community is the community of others, which does not mean that 
several individuals possess some common nature in spite of their differences, but 
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rather that they partake only of their otherness. . . . They are together, but togetherness 
is otherness” (Birth 155; emphasis in the original). 
 Nancy’s attempt to break out of the limit of regular subject-object dialectics is 
also articulated in his conception of simultaneity. Instead of positing the subject as the 
center of cognition, affection, reason, and politics, Nancy presents a being of being 
with others simultaneously in a certain “here and now” in history. I will address this 
kind of ethics born of simultaneity in my discussions of Theresa Hak Kyung Cha and 
Dancing Crane. 
 Critics like Critchley are concerned that no politics is possible without 
identification or figuration: “what is lacking [in Nancy’s thinking] is a means of 
identification (in the Freudian sense) for being-with, given that previous forms of 
identification for the political reconstitution of the social have become degraded: 
people, nation, race, party, leader, proletariat or whatever. . . . The vast question here 
is whether being-with can do without some figure, without some form of identification, 
without some form of what Nancy would call ‘civil religion’” (Subjectivity 242; 
emphasis in the original).10 This, I claim, is precisely the kind of proposition in which 
Nancy’s philosophy intends to intervene. It is precisely because previous tropes of 
identification have fallen short, reservations arise on the efficacy of new identity 
politics proposed by, say, minority discourse and identity-politics-informed 
postcolonialism. In the Blanchot passage cited above, Blanchot acutely delineates a 
possible scenario in identity politics, that is, the situation wherein the erstwhile other-
ed being now emerges as sovereignty. In the logic of dialectics, however, this Other 
will soon turn into a big Self that manipulates others and repeats the same itinerary of 
negation and synthesis: “The Self and the Other lose themselves in one another: there 
                                                 
10 Also see Todd May 21-75, who criticizes Nancy for not accepting any common sense of 
commonality. May proposes to conceive of community as practice or as “contingent holism” (75). 
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is ecstasy, fusion, fruition. But here the ‘I’ ceases to be sovereign; sovereignty is in the 
Other who is the sole absolute” (Infinite 66).  
My argument is that Nancy’s notion of community, along with Levinas’s 
ethics, offers an important “reality check” for current identity politics in the sense that 
their thoughts point to an area that identity politics does not tread onto due to its 
unrepresentability. Nancy and Levinas bring into relief the stakes of avoiding the 
unrepresentable; their ethics, in my understanding, pivots upon nothing other than the 
consideration of the unrepresentable.  
In the textual analysis that follows, I will first visit the high time of modernity 
and examine the exigency of the question of difference manifest in the work of 
Charles Baudelaire. Then, through Salman Rushdie’s writing, I will address the 
“ontological” aspect of postcoloniality by looking at postcoloniality’s overdetermined 
condition. From there, I will start exploring the possibility of considering postcolonial 
issues in tandem with ethical thinking through the work of Theresa Cha and Dancing 
Crane. 
 
 
   
CHAPTER TWO 
Vierges en Fleurs: 
The Ethics of Writing Sameness in Charles Baudelaire 
 
The uncommon difficulty in approaching the core of 
Baudelaire’s poetry is, to speak in a formula, this: there is 
about this poetry still nothing out of date. 
--Walter Benjamin, “Central Park” 
 
My textual analysis begins with a study of the shaky grounding of the 
vocabulary of difference at the forefront of high modernity. In this chapter, I propose 
that at a time when the configuration of “difference” is assuming functional 
importance in epistemological, cultural, and political formations in European 
modernity, Baudelaire the ordained arch-modernist is already undermining the 
primacy of difference. I will examine how, in his Lesbian Poems, the male poetic 
persona seeks a non-desiring and non-narcissistic approach to the other, which I will 
read as an ethical approach.  
 
During the period 1845-1847, a decade before the publication of his first 
collection of poetry, Charles Baudelaire (1821-1867) on various occasions announced 
that this collection would be entitled Les Lesbiennes.1 When the first edition of the 
collection finally came out in 1857, with the title of Les Fleurs du mal instead of Les 
Lesbiennes, only three poems explicitly dealt with the lesbian subject, all placed in the 
section bearing the same title as the collection. For a poet whose poetic persona easily
                                                 
1 See editor/annotator Claude Pichois’s notes in the Gallimard (Pléiade) edition of Baudelaire’s Œuvres 
complètes, vol. 1: 792-94. All page references to Baudelaire and Pichois are to this two-volume edition, 
hereafter abbreviated as OC. 
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comes across as misogynous, sado-masochistic, and manipulative towards 
heterosexual female objects2, what is the role played by his one-time fascination with 
the lesbian figure in his “modern” writings? For a poet whose view of modernity finds 
its best articulation in the heterosexual female, what are the ethico-political 
implications of writing female homosexuality into a historical mode that has yet to 
find the right medium to address homoeroticism? Baudelaire was among the pioneers 
who first approached the lesbian theme in nineteenth-century Europe.3 Do the Lesbian 
Poems say anything about the arch-modernist’s poetic vision—and, perhaps, the 
failure of his vision as well?4 Or, are the three poems merely an accidental detour that 
Baudelaire later would forego?  
Walter Benjamin was among the first to suggest examining the ethico-political 
dimensions of modernity via Baudelaire’s transgressive female figures: “The motif of 
the androgyne, the lesbian or the barren woman is to be dealt with in relation to the 
destructive violence of the allegorical intention” (“Central Park” 35). Benjamin would 
historicize these transgressive women and place them within the emergent capitalist 
world of commodification and mass production:  
The nineteenth century began openly and without reserve to include 
the woman in the process of commodity production. The theoreticians 
were united in their opinion that her specific femininity was thereby 
                                                 
2 Some famous readings conducted along these lines include those by Leo Bersani, Richard Burton, 
Barbara Johnson, and Peggy Kamuf. Bersani suggests that Baudelaire’s misogyny is nothing but the 
poet’s attempt to repress his feminine side and to keep his identity from being reduced to fragments. 
Johnson argues that Baudelaire manipulates the male privilege of “playing feminine” and replaces 
sexual difference with a male self-difference. Burton and Kamuf also argue in a similar vein. Burton 
contends that there is a repressed femininity inside the male poet, and that the Baudelairean woman 
often represents poetic creativity, a force that man has to tame in order to take advantage of it. Kamuf 
suggests that the invoking and silencing of the female voice are integral part of the poet’s artistic 
creation. Also see Lowe. 
3 See Claude Pichois, OC 1: 1127-28; Joan DeJean; Lillian Faderman; and Thaïs Morgan. 
4 I will refer to those poems in Les Fleurs du mal that address the poetic persona’s (heterosexual) 
mistress as Mistress Poems, and those poems that can be read as addressing the prostitute figure as 
Prostitute Poems. 
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endangered; masculine traits must necessarily manifest themselves in 
women after a while. Baudelaire affirms these traits. At the same time, 
however, he seeks to free them from the domination of the economy. 
Hence the purely sexual accent which he comes to give this 
developmental tendency in woman. The paradigm of the lesbian 
woman bespeaks the ambivalent position of “modernity” vis-à-vis 
technological development. (Arcades 318; also “Central Park” 39) 
 
Prostitution opens up the possibility of a mythical communion with the 
masses. The rise of the masses is, however, simultaneous with that of 
mass-production. Prostitution at the same time appears to contain the 
possibility of surviving in a world (Lebensraum) in which the objects of 
our most intimate use have increasingly become mass-produced. 
(“Central Park” 40)  
This twofold approach—on the one hand, an eschatological reading of 
transgressive women as signifying the violence of history that would denaturalize the 
organic; on the other hand, a sociological anatomy of modernity’s maneuvering of 
sexuality and gender ramifications—renders Benjamin’s analytic framework insightful 
and complex, if not also confusing.5 It seems that, at the sociological level, Benjamin 
                                                 
5 One possible cause for confusion is the inclusive scope of Benjamin’s notion of allegory. Critics have 
attempted to distinguish Benjamin’s allegory from his other philosophemes. Susan Buck-Morss, for 
instance, differentiates allegory (historical nature: ruin) from symbol (mythic nature: wish image), 
phantasmagoria (mythic history: fetish), and trace (natural history: fossil) (210-12), yet Benjamin’s 
allegory very often is interchangeable with his other philosophemes and, once in a while, even emerges 
as the central signifier for modernity. It is debatable as to whether Benjamin’s theoretical paradigm is 
indeed fixed, as Buck-Morss puts it, “within an unreconciled and transitory field of oppositions” (210). 
For example, while he presents allegory as an “antidote to myth” (“Central Park” 46), Benjamin 
elsewhere also mentions the “refunctioning of allegory in the commodity economy”—by which he 
means the re-creation of aura for the commodity, the “deceptive transfiguration of the world of the 
commodity” (42). Thus, allegory here appears to resemble the fetishization of the commodity or 
“phantasmagoria” in Buck-Morss’s categorization. Or, Benjamin would present the dialectical image as 
“an image flashing up in the now of recognisability, that the past, in this case that of Baudelaire, can be 
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means to distinguish the relationships of the prostitute and the lesbian vis-à-vis 
modernity: prostitution bespeaks the reification of women while the lesbian figure 
assumes a heroic positioning against the “naturalizing” agenda of modernity. At the 
eschatological level, however, this distinction is not meticulously pursued, and the 
prostitute and the lesbian tend to be considered within the same idiom.  
Following Benjamin’s model, major critic Christine Buci-Glucksmann situates 
Baudelaire within the “feminization of culture” that transpired in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century. She argues that in a 
crisis period such as modernity, the “woman question” emerges as a sign for the 
“question of civilization” that has to be tackled via “a whole series of oppositions and 
myths.” Gender identity, then, represents one of these “oppositions and myths.” More 
importantly, the feminine would become “an element in the break with a certain 
discredited rationality based upon the idea of a historical and symbolic continuum”; 
the feminine would come to signify a new heterogeneity, a new otherness in 
modernity (49).  
Buci-Glucksmann’s critique usefully elaborates Benjamin’s gendered reading 
of modernity. Yet, both she and Benjamin focus primarily on the ethico-political 
significance of Baudelaire’s lesbian figure at the expense of the real texture/textuality 
of the three Lesbian Poems. Moreover, they both see the Baudelairean prostitute and 
lesbian figures through the same optics. The problem with this approach rests in their 
allegorical reading of Baudelaire’s lesbian figure. For, as a matter of fact, the lesbian 
in Baudelaire’s Lesbian Poems—a mythological figure, perhaps—is barely an 
allegorical figure in the conventional sense, that is, a personification. Nor does she fit 
                                                                                                                                            
captured” (“Central Park” 49)—an image not so different from the allegorical, which Benjamin renders 
as “the opposition between antiquity and the modern to be transposed out of the pragmatic context” (35). 
Yet, at some point, Benjamin also stipulates that the “correspondence between antiquity and the 
modern” to be found in Baudelaire—that is, “the allegorical way of seeing”—excludes dialectics rather 
than contains it (47).  
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into the Benjaminian notion of “modern allegory.”6 It is rather the mistress and the 
prostitute in Les Fleurs du mal who have occasionally emerged as allegorical 
personifications. It is also the mistress and the prostitute who best illustrate 
Benjamin’s modern allegory.  
Outside the Benjaminian tradition, other Baudelairean critics who have dealt 
with the lesbian subject either dismiss this thematic as the poet’s intent to shock 
society7, or contend from the perspective of gender studies that femininity (including 
homosexual femininity) in and for Baudelaire represents a creativity and otherness that 
the poet figure eventually must subsume to maintain his creative male subjectivity.8 
While the latter approach in general has produced sophisticated readings of 
Baudelaire’s Mistress Poems,9 I will argue that it is insufficient to read the Lesbian 
Poems solely in the light of gender issues. Nor is it enough to view the Lesbian Poems 
through the same lens that we view other poem clusters, or to deal with the lesbian 
figure merely in relation to the biographical Baudelaire in the context of an emerging 
modernity.10 I will claim that the Lesbian Poems in effect occupy a very distinctive 
position in Baudelaire’s poetic mission. In terms of semantics, stylistics, and thematics, 
the Lesbian Poems stand out on their own; the use of metaphors and the 
imagery/imaginary of the female figure in these poems signify a different sense of 
temporality and a different subject-object relationship than what we find, for instance, 
in the Mistress and Prostitute clusters.  
                                                 
6 What needs to be emphasized is that Benjamin’s notion of modern allegory, which is largely born of 
his reading of Baudelaire, is to be distinguished from his notion of baroque allegory, which he 
elaborates in the monograph The Origin of German Tragic Drama. 
7 See, for example, Lillian Faderman 254-71. 
8 For the “male lesbianism” in Baudelaire, see Michel Butor (ch. 6) and Thaïs Morgan. For Baudelaire 
as a disturbed homosexual playing out masochistic neuroses in his poetry, see Nicholas Kostis. I will 
return to these critics later. 
9 See note 2. 
10 For the latter, see Walter Benjamin, “Central Park”; Christine Buci-Glucksmann; and Dominique 
Fisher. 
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In what follows, I will launch a close textual analysis of the Lesbian Poems 
and address not only the poetics but also, based on the understanding of these poetics, 
the ontological and epistemological dimensions of these poems. The ultimate goal is to 
achieve a better grip on the ethico-political exigency of a (heterosexual) male writer’s 
writing of female homosexuality, the exigency of writing sameness in (sexual) 
difference. In my analysis, I will use the capitalized “Poet” to denote the male poetic 
persona in Baudelaire’s poetry—a persona that straddles the floating space 
interconnecting the real-life poet Baudelaire, the ideal writing subject that Baudelaire 
aims to project into his verses, and the actual/textual subject whose presence 
constantly reveals his discrepancies from the ideal and eventually disturbs the entire 
poetic enterprise that Baudelaire seems to have in mind.  
 
I. The Mistress and the Prostitute: The Wrong Muses 
Baudelaire’s artistic ideal is marked by an obsession with the orders of time. 
As one of his art critiques, “Le Peintre de la vie moderne,” suggests: “toute notre 
originalité vient de l’estampille que le temps imprime à nos sensations” (OC 2: 696; 
emphasis in the original).11 His conception of beauty repeatedly stresses the co-
existence of eternity with transitoriness: 
Toutes les beautés contiennent, comme tous les phénomènes possibles, 
quelque chose d’éternel et quelque chose de transitoire, —d’absolu et 
de particulier. La beauté absolue et éternelle n’existe pas, ou plutôt elle 
n’est qu’une abstraction écrémée à la surface générale des beautés 
diverses. L’élément particulier de chaque beauté vient des passions, et 
                                                 
11 “All our originality comes from the stamp that time imprints on our sensations.” All translations are 
mine unless otherwise noted. For aesthetic reasons, most quotations will be placed in the footnotes. 
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comme nous avons nos passions particulières, nous avons notre beauté. 
(“Salon de 1846,” OC 2: 493)12
Most Mistress Poems indicate that the Poet is constantly wrestling with mortal 
time—which is tantamount not so much to human mortality as to the “immortal” life 
of ennui. In “Le Masque,” for example, the woman who symbolizes divine beauty is 
condemned in that she shares the same fate with ordinary creatures: “Elle pleure, 
insensé, parce qu’elle a vécu! / Et parce qu’elle vit! Mais ce qu’elle déplore / Surtout, 
ce qui la fait frémir jusqu’aux genoux, / C’est que demain, hélas! il faudra vivre 
encore! / Demain, après-demain et toujours! —comme nous!” (OC 1: 24).13 Here, 
daily existence turns into the curse of eternal return. This sentiment also predominates 
in all four poems entitled “Spleen,” where immortality is received with mixed feelings 
because it is (mis)recognized as ennui: “L’ennui, fruit de la morne incuriosité, / Prend 
les proportions de l’immortalité” (OC 1: 73).14 Yet various Mistress Poems suggest 
that the Poet shuns mortality as well. In “Une Charogne,” for instance, the sight of a 
dead animal conjures up the loathsome thought that his mistress, too, will soon fall 
prey to mortality (OC 1: 31-32).  
The Poet does long for eternity. Yet, instead of the pseudo-immortality or 
eternal curse of ennui, he seeks the kind of eternity that will not only facilitate but also 
commemorate the creation of his poetry. In his bitter moments (moments of Spleen, so 
to speak), the Poet’s agony is mostly generated by the mistress’s oblivious nature: 
“L’oubli puissant habite sur ta bouche, / Et le Léthé coule dans tes baisers” (“Le 
                                                 
12 “All kinds of beauty, just like all possible things, contain some eternal aspect and some transitory 
aspect—some absolute element and some particular element. Absolute and eternal beauty does not exist; 
or, rather, it is nothing but an abstraction skimmed off the general surface of diverse beautiful things. 
The particular element of each kind of beauty comes from passion. And just as each of us has our 
particular passion, each of us has our own sense of beauty.” 
13 “She cries, madly, because she has lived, and because she lives! Yet what she deplores most and 
what makes her tremble all the way to her knees is the fact that tomorrow, alas, she has to live again—
tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, and forever—just like us!” 
14 “Ennui, result of gloomy indifference, takes on the proportion of immortality.” 
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Léthé,” OC 1: 156);15 “Désormais tu n’es plus, ô matière vivant! / Qu’un granit 
entouré d’une vague épouvante, / . . . / Un vieux sphinx ignoré du monde insoucieux, / 
Oublié sur la carte . . .” (“Spleen,” OC 1: 73).16 In his moments of Idéal, on the other 
hand, the Poet finds inspiration in his mistress’s eternalizing memory: “Ton souvenir 
en moi luit comme un ostensoir!” (“Harmonie du Soir,” OC 1: 47);17 “chère Déesse, 
Être lucide et pur, / Sur les débris fumeux des stupides orgies / Ton souvenir plus clair, 
plus rose, plus charmant, / À mes yeux agrandis voltige incessamment. / . . . / Ainsi . . . 
ton fantôme est pareil, / Âme resplendissante, à l’immortel soleil!” (“L’Aube 
spirituelle,” OC 1: 46).18 At times, however, it is the Poet’s art rather than the 
mistress’s memory that can surpass mortal time: “Alors, ô ma beauté! dites à la 
vermine / Qui vous mangera de baisers, / Que j’ai gardé la forme et l’essence divine / 
De mes amours decomposes” (“Une Charogne,” OC 1: 32).19
It seems that infinity or immortality is desirable only when poetic creation is 
involved. Yet, the Poet seems constantly anxious over the genuine source of his 
creativity. On the one hand, infinity is something he has yet to be introduced to, as he 
confesses in “Hymne à la Beauté”: “Si ton œil, ton souris, ton pied, m’ouvrent la porte 
/ D’un Infini que j’aime et n’ai jamais connu?” (OC 1: 25).20 On the other hand, 
infinity seems already inherent in his poetry (“j’ai gardé la forme et l’essence divine”). 
Such an uncertainty can explain why he is often misled by the kind of beauty his 
mistress represents and why he is often left devastated afterwards. For behind the 
                                                 
15 “Powerful oblivion lives on your lips, and the Lethe flows in your kisses.” 
16 “O living matter, from now on you are nothing but a rock encompassed by a vague fear, . . . an old 
Sphinx unknown to the insouciant world, left off the map . . . .” 
17 “Your memory shines on me like a monstrance.” 
18 “Dear Goddess, so bright and pure: on the smoked debris of stupid orgies, your memory—clearer, 
rosier, and more charming—hovers incessantly before my wide eyes. . . . Glorious spirit, your shade is 
equal to the immortal sun!” 
19 “O my Beauty! Tell the vermin that will devour you by its kisses that I have kept intact the divine 
form and essence of my rotten loves.” 
20 “What if your eyes, your smiles, and your feet open for me the door of Infinity, which I love and yet 
have never known?” 
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mistress’s superficial beauty is nothing but a void that cannot promise any 
difference—that is, a void that cannot make today different from yesterday, tomorrow 
different from today. It is noteworthy that, even though Baudelaire constantly 
reiterates his dichotomous aesthetics in his prose pieces (that is, as shown in the quotes 
above, beauty and art are both constituted by the eternal and the transitory), the poetic 
rendition of the “transitory” part of beauty/art very often emerges as a distressing, 
sometimes destructive, experience for the Poet. 
This motif of the misplaced ideal of beauty is tellingly unfolded in the 
allegorical mode. Two poems in the Mistress cluster explicitly address Beauty as a 
personification of fatal attraction: 
Viens-tu du ciel profond ou sors-tu de l’abîme, 
Ô Beauté? ton regard, infernal et divin, 
Verse confusément le bienfait et le crime, 
Et l’on peut pour cela te comparer au vin. (“Hymne à la Beauté,” OC 1: 
24)21
 
Les poètes, devant mes grandes attitudes, 
Que j’ai l’air d’emprunter aux plus fiers monuments, 
Consumeront leurs jours en d’austères études; 
 
Car j’ai, pour fasciner ces dociles amants, 
De purs miroirs qui font toutes choses plus belles: 
Mes yeux, mes larges yeux aux clartés éternelles! (“Beauté,” OC 1: 
21)22
                                                 
21 “O Beauty! Do you come from the deep sky or are you from the abyss? Your regard, both infernal 
and divine, pours out a mixture of beneficence and crime, and that is why we can compare you to 
wine.” 
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I will come back to this image of mirrors and compare it with the mirror image 
in the Lesbian Poems in light of the Poet’s (mis-)identification with his female objects. 
Allegory in the Mistress Poems, illustrated in these two poems above, translates the 
Poet’s desperation for poetic inspiration, which is wrongly identified with his 
heterosexual lover. This sentiment is pointedly replayed, with an even more diabolical 
twist, in the Prostitute Poems. “Les Deux Bonnes Sœurs” presents Debauchery and 
Death as twin sisters who scoff at the modern mystification of marriage and fertility; 
“Allégorie” portrays a transgressive woman’s defiance of Debauchery and Death 
while at the same time it also betrays her affinity with them. “La Béatrice” and “Les 
Métamorphoses du Vampire,” both addressing the Poet’s disillusionment with his 
false muse, do not feature any allegorical figure at first sight. Yet, as another poem in 
the same cluster, “Un Voyage à Cythère,” well puts it, the Poet’s perception of life has 
already been shaped by the allegorical lens: “Le ciel était charmant, la mer était unie; / 
Pour moi tout était noir et sanglant désormais, / Hélas! et j’avais, comme en un suaire 
épais, / Le cœur enseveli dans cette allégorie” (OC 1: 119; emphasis mine).23  
It seems that Benjamin’s various senses of modern allegory developed out of 
Baudelaire’s poetry may converge here. First, there is the “allegorical intention” as the 
“destruction of the organic and living—the extinguishing of appearance” (“Central 
Park” 41). Secondly, there is the deadly image of allegory in the female: “Women in 
Baudelaire: the most precious spoils in the ‘Triumph of Allegory’—Life, which means 
Death. This quality is most unqualifiedly characterised by the whore” (39). Then, there 
is the association of allegory with the sentiment of melancholy when the latter 
                                                                                                                                            
22 “Poets, when facing my grand postures that I seem to borrow from the proudest monuments, spend 
their days in austere studies. For I, in order to fascinate these docile lovers, have these pure mirrors that 
can make everything prettier—my eyes, my big eyes with eternal clarity!” 
23 “The sky was charming, and the sea was peaceful. Yet for me everything was dark and bloody since 
then. Alas! I had, as if in a thick shroud, buried my heart in this allegory.” 
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indicates a dwelling on nothing other than fragments (36, 41, 51). Finally, there is the 
optical aspect of allegory—that is, allegory as a way of seeing (52).  
A look at a much discussed poem, “Le Cygne” from the “Tableaux Parisiens” 
section, further drives home the point that the allegorical nature (in the Benjaminian 
sense) of Les Fleurs du mal is centered around the incongruous sense of temporality 
qua modernity: “Paris change! mais rien dans ma mélancolie / N’a bougé! palais neufs, 
échafaudages, blocs, / Vieux faubourgs, tout pour moi devient allégorie, / Et mes chers 
souvenirs sont plus lourds que des rocs” (OC 1: 86; emphasis mine).24 This sentiment 
would find its film-noir version in the vampirical prostitute figure: “Tremblaient 
confusément des débris de squelette, / Qui d’eux-mêmes rendaient le cri d’une 
girouette / Ou d’une enseigne, au bout d’une tringle de fer, / Que balance le vent 
pendant les nuits d’hiver” (“Les Métamorphoses du Vampire,” OC 1: 159).25 The 
creaky metallic sounds issuing from the remains of the vampirical woman allegorize 
the anachronism of modern life. 
Baudelaire once commented that modernity constitutes one half of art, whose 
other half is eternity: “La modernité, c’est le transitoire, le fugitif, le contingent, la 
moitié de l’art, dont l’autre moitié est l’éternel et l’immuable” (“Peintre,” OC 2: 
695).26 If his allegorical figures in the Mistress and Prostitute clusters illustrate the 
ephemeral and fugitive half of art qua modernity, where, then, does he locate the 
eternalizing aspect of art if it does exist in his poetic vision? Even though the multi-
layered allegory in the Benjaminian model is meant to apply to both the prostitute and 
the lesbian, I would argue that, in effect, the use of allegory in Les Fleurs du mal 
                                                 
24 “Paris changes, but nothing in my melancholy has moved. New palaces, scaffoldings, blocks, and the 
old suburbs—all of them become allegories to me, while my dear memories are heavier than rocks.” 
25 “The ruins of a skeleton were trembling by themselves like a creaking weather vane, or like a 
[commercial] sign hung at the end of an iron pole swinging in the wind on winter nights.” 
26 “Modernity is the transitory, the fugitive, the contingent—one half of art, whose other half is the 
eternal and the immutable.” 
 
 49
marks the very difference between the lesbian and other female figures in Baudelaire. 
Both conventional allegory and Benjaminian modern allegory are nowhere to be found 
in the three Lesbian Poems. As a matter of fact, even though I have tried to separate 
the two types of allegories for the sake of clarity, it should be noted that, in Baudelaire, 
Benjaminian modern allegory, with its use of terms like Debauchery and Death, is 
decodable insofar as it happens to inhabit a conventional personification. 
 
II. Flowering Virgins 
Of the three immediately identifiable Lesbian Poems in Les Fleurs du mal, two 
were banned from publication after the appearance of the 1857 edition: “Lesbos” and 
“Femmes damnées: Delphine et Hippolyte” (the latter will be cited as “Delphine et 
Hippolyte” hereafter). Only the third poem, also entitled “Femmes damnées,” survived 
juridical scrutiny. These poems are generally dated to the earlier stages of the poet’s 
career.27  
The condemned women in these poems do not appear in the conventional 
allegorical mode of personification. “Lesbos” portrays the mythical figure Sappho as 
the mother of the isle of lesbians, Lesbos. Yet Sappho only exists as an absence that 
both Lesbos and the narrative about Lesbos (namely, this poem) seek to invoke in 
order to generate their respective possibilities. Nor do Delphine, Hippolyte, or those 
nameless lesbian women in “Femmes damnées” come across as allegorical figures. If 
anything, these poems project an intricate temporality: a seeming timelessness 
interrupted by the present—the Poet’s present.  
“Lesbos” is narrated mostly in the present tense. As each stanza begins and 
ends with the same verse, refrains lend an air of always-the-same-ness—a feeling that 
                                                 
27 An earlier version of “Lesbos” was published in an anthology of poetry published by Garnier entitled 
Les Poètes de l’amour in 1850. See Claude Pichois, OC 1: 1060-61, 1123-24, 1126-27; also F. W. 
Leakey 30-31.  
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is reinforced by the fact that the real addressee of the narrative is the immobile isle 
Lesbos instead of any specific figure that comes and goes. Yet this timelessness is 
disturbed at least twice: the first time is when the Poet recalls how he has started a 
liaison with Lesbos, and the second time when Sappho’s death is mentioned. At first 
sight, it is Sappho’s death that marks the history of the isle, that divides the time of 
Lesbos into a before and an after: “Et c’est depuis ce temps que Lesbos se lamente!” 
(OC 1: 152).28 Yet, as I will argue, it is in effect the Poet’s intrusion into the middle of 
the narration that makes history for Sappho and Lesbos possible—and this is so all 
because of the Poet’s act of writing. Stanzas nine and ten of “Lesbos” read: 
Car Lesbos entre tous m’a choisi sur la terre 
Pour chanter le secret de ses vierges en fleurs, 
Et je fus dès l’enfance admis au noir mystère 
Des rires effrénés mêlés aux sombres pleurs; 
Car Lesbos entre tous m’a choisi sur la terre. 
 
Et depuis lors je veille au sommet de Leucate, 
Comme une sentinelle à lœil perçant et sûr, 
Qui guette nuit et jour brick, tartane ou frégate, 
Dont les formes au loin frissonnent dans l’azur; 
Et depuis lors je veille au sommet de Leucate (OC 1: 151)29
The conjunction car (“for”) in stanza nine demands attention. Right before this 
stanza, the Poet was celebrating the “religion” of these “vierges au cœur sublime” 
                                                 
28 “And it’s since then [Sappho’s death] that Lesbos started to moan.” 
29 “For Lesbos chose me out of all poets on earth to sing the secret of her flowering virgins, and since 
childhood I have been admitted to the dark mystery of excessive laughter mixed with somber tears. For 
Lesbos chose me out of all poets on earth. And since then I have stayed on guard on the top of Leucate, 
like a sentinel with a piercing and certain eye, who watches day and night for brigs and frigates—whose 
shapes from afar shiver in the blue sky. And since then I have stayed on guard on the top of Leucate.” 
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(“virgins of the sublime heart”) and, more importantly, was addressing the fate of 
these lesbians in judiciary and moral terms: 
Que nous veulent les lois du juste et de l’injuste? 
Vierges au cœur sublime, honneur de l’archipel, 
Votre religion comme une autre est auguste, 
Et l’amour se rira de l’Enfer et du Ciel! 
Que nous veulent les lois du juste et de l’injuste? (OC 1: 151)30
Then, with no conspicuous causal connection, the Poet throws in this car in the ninth 
stanza to arbitrarily establish not only his connection with Lesbos but also the 
relevance of his poetry to religion, law, and justice. The intrusiveness of this “car” 
generates two possibilities: either the Poet’s poetic vocation begins as an outcome of 
his sympathizing with these condemned women, or his enunciative moment marks the 
starting point of Lesbian history. Either way, the Poet intends to address the limits and 
limitations of the discourse of law and justice (“Que nous veulent les lois du juste et 
de l’injuste?”). Moreover, the writing here promises an ethics in that this writing, in its 
act of enunciation, enables a history of the condemned to take place beyond the 
confines of human laws and cults.  
“Femmes damnées” also undergoes a change of narrative perspectives. The 
first half of the poem appears to be an impersonal depiction of lesbian women as 
“bétail pensif” (“pensive cattle”), but the second half turns into a second-person 
address to Bacchus, whom the Poet calls “endormeur des remords anciens” (“the 
deceiver of ancient remorse”; OC 1: 113, 114). The Poet’s monologue to the god of 
drunken revelry focuses on sensory images of the lesbian women: how their eyes turn 
towards the horizon, how their feet reach for each other’s bodies, and how they 
                                                 
30 “What do laws of justice and injustice want from us? Virgins of the sublime heart, honor of the 
archipelago. Your religion, like another religion, is august, and love will ignore the Hell and the Heaven! 
What do laws of justice and injustice want from us?” 
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indulge themselves in secretive conversations. All of this representation, too, is 
facilitated by the always-ness of the present tense. Towards the end, however, the Poet 
turns to these women and cries out to them in a most urgent tone. His apostrophes, 
once again, reveal that the determining mode of temporality for poetic and historical 
cognition in this other world is the Poet’s “writing present”: 
Ô vierges, ô démons, ô monstres, ô martyres, 
De la réalité grands esprits contempteurs, 
Chercheuses d’infini, dévotes et satyres, 
Tantôt pleines de cris, tantôt pleines de pleurs, 
 
Vous que dans votre enfer mon âme a poursuivies, 
Pauvres sœurs, je vous aime autant que je vous plains, 
Pour vos mornes douleurs, vos soifs inassouvies, 
Et les urnes d’amour dont vos grands cœurs sont pleins! (OC 1: 114)31
“Delphine et Hippolyte” consists of the Poet’s third-person depiction of 
Delphine and Hippolyte, a dialogue between the two heroines, and the Poet’s final 
comment. The first part is carried out in l’imparfait, a past or past progressive tense. 
The past mode lends a feeling of historical reality (something already happened) while 
the progressive mode produces a sensory reality (as if the reader was there watching). 
All of this “realness” seems to be furthered by the direct quotations in the dialogue. 
Yet, in effect, it does not take long before the artificiality of the dialogical setting 
reveals itself. Delphine and Hippolyte speak almost exactly in the same way as the 
narrating Poet outside the dramatic dialogue: with the same diction, the same 
                                                 
31 “O virgins, demons, monsters, martyrs! You in your proud spirit contempt reality. You are seekers of 
infinity, devotees and satyrs—one moment full of cries, and the next moment full of tears. You whom, 
in your hell, my soul has followed—poor sisters, I love you as much as I pity you, for your gloomy pain, 
for your insatiable thirst, and for the urns of love that fill your noble hearts.” 
 
 53
metaphors, and the same sentiment. It seems that the Poet cannot “decode” the two 
heroines properly without the translation of similes and metaphors: “le rideau de sa 
jeune candeur” (“the curtain of her young innocence”); “Ainsi qu’un voyageur qui 
retourne la tête / Vers les horizons bleus dépassés le matin” (“like a traveler who turns 
his head towards the blue horizons passed in the morning”); “ses bras vaincus, jetés 
comme de vaines armes” (“her arms conquered, dropped like useless weapons”); 
“Delphine . . . / Comme un animal fort qui surveille une proie” (“Delphine . . . like a 
strong animal watching her prey”); “s’allongeait vers elle, / Comme pour recueillir un 
doux remercîment” (“lying down near [Hippolyte] as if she wanted to receive sweet 
gratitude”); “Delphine secouant sa crinière tragique, / Et comme trépignant sur le 
trépied de fer, / L’œil fatal, répondit d’une voix despotique” (“Delphine shook her 
tragic hair, and, as if trampling on the iron tripod, with fatal eyes, she responded with 
a despotic voice”).  
Figures of speech inundate the first part of the poem, and they continue into the 
dialogue between the two heroines: “l’holocauste sacré de tes premières roses” (“the 
sacred holocaust of your first flowers”); “mes baisers sont légers comme ces 
éphémères” (“my kisses are as light as ephemeral mayflies”); “ceux de ton amant 
creuseront leurs ornières / Comme des chariots ou des socs déchirants” (“your lover’s 
kisses leave ruts just like carts or ploughs do”); “ils passeront sur toi comme un lourd 
attelage” (“your lover’s kisses trample over you like a heavy harness”); “je souffre et 
je suis inquiète, / Comme après un nocturne et terrible repas” (“I suffer and I feel 
disquieted like coming back from an evening prayer and a terrible dinner”); “Je sens 
s’élargir dans mon être / Un abîme béant; cet abîme est mon cœur” (“I feel that a wide 
abyss is enlarging in my being, and this abyss is my heart”); “brûlant comme un 
volcan, profond comme le vide” (“scorching hot as a volcano, deep as the void”) (OC 
1: 152-54). Based on the predominance of these tropes, critics have argued for 
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multiple gender identifications on the part of the Poet, or at least for his manipulation 
of gender roles. I would argue, however, that the ampleness of similes here indicates 
the artificiality of the Poet’s rapport with these female figures. I will return to this 
point later. 
Critics have suggested that the last five stanzas of this poem were added only 
later, possibly a few days before the publication of the 1857 edition of Les Fleurs du 
mal to avoid censorship (Pichois, OC 1: 1126-27). These stanzas are separated from 
the preceding ones with a dash, and, here, the Poet addresses the heroines directly:  
--Descendez, descendez, lamentables victimes, 
Descendez le chemin de l’enfer éternel! 
Plongez au plus profond du gouffre, où tous les crimes, 
Flagellés par un vent qui ne vient pas du ciel, 
 
Bouillonnent pêle-mêle avec un bruit d’orage. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Loin des peuples vivants, errantes, condamnées, 
À travers les déserts courez comme les loups; 
Faites votre destin, âmes désordonnées, 
Et fuyez l’infini que vous portez en vous! (OC 1: 155)32
At first, this addition indeed seems to convey a severe, even clichéd, 
condemnation of these women. The first and the last verses, nevertheless, would 
disrupt the superficial moral pedagogy. In the first verse, the Poet shows his sympathy 
by calling these women “lamentables victimes.” The last verse also manages to dilute 
                                                 
32 “Go down, go down, lamentable victims. Go down to the road of eternal hell. Plunge into the deepest 
gulf, where all the crimes, flagellated by a wind that is not from heaven, roar chaotically with a stormy 
noise. . . . Far away from living people, wandering and condemned, run across deserts like wolves. 
Create your own destiny, disordered souls, and flee the infinity that you carry within you!” 
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the putative moralist doctrine by lending itself to ambiguity. In the other “Femmes 
damnées” poem, in which the Poet’s compassion for these women is unmistakable, 
lesbian women are also portrayed as “chercheuses d’infini” (“seekers of infinity”). 
Why, then, would the Poet here urge them to flee infinity? If the destiny of these 
women lies in an other world, why does he suggest that they abandon infinity since 
infinity appears to be the time marker of that other world (be it infinite curse or 
infinite felicity)? Wouldn’t the abandoning of infinity turn the heroines into historical 
beings bound by historical time (“peuples vivants”), whom the Poet also advises the 
heroines to shun? If it is true that these last verses were a last-minute addition, it does 
not seem unfair to argue that the Poet in effect is disguising his sympathy, hiding it 
beneath this ambiguity. After all, he is urging the heroines to flee and to create their 
own fate. Their fate, to be sure, is possible only in a world other than the human one.  
All three Lesbian Poems are placed in a mythical milieu: Lesbos is the mother 
of “des jeux latins et des voluptés grecques” (“Latin pleasures and Greek sensuality”; 
OC 1: 150); Sappho is “plus belle que Vénus” (“more beautiful than Venus”; OC 1: 
151); and other mythical figures such as Hippolyte, Bacchus, St. Antoine, and the 
satyrs are also important actors here.33 If, as argued earlier, the mistress and the 
prostitute articulate the confusing experience of modernity—that is, the concurrent 
encounter with eternity and transitoriness, creation and destruction, infinity and 
oblivion—the lesbian figure bespeaks a different sense of time. As shown above, the 
temporality in the three Lesbian Poems is a timelessness virtually punctuated by the 
Poet’s present. It is the Poet’s present, rather than the lesbian women’s existence, that 
serves as the vantage point for poetic imagination, historical cognition, and, above all, 
ethical engagement. This, however, is not to say that the Poet in the Lesbian Poems 
                                                 
33 See Claude Pichois’s notes  (OC 1: 1128) for possible sources for figures of Delphine and 
Hippolyte—especially the connection of the latter with the Amazons. 
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means to show the same kind of anachronism as in, for instance, the Prostitute Poems. 
Rather, registered in the Lesbian Poems is an artificially fabricated chronotope that is 
devised to escape the false eternity of this historical world; it is a new eternity 
rendered possible by the Poet’s writing of the hitherto unwritten, that is, lesbian eros. 
As the arbitrary conjunction-word “car” in “Lesbos” suggests, artificiality is the 
keyword here.  
Baudelaire has famously pronounced his detestation of naturalness (either in 
women or in art) while stressing the primacy of artificiality in his poetics: 
La femme est naturelle, c’est-à-dire abominable. (Mon cœur mis à nu, 
OC 1: 677; emphasis in the original)34
  
Tout ce qui est beau et noble est le résultat de la raison et du calcul. Le 
crime, dont l’animal humain a puisé le goût dans le ventre de sa mère, 
est originellement naturel. La vertu, au contraire, est artificielle, 
surnaturelle, puisqu’il a fallu, dans tous les temps et chez toutes les 
nations, des dieux et des prophètes pour l’enseigner à l’humanité 
animalisée, et que l’homme, seul, eût été impuissant à la découvrir. Le 
mal se fait sans effort, naturellement, par fatalité; le bien est toujours 
le produit d’un art. (“Peintre,” OC 2: 715; emphasis in the original)35
In this context, it would be easier to explain why the mistress figure very often 
signals an uncontainable alterity, one that the Poet feels impelled to manipulate for the 
sake of his creative power (see note 9). It is also in this context that the centrality of 
                                                 
34 “The female is natural, that is to say abominable.” 
35 “All that is fine and noble is the outcome of reason and calculation. Crime, for which the human 
animal started developing a taste since he was in his mother's womb, is originally natural. Virtue, on the 
contrary, is artificial and supernatural, since at all times and in all countries, we needed gods and 
prophets to teach animalized humankind what virtue is, and man alone had been incapable of 
discovering it. Evil is committed effortlessly, naturally, by fate; good is always the product of an art.” 
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the lesbian figure in relation to the Poet’s poetic enterprise can be better appreciated. 
In the next section, I will relate the primacy of artificiality in the Baudelairean system 
to other poetic practices of his Poet persona—such as poetic identification and the 
subject-object dynamic—and address the problem of why the Poet has sought to form 
an artificial community with lesbian women.  
 
III. Gender Trouble 
As mentioned above, many critics approach Baudelaire’s lesbian subject in 
light of gender ambiguity. Thaïs Morgan, following Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s classic 
model, contends that there are multiple identifications operating in the Lesbian Poems, 
and that by misrepresenting male-male desire through lesbian bodies, Baudelaire 
manages to retain a normative masculinity and a heterosexual model of gender 
identification: 
. . . Baudelaire’s ambiguation of genders in this lesbian couple 
[Delphine and Hippolyte]—each woman is both masculine and 
feminine—enables the male poet-reader to move rapidly back and forth 
between opposable subject-positions on the axes of both gender and 
sexual orientation. When he wishes to desire the Other as a heterosexual 
male, the writer-reader can identify with Delphine, the masculinized 
woman whose gaze and hand have clearly mastered the feminized 
object of desire, Hippolyta (sic). Or, when he wishes to be desired as the 
Other himself—that is, as Woman—the writer-reader can identify with 
Hippolyta. Alternatively, when the writer-reader desires the Same as a 
homosexual male, he occupies both the feminized lesbian and the 
masculinized lesbian positions simultaneously, without risking his 
gender identity—that is, his masculinity—because whenever he feels 
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threatened or excessively feminized (the Hippolyta position), he can flip 
back to identifying with the masculine member of the couple (the 
Delphine position). It is at this moment of double identification with 
both gender positions within the same-sex couple that the male writer-
reader becomes what I call a male lesbian. (46) 
Morgan wants to critique the male writer’s appropriation of the lesbian figure 
in order to maintain or reproduce masculinity. Morgan’s problem, however, lies in her 
own reproduction of the stereotypical gender roles of masculinity and femininity in 
both heterosexual and homosexual identifications. It is also debatable whether 
Morgan’s reading would not paralyze all male writers’ attempts to portray lesbian eros, 
since all these attempts could be easily relegated to nothing but a sinister 
masculinizing scheme.  
Another critic, Nicholas Kostis, links the aggressive image of Delphine to 
Baudelaire’s masochistic psyche, claiming that the play with female homosexuality 
disguises Baudelaire’s androgynous desire. According to Kostis, to solve inner 
conflicts occasioned by his sexual “abnormality,” Baudelaire (the author) draws on the 
“magic” of poetic images to assimilate different roles into his own subjectivity. Thus, 
sexual transpositions and the interchangeability of subject and object are essential to 
his creation of poetry. This is manifest in his fascination with images of aggressive 
women, androgynous eroticism, and masochistic pleasures.  
Kostis’s association of Baudelaire’s gender ambiguity with the latter’s 
propensity for conflated subject-object relationships insightfully points to the 
predominant object-images in Les Fleurs du mal, such as cats, bottles, hair, and ships. 
Kostis explains the ontological grounding of this poetic device: 
This foundation of Baudelaire’s technical innovation in poetry is the 
belief that there exists in nature an object which corresponds to every 
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subjective or psychological state: “Qu’est-ce que l’art pur suivant la 
conception moderne? C’est créer une magie suggestive contenant à la 
fois l’objet et le sujet, le monde extérieur à l’artiste et l’artiste lui-
même.”36 This linguistic and ontological confounding of subject with 
object is a poetic operation indispensable to the poet in expressing his 
deepest psychological structure. Only through a superimposition or 
interchangeability of subject-object can he hope to make the sexual 
and emotional transpositions necessary to assuage and defend his inner 
state. (52) 
Kostis’s argument pivots on the series of masochistic transferences that assist 
Baudelaire in ultimately achieving a harmonious poetic ideal. For example, in the two 
“Le Chat” poems, Kostis claims, it is through the action of an object, the cat, that the 
Poet finds a psychic bridge between his own subjectivity and that of the mistress. 
What is involved here includes the Poet’s absorption of the female being, transposition 
of the penis and the aggressive role to the woman, the Poet’s masochistic 
subjectification of his own being, as well as his “making place for the female psyche 
to enter and displace and unite with his own psyche” (54-55). Kostis further identifies 
two groups of poems in terms of their poetic achievement: in the “Spleen et Idéal” 
section the Poet’s masochistic suffering leads to the creation of beauty while in the 
“Fleurs du mal” section (where the Lesbian Poems and Prostitute Poems are located) 
masochism and sexual perversion eventually amount to the ruin of the poetic process. 
In the “Fleurs du mal” section, according to Kostis, “poetry is an agent of bondage, 
synonymous with the poet’s process of self-humiliation. The sexual bondage now 
                                                 
36 “What is pure art, according to the modern idea? It is to create a magic that contains the object and 
the subject at the same time, the external world outside of the artist and the artist himself” (“L’Art 
Philosophique,” OC 2: 598). 
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becomes the poetic bondage as poetry ceases to offer an escape from masochistic 
love” (67).  
Kostis is right about the epistemological centrality of object-images in Les 
Fleurs du mal.37 He is also right in pointing out the ontological underpinnings of the 
Poet’s artistic manifestations. Yet Kostis’s reading of the Lesbian Poems, which 
proceeds in the same fashion as his reading of other poems, falls short of explaining 
certain isolated characteristics of the Lesbian Poems—this hermeneutic flaw will be 
clearer in the discussion that follows. 
One central poetic idea/ideal of Baudelaire’s is “les transports de l’esprit et des 
sens” (“transpositions of spirit and senses”; “Correspondances,” OC 1: 11).38 
Perfumes would emit a fragrance as sweet as the baby’s flesh or as the sound of the 
oboe—all scents, all colors, and all sounds would correspond to one another. It is 
noteworthy that such a state of “correspondance” rarely takes place in the Poet’s direct 
encounter with women; correspondence only transpires when there are other objects 
involved—objects other than the female figure. Furthermore, after a series of sensuous 
transpositions, this correspondence very often leads to nothing other than the Poet’s 
self-reflexivity:  
Quand mes yeux, vers ce chat que j’aime 
Tirés comme par un aimant, 
Se retournent docilement 
Et que je regarde en moi-même, 
 
                                                 
37 It is, however, debatable as to whether the subject-object transpositions in famous poems like 
“Parfum exotique,” “Le Chevelure,” and “Le Beau Navire” work precisely in the same way as the two 
“Chat” poems. For, in the former three poems, women function as the initiative point of the Poet’s 
sexual and poetic fantasizing and eventually lead the Poet to the world of objects—this is also the main 
argument of critic Leo Bersani. In “Le Chat” poems, on the other hand, it is the external object, the cat, 
that enables the poet to relate with his lover. 
38 See Paul de Man’s famous reading of the poem “Correspondances.”  
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Je vois avec étonnement 
Le feu de ses prunelles pâles, 
Clairs fanaux, vivantes opales, 
Qui me contemplent fixement. (“Le Chat,” OC 1: 51)39
Critic Michel Deguy describes this unique poetics of Baudelaire’s as a 
“theology of the thing” (190). By this Deguy means the extension of possibilities 
rendered palpable by the use of metaphors: “The poetic transaction offered through a 
comparison—or rapprochement—in the general form of A or B holds in reserve a 
possibility offered (and refusable) to future recognition (in other circumstances 
wherein the relation in question recurs). Thus the poem itself is an ‘expansion of 
infinite things’; a place where things not finite may be extended, expanded . . . or an 
extension of possibility upon the world” (189; emphasis in the original). For Deguy, 
the ultimate poetic experience is to provide possibilities by way of sensory, emotional, 
psychological, and cognitive transpositions. 
To be certain, Deguy’s critical paradigm works for the majority of the 
“female” poems in Les Fleurs du mal. The predominant form of figurative language in 
the Mistress cluster is indeed the metaphor, especially an extended metaphor that runs 
through the entire poem as the central image: for instance, the famous oceanic imagery 
in “Le Beau Navire,” “L’Invitation au Voyage,” “Parfum exotique,” and “Le 
Chevelure”; the closed-box imagery (coffin, flask, boudoir) in “Le Falcon,” 
“Correspondances,” and “Spleen”; the animal imagery in “Le Serpent qui danse” and 
“Le Chat”; and, above all, the satanic imagery of women throughout the cluster. One 
may even venture to say that the originality of these extended metaphors well attests to 
the popularity of these poems in Baudelaire scholarship. 
                                                 
39 “When my eyes, as if drawn by a magnet, are drawn to the cat that I love and that I see in myself, and 
then return docilely, I see with amazement the fire of the pale pupils, bright torches, and living opals 
which gaze at me firmly.”  
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Metaphors in the Mistress and Prostitute clusters, all in all, demonstrate “les 
transports de l’esprit et des sens”—be it heavenly fantasizing or nightmarish 
encounters with the wrong muse—and henceforth also a subject-object confluence. 
That is, the extended process of imagining or image-making oftentimes would 
mobilize the interpenetration of the subject and the object. Thus, the Poet’s enjoyment 
of the state of “correspondance” has to be facilitated by his mistress (who can function 
both as object and as subject), and his fantasized adventures happen only after his 
subjectivity is taken over by the mistress—in other words, he objectifies himself in 
order to enjoy the sensory pleasures as a subject. Or, the Poet sees himself in the cat, 
which, as Kostis has pointed out, serves as a medium for the fulfillment of the Poet’s 
fantasizing.  
In the Lesbian Poems, however, it is simile (in the mechanical formula of “A is 
like B”) that abounds. Unlike the metaphor, which suggests an organic correspondence 
between the sign and the image-product, the simile generally comes across as an 
artificial construct in which the relationship between the two terms depends heavily on 
the preposition “like.” Moreover, as shown in the previous section, the similes in the 
Lesbian Poems—which only exist on a local scale and rarely go beyond the length of a 
stanza—are so numerous that the Poet seems unable to read the lesbian heroines 
without constantly changing the lens through which he observes these women. What 
strikes home here is the absolute otherness of these lesbian figures to the Poet—so 
radically other that the Poet cannot even manipulate the femaleness of the lesbians as 
he does that of the mistress figure and the prostitute figure. Moreover, if “les 
transports de l’esprit et des sens” stands as the central aesthetics or epistemology in 
the Mistress Poems, the Lesbian Poems specifically name not only the impossibility 
but also the immorality of conflating different sensuous and cognitive experiences: 
Celui qui veut unir dans un accord mystique 
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L’ombre avec la chaleur, la nuit avec le jour, 
Ne chauffera jamais son corps paralytique 
À ce rouge soleil que l’on nomme l’amour! (“Delphine et Hippolyte,” 
OC 1: 154)40
Once again, the Lesbian Poems reveal a distinctive poetics to the extent that they 
appear to contradict Baudelaire’s central idea of “correspondance.” Yet, given the 
distressing nature of the Poet’s poetic/epistemological experience with heterosexual 
women, the Lesbian Poems may very well be the only chance for him to avoid the 
misrecognition or misrepresentation of his poetic inspiration in the mistress and the 
prostitute. 
 
IV. The Unavowable Community 
How different, then, is the subject-object dynamic in the Lesbian Poems from 
that in other clusters? 
Tackling the lesbian subject in Baudelaire, one cannot ignore a poem that the 
young poet wrote addressing the-then established poet Sainte-Beuve. This poem, not 
included in Les Fleurs du mal, suggestively invites a reading in terms of double 
homoeroticism. First of all, the young Poet in the poem unmistakably articulates a 
homoerotic-sounding identification with the veteran poet: 
Poète, est-ce une injure ou bien un compliment? 
Car je suit vis-à-vis de vous comme un amant 
En face du fantôme, au geste plein d’amorces, 
Dont la main et dont l’œil ont pour pomper les forces 
Des charmes inconnus. –Tous les êtres aimés 
                                                 
40 “He who wants to unite shadow and heat, night and day, in a mystical accord, shall never warm his 
paralyzed body under that sun which we call love.” 
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Sont des vases de fiel qu’on boit les yeux fermés (OC 1: 208)41
This is the closing stanza of the poem. While homoeroticism is ostensibly 
present, many details in effect emerge to unsettle the homoerotic elements. For 
example, the young Poet’s love object is likened to a phantom image, and the young 
Poet’s amorous journey is taken in an unknown realm (“charmes inconnus”). 
Furthermore, the Poet suggests that all the loved ones are bitter “vases of gall” that he 
drinks with his eyes closed. All these clues point to an intricate play between sameness 
and difference, between identification and non-identification—or, more precisely, 
between the possibility and impossibility of identification. The final image of “eyes 
closed” will further disturb the predominant mirror image in the earlier stanzas of the 
poem, where the Poet compares his fate as an aspiring writer to the fate of lesbian girls: 
—Et puis venaient les soirs malsains, les nuits fiévreuses, 
Qui rendent de leur corps les filles amoureuses, 
Et les font aux miroirs—stérile volupté— 
Contempler les fruits mûrs de leur nubilité— 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
—J’ai partout feuilleté le mystère profond 
De ce livre si cher aux âmes engourdies 
Que leur destin marqua des mêmes maladies, 
Et devant le miroir j’ai perfectionné 
L’art cruel qu’un Démon en naissant m’a donné, 
—De la Douleur pour faire une volupté vraie, — 
D’ensanglanter son mal et de gratter sa plaie. (OC 1:207-208; 
emphasis mine)42
                                                 
41 “Poet—is it an insult or rather a compliment? For, with regard to you, I am like a lover facing a ghost, 
with a gesture full of baits, and whose hands and eyes are to pump forces out of unknown spells. –All 
the loved ones are vases of gall that we drink with eyes closed.” 
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The young Poet in his throes of writing dwells on homosexual girls in their 
affliction of love. The Poet calls the book that is so dear to numbed souls a “livre 
voluptueux” (“voluptuous book”). His ambition to write, thus, is marked by a 
sensuous and sensual desire—also something shared by lesbians, just as diseases are. 
The repetition of the word “volupté” emphatically suggests his identification with 
these women. So does the recurrence of the mirror image—his mirror in comparison 
with their mirrors. 
The mirror image in this poem reveals a complex matrix of identifications. The 
singular mirror in the Poet’s chamber may well suggest a narcissistic self-love, yet this 
very mirror’s status as an echo of the lesbian mirrors also points to an outward 
identification, thus to something other than narcissism. As critic Dominique D. Fisher 
suggests, “Repetition and difference undo the narcissistic paradigm in a theater of 
writing where sameness, by means of a series of mirror images, is constantly asserted 
and diverted” (51). It is noteworthy that the Poet usually refers to lesbians in the plural 
form—while the mirror in his poetic world is singular, the lesbians’ mirrors always 
come in the plural form. Based on this nuance, one may have to think twice before 
concluding that there is an element of male lesbianism in the Poet. My argument is 
that, if there is any identification here, the Baudelairean Poet desires not so much to 
become a disguised lesbian figure as to watch what lesbians experience while he 
remains an other himself. What the Poet identifies with in the lesbians is the same 
otherness—an otherness that can be shared insofar as they both occupy a marginalized 
position punctuated by sickening nights, voluptuousness, disease, and pain. Thus, the 
                                                                                                                                            
42 “—And then came those sickening evenings and feverish nights, which make girls fall in love with 
their bodies and make them contemplate, in mirrors—sterile voluptuousness—the mature fruits of their 
nobility. . . . I browsed through the profound mystery of this book so dear to numbed souls that their 
destiny marked the same diseases. And in front of the mirror I improved the cruel art that a Demon 
gave me upon my birth—the art of pain, so as to make a true voluptuousness, and the art of staining his 
illness with blood and of scratching his wound.” 
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stereotypical images of lesbian women in “Delphine et Hippolyte” should not be read 
as the Poet’s sinister maneuver of gender identifications, as many critics have 
suggested, but as the Poet’s precocious attempt to represent an unknown realm of 
knowledge, that is, lesbian eros. His true identity remains that of the Poet at the end of 
the poem, calling out to these heroines and hiding his compassion underneath moral 
fuzziness.  
In comparison, the mirror image in the allegorized “Beauté,” where the eyes of 
Beauty are described as the purest mirrors that young poets look up to in vain for 
poetic inspiration, is but a hollow void that neither reflects nor generates anything.  
Nevertheless, if one only looks at the poem to Sainte-Beuve, one may easily jump to 
the conclusion that the Poet, after all, is manipulating the lesbian eros in order to shape 
his own writing subjectivity. For, despite his identification with these homosexual 
women, he claims that their voluptuousness is “stérile” while his is “vraie” (“true”). A 
gender-studies approach, then, seems to suffice here. Yet, if one compares this poem 
with the Lesbian Poems in Les Fleurs du mal, a more nuanced reading is in order. 
The passage on identification with lesbians in the poem to Sainte-Beuve will find a 
variation, a repetition with difference, in “Lesbos”: 
Lesbos, terre des nuits chaudes et langoureuses, 
Qui font qu’à leurs miroirs, stérile volupté! 
Les filles aux yeux creux, de leurs corps amoureuses, 
Caressent les fruits mûrs de leur nubilité; 
Lesbos, terre des nuits chaudes et langoureuses (OC 1: 150)43
                                                 
43 “Lesbos, land of hot and languid nights, which make, in their mirrors, sterile voluptuousness! Girls 
with empty eyes, in love with their bodies, caress the mature fruits of their nubility.” 
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Although its diction is similar, “Lesbos” differs from the poem to Sainte-
Beuve in many ways. First of all, in the poem to Sainte-Beuve, “stérile volupté” is 
closely associated with the fruits of lesbian nubility: 
—Et puis venaient les soirs malsains, les nuits fiévreuses, 
Qui rendent de leur corps les filles amoureuses, 
Et les font aux miroirs—stérile volupté— 
Contempler les fruits mûrs de leur nubilité— 
In “Lesbos,” however, the reference of “stérile volupté” is less definite. For the 
reference of “leurs miroirs” is uncertain since “leurs” can refer to either the lesbian 
girls or the “nuits chaudes et langoureuses” (“hot and languid nights”). If the latter, 
“stérile volupté” can be merely the result of the languid land and henceforth is not to 
be so directly associated to the lesbian women. The Poet in “Lesbos” is not forcefully 
dismissing lesbian eros as sterile or wishing to fulfill his own literary desire through 
representations of lesbianism, as he seems to be doing in the poem to Sainte-Beuve.  
Furthermore, in the poem to Sainte-Beuve, girls are made to love their bodies 
and to contemplate the “fruits of their nobility” in mirrors. In “Lesbos,” however, they 
are in love with their own bodies and caress the fruits of their nubility. Girls in the 
latter poem come across as more active agents of their action while in the poem to 
Sainte-Beuve they are more like objects in the Poet’s desire for a poetic vocation. 
The Lesbian Poems in Les Fleurs du mal, to be sure, are closely related to the Poet’s 
poetic vision, but this vision does not work through a manipulation of lesbian eros as 
the poem to Sainte-Beuve so voluptuously suggests. The Poet in the Lesbian Poems 
claims that he has been chosen by the lesbian isle to “chanter le secret de ses vierges 
en fleurs” (“sing the secret of these flowering virgins”), and that his soul has been 
following these girls through their infernal world since childhood. In the narrative 
setting of these poems, however, no verbal exchange, eye contact, or other physical 
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communion is to be found between the spokesman for the lesbian land and the 
condemned women; the only form of connection between them is established by the 
Poet’s own enunciation. One can even argue that the Poet’s poetic vocation takes off 
at that very moment of self-enunciation—a moment of self-introduction translated into 
identification with an absolute Other qua the homosexual woman. There may well be 
a palpable act of silencing women in the Mistress Poems, as many critics have acutely 
pointed out; yet in the Lesbian Poems, the impossibility of communion/ 
communication predominates. The Poet’s recognition of his poetic vision is revealed 
and materialized in a recognition of his otherness in the otherness of lesbian women.  
What philosopher Maurice Blanchot terms “communauté inavouable” 
‘unavowable community’ can serve as a literal rendition of the rapport between 
Baudelaire’s Poet persona and the lesbian subjects: 
[The community] includes the exteriority of being that excludes it—an 
exteriority that thought does not master, even by giving it various 
names: death, the relation to the other, or speech when the latter is not 
folded up in ways of speaking and hence does not permit any relation 
(of identity or alterity) with itself. Inasmuch as the community on 
behalf of everyone rules (for me and for itself) over a beside-oneself 
(its absence) that is its fate, it gives rise to an unshared though 
necessarily multiple speech in a way that does not let it develop itself in 
words: always already lost, it has to use, creates no work and does not 
glorify itself in that loss. Thus the gift of speech, a gift of “pure” loss 
that cannot make sure of ever being received by the other, even though 
the other is the only one to make possible, if not speech, then at least 
the supplication to speak which carries with it the risk of being rejected 
or lost or not received. Hence the foreboding that the community, in its 
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very failure, is linked to a certain kind of writing, a writing that has 
nothing else to search for than the last words: “Come, come, you for 
whom the injunction, the prayer, the expectation is not appropriate.” 
(Unavowable 12) 
Where the lesbian’s existence does not fit in “the injunction, the prayer, and 
the expectation” of society, ordinary speech—a carrier of identity and difference, 
hence also a medium of moral pedagogy—can turn violent. Consequently, 
speechlessness (or, in Blanthot’s words, “multiple speech” that does not reveal in 
words) may emerge both as a trace of the past trauma and as a potentiality for a 
different community—a community that can “accommodate” the experience with the 
impossible, a community whose possibility, literally, is mediated by way of writing.  
While Blanchot’s model falls short of a historical dimension, the fact that 
Baudelaire articulates lesbian eros at a time when both writing and the 
epistemologization of modernity have become mutually generative ideological praxes 
suggests the ethical potential of writing—which I define here as the attentiveness to 
the impossible experience figured in the unattainability of communion and 
communication. As the pedagogical version of modernity is primarily registered by a 
power play of the subject vis-à-vis the object, the imperative of writing for/towards the 
other evinced in Baudelaire’s Lesbian Poems points to a distinctively different subject-
object scenario. The mature Baudelaire may be remembered mostly for his 
manipulation of female objects and the gendered staging of his poetic settings. The 
young poet, nevertheless, does attempt to establish his poetic enterprise upon an 
ethical call prompted by the other-ed lesbian.  
Most importantly, Baudelaire’s displacement of the idiom of difference in the 
formative stage of high modernity poses a timely irony on the pedagogy of modernity. 
 
 
    
CHAPTER THREE 
Obscenity of Immediacy: 
The Allegorical Impulse and the De-fetishization of Difference in  
Salman Rushdie1
 
Essentially, I have been arguing that the very possibility of 
imagining the nation only arose historically when, and where, 
three fundamental cultural conceptions, all of great antiquity, 
lost their axiomatic grip on men’s minds. The first of these was 
the idea that a particular scrip-language offered privileged 
access to ontological truth . . . . Second was the belief that 
society was naturally organized around and under high 
centres—monarchs who were persons apart from other human 
beings and who ruled by some form of cosmological (divine 
dispensation. . . . Third was a conception of temporality in 
which cosmology and history were indistinguishable . . . . 
  --Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities 
 
In this chapter, I will contest the primacy of the idiom of difference in 
postcoloniality by looking at two major aspects of Salman Rushdie’s novels: the 
relevance of allegory in postcolonial writing and thinking on the one hand, and the 
prevalence of imagist sameness in his writing on the other hand. As the first
                                                 
1 Of Rushdie’s primary works referred to hereafter in page references, Midnight’s Children (1981; 
New York: Penguin, 1991) will be cited as MC; Shame (1983; New York: Vintage-Random, 1984) as S; 
The Satanic Verses (1988; New York: Viking-Penguin, 1989) as SV; and Imaginary Homelands: Essays 
and Criticism 1981-1991 (London: Granta-Penguin, 1991) as IH.  
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postcolonial writer I discuss in my study, Rushdie’s writing serves as an exemplary 
case in my ontological examination of postcoloniality.  
 
Allegory demands a reappraisal at the historical juncture called the 
postcolonial not really because this age-old literary mode has been accorded a 
privileged position in postcolonial literary studies—by which I am referring primarily 
to the debates occasioned by Fredric Jameson’s famous claim about national allegory 
(“the story of the private individual destiny is always an allegory of the embattled 
situation of the public third-world culture and society” [“Third-World” 69; emphasis 
in the original]),2 and the primacy of allegory promoted by some critics as the most 
legitimate mode of imaging the postcolonial experience.3 Rather, I argue that 
postcolonial allegory, as evinced in Rushdie’s novels, can emerge as a double-edged 
mode of historical cognition: naming postcoloniality on the one hand and posing a 
critique of postcoloniality on the other hand. 
Typical allegorical interpretations tend to read Rushdie’s writings as the 
embodiment of postcoloniality’s fate. Often prompted by the novelist’s textual 
manipulation (the most infamous one being his portrayal of a protagonist whose life 
ostensibly appears to be an allegory of the nation’s life), these readings prematurely 
presume the failure of postcolonial nationhood to be the doom of postcoloniality in 
general. I propose, however, to focus on the allegorical impulse manifest in Rushdie’s 
fictional characters and to consider the duality of allegory at work in his novels. As I 
will demonstrate in these pages, Rushdie’s allegorical rendition of history bespeaks 
the overdetermination of the postcolonial—that is, a condition wherein the 
                                                 
2 See Jameson’s 1986 essay “Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Nationalism.” 
More notes will follow in the next section. 
3 See, for example, Stephen Slemon’s consistent valorization of allegory (“Revisioning”; 
“Monuments”; and “Post-Colonial”). I will comment on him in a moment. 
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postcolonial subject has to stumble through proliferated national, cultural, and 
linguistic metaphors, with the putative “national allegory” being the ultimate 
articulation of such metaphoricity. On the other hand, Rushdie eventually will undo 
the demands of national allegory into a rhetoric of hope—not by taking a detour 
around all the metaphors that constitute the cultural pedagogy nor by positing an 
antagonistic stance, but by cutting through the proliferated cultural determinants. 
I find Benjamin’s conception of allegory highly relevant here because, for 
Benjamin, allegory too articulates a double inscription: it emerges as the symptom of 
modernity on the one hand and as a critique of modernity on the other hand. In 
addition, Benjamin’s imagist reading of history, which he pits against the 
epistemically violent historicism, resonates with the overflow of images in Rushdie’s 
novelistic narratives. Furthermore, the way in which Benjamin reads epistemo-
ontological implications out of the texture of allegory provides a model as to how to 
epistemologize and ontologize literary texts. In my study, I concentrate on the 
relationship between the materiality of writing and the historical impulse named by 
this materiality. In Rushdie’s case, the accumulation and repetition of similar images 
in the narrative, I maintain, indicate the symptom of the overdetermined 
postcoloniality. As Benjamin has not been widely applied in postcolonial studies,4 I 
place him and Rushdie in a virtual dialogue to see how their allegorical modes inform 
each other. The point of employing the popular Benjamin is not so much to transplant 
a useful analytical tool as to lay bare the epistemological convergence and divergence 
between postcoloniality and modernity. I argue that while the critical thrust of 
Benjamin’s notion of modern allegory lies partly in the time gap between the modern 
                                                 
4 Timothy Brennan mentions Benjamin in passing in his Salman Rushdie and the Third World: 
Myths of the Nation, arguably the first book-length study of Rushdie in the English-speaking world. 
Todd Kuchta, in a critical essay, (mis)uses Benjamin when discussing Midnight’s Children—on which I 
will comment later.  
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and the classical, the condition of possibility for Rushdie’s allegory is the absence of 
such a time gap. To repeat Spivak once again, postcoloniality is a structure which one 
critiques and yet at the same time inhabits intimately (“Foundations” 158). Rushdie’s 
profane illumination, in the same token,, proceeds alongside an obscene immediacy. 
In what follows, I will first address the stakes of allegorizing postcoloniality in 
a straightforward fashion. Then I will reevaluate Benjamin’s theory of allegory, 
foregrounding the exigency of an allegorical perception of history that he has 
insightfully brought into light. Finally, in my close reading of Rushdie, I will examine 
the proliferation of allegorical manifestations in Midnight’s Children and the motif of 
sameness in The Satanic Verses. I will argue that the allegorical impulse in Rushdie’s 
characters (the urge to decode cultural master codes in accordance with pre-given 
pedagogy) indicates the impossibility of a break from historical overdetermination. 
Yet it is also in the process of decoding, misreading, and over-reading, that the 
interpretative authority of the master codes is diluted and defused, to the point that 
eventually the proliferation of coding/decoding turns into senselessness and 
senselessness into a break from the cultural pedagogy and its paraphernalia. 
 
I. The Double Vision of Allegory and the Doubled History of Postcoloniality 
The period when postcolonial studies is emerging as a definitive academic 
practice happens to witness the naturalization of the conjunction between allegory and 
postcolonial literary imagination. The Canadian scholar Stephen Slemon, among 
others, wrote a series of essays in late 1980s elaborating on the privileged position of 
allegory for postcolonial writers (in fact, he prefers to use the hyphenated “post-
colonial”). His main contention is predicated upon the openness to appropriation of 
allegory. A notable mode of myth-building in colonial discourse (Slemon’s favorite 
example is the naming ritual in the prehistory of the Americas, when Columbus named 
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the first “discovered” New World islands based on the Christian canon and Spanish 
royal heritage), allegory in the hands of postcolonial writers automatically transforms 
into not only an ideal mode of storytelling but also a figure for postcolonial writing in 
general.  
This dual session of postcolonial allegory derives from a set of premises. First 
of all, postcolonial writing is rendered possible by the existence of a pre-text. Slemon 
argues that a considerable number of postcolonial texts depend on the “prefigurative 
discourse of colonialism” for their mobilization. Allegory, in this regard, emerges as a 
cultural site “upon which certain forms of post-colonial writing engage head-on with 
the interpellative and tropological strategies of colonialism’s most visible figurative 
technology” (“Monuments” 11). Another key premise Slemon holds is the political 
necessity of viewing postcoloniality as textuality. Allegory’s peculiar way of reading a 
narrative is described by Slemon as follows: “the allegorical levels of meaning that 
open into history are bracketed off by a literal level of fiction interpolated between the 
historical events and the reader so as to displace the matter of history into a secondary 
level of the text accessible only through the mediation of the primary fictional level” 
(“Post-colonial” 160; an almost identical passage also appears in “Monuments” 12). 
Slemon’s argument is that the allegorical mode of representation exposes the 
fictionality of historical discourse; thus, in allegory, “it is fiction that determines the 
way we read history, history that is contingent upon fiction, and not the other way 
around” (“Post-colonial” 164-65). 
There are some fuzzy moments in Slemon’s argumentation, including his 
essentializing “the literary” as “the literal,” his collapsing “the literal’ and “the 
fictional,” as well as his assuming simultaneously allegory’s natural affinity with 
imperialist thinking and with postcolonial emancipatory imagination. It is not my 
primary intent to elaborate on these problems here (which can be summed up as too 
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much essentialization). Yet to preview one key issue in the following sections, I would 
like to call attention to one particular point that Slemon puts forward, that is, the way 
in which allegory emerges as an affirmative trope for postcolonial writing in general. 
Slemon makes this point by arguing for a hierarchy of temporality: first, allegory is 
constituted by a time gap; secondly, the postcolonial present surpasses the colonial 
past by all accounts. His viewpoint will be echoed by many other postcolonial-theory 
practitioners, especially critics from former settler colonies. The groundbreaking work 
in postcolonial studies, The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-colonial 
Literatures, for instance, emphatically foregrounds “appropriation” as the primary 
mode of postcolonial writing, which, to a great extent, resembles the double vision 
that informs the commonplace sense of allegory. 
 Jameson’s “Third-World Literature” essay, to be sure, also resorts to the 
common-sensical conception of allegory when he claims that third-world writing 
“necessarily project[s] a political dimension in the form of national allegory” (69). 
While his essay has provoked enough debates,5 what has not been heeded is that all 
these debates exemplify, among other things, the ongoing tug-of-war between the 
                                                 
5 The most frequently cited critique of this essay is by Aijaz Ahmad, who reprimands Jameson’s 
indiscriminate appropriation of the “three worlds” theory. Trying to make Marxist sensibility vibrantly 
valid in contemporary cultural critique, Ahmad turns to the model of capital/labor struggle in 
configuring the world and argues that “we live not in three worlds but in one” (“Jameson’s” 9). Other 
major problems that Ahmad identifies in Jameson’s reasoning include the latter’s construction of a 
binary opposition between a capitalist first world and a pre- or non-capitalist third world; the 
private/public separation as an exclusively capitalist characteristic; national experience of colonialism 
and imperialism as the single determining characteristic of the third world; and the conflation of 
“nation” with “culture,” “society,” and “collectivity.” For more comments on Jameson, also see Jean 
Franco, who draws on examples from Latin American literature to illustrate the inadequacy of 
Jameson’s generalization. Slemon himself, on the other hand, is rather ambivalent about Jameson’s 
essay. On the one hand, he demands “a realignment of the modality of critical access away from the 
determining structure of the first-world/third-world binary into the problematics of what might more 
accurately be called the conditions of post-coloniality” (“Monuments” 9-10). On the other hand, 
Slemon converges with Jameson on seeing postcolonial or third-world allegory as being conditioned by 
a division between the private and the public realms (13). In a different vein, Imre Szeman espouses 
Jameson’s claim by placing “national allegory” within a contextual relationship with other theses that 
Jameson has put forward, such as the relevance of form. Szeman subscribes to Jameson’s generalization 
and contends that there is a political dimension to third-world texts “that is now (and has perhaps long 
been) absent in their first world counterparts” (807).  
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primacy of generalities and that of particulars in postcolonial discourse, the stakes of 
which I have tried to address in Chapter One.  
 Another thing that has not invited enough attention is the way in which 
Jameson touches upon the overdetermined relationship between literary production 
and this particular historical moment called “the third world.” Imre Szeman suggests 
reading Jameson’s notion of national allegory vis-à-vis the concept of 
metacommentary that Jameson has developed earlier in his career: “Every individual 
interpretation must include an interpretation of its own existence, must show its own 
credentials and justify itself: every commentary must be at the same time a 
metacommentary” (qtd. in Szeman 823).6 Jameson’s “metacommentary” resonates 
remotely with the notion of “complicity” often identified in Rushdie’s writing, which I 
will get to in a moment. Suffice it to say now that, even though “metacommentary” 
seems to resemble the Rushdian allegory I set out to foreground, there is a register of 
transparency in “metacommentary” in its presumption of an active production of self-
interpretation. Rushdie’s allegory, in contrast, finds potential redemption by cutting 
through muddy paths and, very often, by accident.  
  
II. The Politics of Allegorizing Rushdie 
Rushdie himself once remarked on the ethico-political valence of form in his 
novels: “The story of Saleem [the narrator-protagonist of Midnight’s Children] does 
indeed lead him to despair. But the story is told in a manner designed to echo, as 
closely as my abilities allowed, the Indian talent for non-stop self-generation. This is 
why the narrative constantly throws up new stories, why it ‘teems.’ The form—
multitudinous, hinting at the infinite possibilities of the country—is the optimistic 
counterweight to Saleem’s personal tragedy” (IH 16; emphasis mine). While the 
                                                 
6 The original text is “Metacommentary,” PMLA 86 (1971): 9-17; the quotation is from p. 10. 
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author’s self-interpretation always needs to be taken with a grain of salt, Rushdie is 
not the only person mindful of the overdetermination of form in his writing. Many 
Rushdie critics have shown ambivalence towards the necessity evil of form. Here I 
will focus on two major critics, examining their conceptualization of the complicity 
between Rushdie’s form and the problematic aspects of postcoloniality. As their 
readings of postcolonial literature, like Slemon’s and Jameson’s, also pivot on the 
commonplace sense of allegory, my analysis is meant to zoom in on the stakes of 
binding postcolonial writing with allegory.7
 It seems that, for Timothy Brennan, the political orientation of the author ought 
to be reflected in the form of his/her creation, and the destiny of the work is 
predetermined by the author’s ideological choice. The “failure” of Rushdie’s first 
published novel, Grimus, according to Brennan, lies in the novel’s lack of a 
“habitus”—in this case, a political community such as nation: “It would be hard to 
find a novel that demonstrated better the truth of Fanon’s claim that a culture that is 
not national is meaningless” (70). Or, when comparing Rushdie’s novels about India 
and his journalist prose work on Nicaragua (The Jaguar Smile), Brennan contends that 
Nicaragua, “by virtue of what it represents politically,” lacks the condition to be the 
subject of a novel. That is, in war-battered places like Nicaragua, the distinction 
between “truth” and “untruth” is not so much an issue of debate as a conspicuous fact. 
In contrast, India can be perfectly represented in the novelistic form not only because 
“India itself evokes a distinct national essence,” but also because the problematic 
politics of Pakistan and India seems to “beg[] for the novel form as if to help 
problematise them at an existential level (64). Or, “the nexus of fiction and 
                                                 
7 Aside from Timothy Brennan and Sara Suleri, on whom I will elaborate here, also see Jean M. 
Kane, who links the failure of Midnight’s Children’s political efficacy to the failure of its form; and 
Nasser Hussain, who addresses the author’s “complicity” in relation to the cultural process of “shame.” 
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nationalism in this period occurs within the borders of the nation-state—that is, in the 
apparatuses of ideological control” (97). Inspired by the ensemble of Mikhail Bakhtin, 
Regis Debray, and Benedict Anderson, who all address the ontological significance of 
the modern nation, Brennan sees the postcolonial world as another time of 
disintegration in history and foregrounds the formalistic correspondence between 
novelistic heteroglossia and the presumably heterogeneous postcolonial national 
community.8 Yet at the same time, Brennan also contends that, while the modern 
novel once served as a liberating tool as it sought to incorporate voices of the lower 
class into literary imagination, the post-war novel in the third world has turned into a 
privilege for the elite alone. 
 More precisely, the linkage point between the possibility of postcolonial 
nationalism and the possibility of fiction, for Brennan, is class-specific. Seeing 
Midnight’s Children as a metafiction about the production of the third-world literature, 
Brennan detects in the protagonist’s narrative a built-in corruption on the part of the 
postcolonial (“neo-colonial” in Brennan’s wording) national elite. Brennan intends to 
show that not only is the failure of the newly independent nation the responsibility of 
the domestic elite, the failure of this class is best illustrated through nothing other than 
the writer figure:  
In exploring his own culpability for the events of the novel, Saleem 
determines responsibility not only by his acquiescence . . ., or by his 
                                                 
8 Bakhtin’s overarching proposition in The Dialogic Imagination stipulates that the rise of 
novelistic discourse corresponds to the historical fact that “the world becomes polyglot” (qtd. in 
Brennan 9). Debray, in “Marxism and the National Question” in particular, stresses the “natural” and 
“sacred” quality that constitutes the nation: “[The form of the nation-state] is created from a natural 
organization proper to homo sapiens, one through which life itself is rendered untouchable or sacred. 
This sacred character constitutes the real national question” (qtd. in Brennan 10; emphasis in the 
original). Anderson’s much cited work, Imagined Communities, echoes the former two theorists in 
evoking the nation’s ontological functions, such as the nation’s takeover of the role of religion in 
dealing with death, continuity, and the desire for origins. For recent inquiry into the ontological 
underpinnings of the modern nation-state in relation to the postcolonial experience, see Pheng Cheah 
(Spectral; “Living On”) 
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sharing of the desires and human failings of the more visible culprits, 
but specifically as a writer—a creator of communicative fictions. Guilt 
is centred in, and emanates from, the writer himself, extending to all his 
creations. This conforms to the book’s central trope in which Saleem 
contains India’s multitudes within him. Authorial ambiguity translates 
into bi-polar morality in which every group has a good and a bad 
expression. (89)  
For Brennan, thus, the postcolonial national consciousness, to a great extent, is 
grounded in the elite’s capacity of fiction-building—here, “fiction” denotes any type 
of discursive practice (the construction of national history included) as well as the 
novelistic form. Brennan arrives at the conclusion that the most fatal and unfortunate 
mistake of Saleem’s narrative is that “he proliferates metaphor and master illusion 
(‘dreams’)” (98; emphasis in the original). The “Indian talent for non-stop self-
generation” that Rushdie himself champions ends up becoming a “paradigm of the 
state lie” entertained by Saleem. 
 One major problem in Brennan’s reasoning falls upon his mixture of different 
levels of discourses in the framework of the novel. On the one hand, he acknowledges 
Rushdie’s intention in denying the reader an “organic” narrative that “progresses 
uninterrupted, and that creates a completely imagined world” (85). On the other hand, 
however, Brennan translates the inadequacy of the fictional character’s configuration 
of history into the inadequacy of postcolonial writing, and further into the essentially 
inadequate position of the migrant author.  
 For Brennan, in other words, Rushdie’s fiction allegorizes the predicament of 
postcoloniality—on this point, his argumentation is echoed by many other critics.9 A 
foremost assumption of these critics is that a configuration of postcoloniality is made 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Jane M. Kane; Nasser Hussain; and Sara Suleri. 
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possible insofar as the latter is considered in intense figurative terms. While this 
theoretical move is not entirely mistaken, these critiques tend to be paralyzed when 
they show an obsession with biographical readings at the expense of the “formal” 
question, that is, the ethico-political implication of writing/reading postcoloniality 
figuratively. In other words, the figurative or allegorical linings of Rushdie’s writing, 
in these critics’ understanding, are often undermined because of the wrong realism 
located in the author’s life. 
Sara Suleri, to a great extent, shares Brennan’s figurative reading of Rushdie’s 
writing. The chapter on Rushdie in her book The Rhetoric of English India suggests 
that not only should postcoloniality be conceptualized figuratively, the very figure for 
postcoloniality’s figurativeness is fictional writing per se.  
 Suleri’s configuration of postcoloniality presumes the impossibility of 
postcolonial writing, of which she thinks Rushdie’s novels are exemplary—
“impossibility” indicates not so much the nonexistence of postcolonial writing as the 
dilemmatic condition facing the postcolonial writer. Rushdie’s 1983 novel Shame 
makes an illustrative case in this regard for Suleri. Taking up as its subject matter the 
political turmoil in post-Independence Pakistan, Shame centers around the nation’s 
one-time powerful politician Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. For Suleri, Shame works through 
salient allegory—rather than “thinly veiled” allegory, as many critics have 
suggested—on various levels. On one level, the novel allegorizes the schizophrenic 
character of a postcolonial novel—that is, an awareness of censorship and an 
anticipation of different readerships (Western vs. Indian subcontinental) are inscribed 
in the novel’s structure, and so is the fear that the novel is playing with the kind of will 
to power that has driven most colonial narratives (Suleri 176). Hence an ostensible 
sense of self-fabrication and that of shame or guilt in the narrative. Ironically, such a 
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tint of shamefulness, Suleri argues, is exactly what constitutes postcolonial writing’s 
“aesthetic of novelty” (175). 
Throughout her lucid reasoning, however, Suleri reveals a schizophrenia on 
her part from time to time. Her reading of Shame, dismissive to some extent, stands 
incommensurable with her relatively appreciative reception of Rushdie’s 1988 novel, 
The Satanic Verses. The critical discrepancy, I argue, results from her erratic dealings 
with the literalism-allegory dynamic in Rushdie’s texts. Shame is problematic, 
according to her, in that it carefully manipulates the role of censorship in order to shift 
the responsibility of ethical judgment from the novelist to the reader. To facilitate this 
evasion of responsibility, the novel deliberately lodges itself in highly formalistic 
discursive conventions such as a realism based in religious fundamentalism and a 
West-tailored fantastic comedy. The narrator in the text, then, swings between extreme 
forms of rhetoric without having to take up the role of the judge on such a violence-
charged event as Bhutto’s political career. Suleri continues to contend that Shame’s 
ultimate undoing is the historical fact with which the novel has emboldened itself to 
flirt. The critic’s message is simple: if the novelist has chosen to address a temporally 
immediate news event, he faces an immediate judgment within moral parameters. 
 The distance that the fictional narrative takes vis-à-vis a recent news event, 
then, determines the ethical valence of the narrative. So what exactly is the crime that 
the archetypal postcolonial writer, Rushdie, commits? Suleri specifies that Shame is 
incapable of addressing the issue of complicity, a complicity that the novel’s narrative 
entertains “in the structure of a cultural judgment that takes the form of a muffled or a 
silenced voice” (177). The narrative violence imposed on the central female figure 
bespeaks such an ethical flaw: 
The rawness of postcolonial narrative . . . of which Shame is exemplary, 
presents itself as a peculiarly resonant site for the reading of the erotic 
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structure of morality. In Shame, this conjunction is represented by the 
central female character, an allegorical figure who embodies both what 
Rushdie sees as the feminine discourse of shame and also its capacity 
to exceed the limits of censorship in order to articulate the indictment 
of a culture. With the text’s characteristic swerve toward violence, this 
figure is in addition an imbecile, signifying an ethical inchoateness that 
is uncannily similar in tone to the sexual terror that marks the novel’s 
disturbingly apocalyptic conclusion. “Realism,” therefore, functions in 
the narrative as a trope for the punishability of discourse, of its curious 
ability to exude a fear of bodily harm. (180) 
 Another symptom of the critic’s moral stiffness is her hastiness in wrapping up 
the case on the allegory in the novel. At one point, Suleri comments on the allegorical 
implication of the character Omar Khayyaam, who in the story is said to be conceived 
by three mothers. Suleri remarks that the detail of Omar’s tripartite birth “warns the 
reader away from the obviousness of decoding, of falling into the simplicity of 
assuming that Omar Khayyaam, born out of a trinity of mothers, signifies that fresh 
arrival of the Pakistani citizen, born neither of Britain, nor of India, nor of Pakistan, 
which is still too new to be true. Thus allegory itself is subjected to an internal censor, 
constructing a symbolic structure that is somehow emptied of symbol” (180-81). Here 
the dynamic of allegorical disruption in the novel is relegated to an “internal censor,” 
which Suleri further associates with the symptom of “the vocabulary of otherness,” a 
discursive violence done to the other via a rhetoric of productivity. One would almost 
be taken aback by the critic’s neglect of Rushdie’s use of irony. As a matter of fact, 
Suleri does recognize Rushdie’s “self-repeating irony.” Such irony, however, does not 
conjure away for her the suspiciousness of the novel: “Shame is unable to address . . . 
the narrative’s responsibility to the story it must tell . . . to represent how political 
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information gets transmitted once it has been let loose, as it were, from the decorum of 
oppression” (177). 
 Again and again, the critic directs our attention to the moral weakness of the 
novel and the wrongly placed emphasis on realism that manifests this very weakness. 
Suleri attempts to show that Shame’s problem lies primarily in its clumsy play with 
historical literalism and with a hit-and-run allegory. Intriguingly, the critic measures 
the postcolonial narrative’s propriety with a rather similar literalism applied to the 
author of the novel. She conceives of Pakistan as a sign for mutual betrayal between 
the nation and Rushdie: “its betrayal, to him, of the idea of a home, and his betrayal of 
it, in his need to have none of it” (177). After having read a good deal of allegorical 
significance into the novelist’s life story, the critic proceeds to suggest that fictional 
narrative is not only entitled but also obligated to effect ethical responsibility, all 
because of the novelist’s intimacy with his subject. But this is not all; the critic, while 
calling for an ethical sensibility, dismisses a formalistic overdetermination of 
historical meanings, be it tragic or comic, both of which she has identified in Shame. 
The result, then, is a confusing injunction as follows: “Is it really the business of 
narrative to confer tragedy on a historical event, or is Rushdie obliquely referring to 
his own desire to gothicize a structure already hopelessly lost in its own 
ornamentation? What filial anxieties is the writer himself manifesting, when he seeks 
to deny all dignity to a history that is indirectly his?” (183). 
 As the critic herself puts it elsewhere in the same essay, “to be too literal is to 
occupy the most tropological realm of all” (202). When she indiscreetly reads a 
biographical literalism (idiom of betrayal, filial anxieties) into the narrative, the 
otherwise explosive energy of the allegorical/figurative side of the novelistic form is 
inevitably marginalized; the novelist’s life story turns out to be the only buoy against 
which the critic navigates her reading.  
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 Dismissive of immediacy and appreciative of time difference, Suleri’s reading 
of The Satanic Verses affirms the critical thrust of the novel’s anachronism, which 
allows Rushdie to “extend—with urgency and fidelity—his engagement with both 
cultural self-definition and Islamic historiography” (191; emphasis mine). Or, on the 
issue of complicity, which she thinks Shame fails to address loyally, Suleri argues that 
the theme of blasphemy in The Satanic Verses “assumes the intimacy of a novel mode 
of historical introspection,” and “manifest[s] the similitudes between the idioms of 
betrayal and loyalty that history has imposed upon a postcolonial world” (192; 
emphasis mine). 
 The critic’s ambivalent intentionality begins to emerge. Shame, to be sure, 
does address the question of complicity. The problem is that it has made a technical 
mistake. Suleri calls the kind of complicity manifest in Shame “the complicity of 
comedy and shame that the postcolonial narrative must experience” (178; emphasis 
mine). Obviously she has detected this complicity as a historical condition for 
postcoloniality; in fact, she even maintains that this writing of complicity finally 
pushes postcolonial writing away from the otherwise banal dichotomous 
colonizer/colonized paradigm—an important insight Suleri has been known for. Yet 
her diverse approaches to Shame and The Satanic Verses reveal nothing but her own 
obsession with the idiom of fidelity, which, I argue, is never a given in postcolonial 
reality. Furthermore, this absence of a given, along with the impossibility to take an 
elegant critical distance from a historical event, in effect brings into relief the 
overdetermination of postcoloniality. 
 Suleri’s critical work has been meticulously scrutinized here primarily because 
it touches upon the anxiety that Rushdie critics experience as to how the postcolonial 
writer can represent history. Suleri, along with Brennan, recognizes the 
overdetermined condition of postcoloniality, yet the rhetoric of fidelity prevails in the 
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final analysis. What are airbrushed, then, are questions such as what may constitute 
the allegorical impulse in Rushdie’s novelistic characters, and why or how this 
impulse may point to an analogous relationship between postcoloniality and writing. 
In the following section, I will start reading Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children while 
examining, by way of Benjamin, the epistemo-ontological significance of allegory. 
 
 
III. Allegory and Overdetermination: From Benjamin to Rushdie 
The narrative of Rushdie’s 1981 novel unfolds in the form of the personal 
memoir of the protagonist, Saleem Sinai. Together with one thousand other babies, 
Saleem is born on the midnight of August 15, 1947, the moment when India officially 
becomes independent. These prodigies later form a special community not only 
because of their shared origin but also because of the magical powers with which they 
are all endowed. Saleem, born at the precise moment of his nation’s nativity, possesses 
the strongest power, telepathy, while his virtual rival Shiva, born at the same golden 
moment, turns into a formidable warrior. On his tenth birthday, Saleem establishes 
M.C.C. (Midnight Children’s Conference) and assumes leadership in the group of five 
hundred and eighty-one remaining midnight’s children.10  
 Allegorical interpretations of Midnight’s Children have dominated Rushdie 
studies. Critics’ foci vary. Sometimes the highlight is on the redemptive potential and 
failure of each class category represented by each character;11 at other times the focus 
                                                 
10 That means that four hundred and twenty midnight’s children did not make it to the founding of 
Midnight Children’s Conference. The numeral 420 is not so much a random choice as an example of 
Rushdie’s careful arrangement of signs all over his texts: “420 has been, since time immemorial, the 
numeral associated with fraud, deception and trickery” (MC 235). Not particularly important in 
Midnight’s Children, this number will assume a more crucial position when it reappears in The Satanic 
Verses. I will return to the magic numbers in Rushdie’s texts later. 
11 Uma Parameswaran praises the female character Padma, adult Saleem’s discontented lover and 
audience, as a representative of collective consciousness and common people who make possible the 
writing of the individualistic artist, such as Saleem (44-45). Brennan has a similar class-sensitive 
argument.  
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is on the novel’s display of various modes of historical consciousness.12 Some critics 
pinpoint the specific allegorical technique that Rushdie deploys;13 others read the 
novel as a metafictional allegory of the cosmopolitan immigrant writer’s positioning 
vis-à-vis the subject matter of his writing.14
 To be certain, Midnight’s Children literally welcomes allegorical readings. The 
narrative teems with self-allegorization as follows: “I [Saleem] had been mysteriously 
handcuffed to history” (MC 3); “India, the new myth—a collective fiction in which 
anything was possible, a fable rivaled only by the two other mighty fantasies: money 
and God. I have been, in my life, the living proof of the fabulous nature of this 
collective dream . . .” (MC 130); “[midnight’s children] can be seen as the last throw 
of everything antiquated and retrogressive in our myth-ridden nation, whose defeat 
was entirely desirable in the context of a modernizing, twentieth-century economy; or 
as the true hope of freedom, which is now forever extinguished . . .” (MC 240).  
Assuming a larger-than-life attempt at “chutnification of history” (MC 548), 
Saleem even develops a complicated nexus of relationships between history and 
himself, charted by the dynamic between the literal and the allegorical: 
                                                 
12 Aruna Srivastava’s analysis of the novel draws on Nietzsche’s three modes of consciousness (the 
unhistorical, the historical, and the superhistorical) as well as Foucault’s notion of genealogy, especially 
the latter’s concept of the body as an “inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by 
ideas), the locus of a disassociated Self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in 
perpetual disintegration” (qtd. in Srivastava 70). In the final analysis, Srivastava turns to Gandhi and 
argues that only Mahatma’s philosophical system promises a reconciliation of Foucault’s and 
Nietzsche’s chronotopic systems on the one side and the axe of myths and mythologies on the other 
side. David Price, basically following Srivastava’s model, makes a more meticulous letter-for-letter 
parallel between Nietzsche’s three modes of historical consciousness and the characters in Midnight’s 
Children.  
13 Neil ten Kortenaar sees the novel as a literalization of common metaphors found in national 
discourse or official historical accounts (“Allegory”). Jean M. Kane reads the narrative as an act of 
literalization of the metaphor of the Indian body politic. 
14 As argued earlier, both Brennan and Suleri see Rushdie’s writing as a metafiction of the 
production of third-world novels, and see the writer figure as an accomplice in the failed enterprise of 
the “national longing for form.” On the other hand, Vijay Mishra applies Lyotard’s notion of differend 
in her configuration of postcoloniality as a quintessential politics of the diaspora. Similarly, Syed 
Manzurul Islam, also drawing on the concept of differend, reads the faulty representation of history in 
Midnight’s Children as an immigrant writer’s effort to come to terms with an inaccessible past, just as 
the Jews with the Holocaust. Also see Jean Kane; Nasser Hussain. 
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How, in what terms, may the career of a single individual be said to 
impinge on the fate of a nation? I must answer in adverbs and hyphens: 
I was linked to history both literally and metaphorically, both actively 
and passively, in what our (admirably modern) scientists might term 
“modes of connection” composed of “dualistically-combined 
configurations” of the two pairs of opposed adverbs given above. This 
is why hyphens are necessary: actively-literally, passively-
metaphorically, actively-metaphorically and passively-literally, I was 
inextricably entwined with my world.  
   . . . By the combination of “active” and “literal” I mean, of course, all 
actions of mine which directly—literally—affected, or altered the 
course of, seminal historical events . . . . The union of “passive” and 
“metaphorical” encompasses all socio-political trends and events which, 
merely by existing, affected me metaphorically—for example, . . . the 
unavoidable connection between the infant state’s attempts at rushing 
towards full-sized adulthood and my own early, explosive efforts at 
growth . . . [these ellipsis points in the original] Next, “passive” and 
“literal,” when hyphenated, cover all moments at which national events 
had a direct bearing upon the lives of myself and my family . . . . And 
finally there is the “mode” of the “active-metaphorical,” which groups 
together those occasions on which things done by or to me were 
mirrored in the macrocosm of public affairs, and my private existence 
was shown to be symbolically at one with history. (MC 285-86; 
emphasis in the original) 
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Saleem, on the surface, is an individual fully aware of putative postmodernist 
epistemological modes and artistic strategies.15 He articulates explicitly in his personal 
accounts things like the fragmentation of historical discourse, the unreliability of 
grand narratives, and the faultiness of the narrator’s memory. In addition, 
metafictional pauses during his storytelling are not uncommon. Yet, at the same time, 
he is constantly compelled to allegorize his connection with his world. How, then, 
should we decode such a combination? To what extent can we identify this allegorical 
impulse, in particular, as a symptom of the postcolonial condition?  
Rushdie himself once stipulated that, in Midnight’s Children, he did not intend 
to write a book of conventional allegory. He consciously resisted the idea of writing a 
book in the vein of “Indian allegorical symbolic model,” that is, “an assumption that 
every story is really another story which you haven’t quite told, and what you have to 
do is to translate the story that you have told into the story that you haven’t told” 
(“Midnight’s” 4, 3). Instead, Rushdie said that he was more interested in creating 
something in line with leitmotif: “the leitmotif, which is basically the idea of Walter 
Benjamin, is that you use as recurring things in the plot incidents or objects or phrases 
which in themselves have no meaning or no particular meaning but which form a kind 
of non-rational network of connections in the book.” For Rushdie, the meaning of the 
leitmotif is “the sum total of the incidents in which it occurs,” and the leitmotif works 
as “it accumulates meaning the more it is used” (3). 
                                                 
15 Elsewhere, Rushdie’s characters would often show an insider knowledge of signature 
postcolonial tropes. For example, here is a passage from The Satanic Verses, describing the two 
protagonists’ fall from an exploded plane: “mingling with the remnants of the plane, equally fragmented, 
equally absurd, there floated the debris of the soul, broken memories, sloughed-off selves, severed 
mother-tongues, violated privacies, untranslatable jokes, extinguished futures, lost loves, the forgotten 
meaning of hollow, booming words, land, belonging, home” (SV 4). This passage finds a striking 
similarity in Rushdie prose work: “The Satanic Verses celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the 
transformation that comes of new and unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, 
politics, movies, songs. It rejoices in mongrelization and fears the absolutism of the Pure” (IH 394). 
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As a matter of fact, leitmotif is never a Benjaminian term.16 He does 
foreground fragmentation as central to the allegorical mode of expression, but 
Benjamin has never explicitly developed any concept around leitmotif.17 Nevertheless, 
what Rushdie describes as the “non-rational network of connections” indeed 
converges with Benjamin’s allegory. Benjamin’s allegory, first of all, sheds light on 
the valence of reading history not temporally but optically, as he sees the former 
approach bordering on Eurocentric historicism. Secondly, Benjamin’s allegorical 
reading of modernity, as mentioned above, opens up the possibility of reading the 
philosophy of history out of a literary mode of expression. My main argument has 
been that both Benjamin’s and Rushdie’s allegories contribute to the philosophization 
of their respective historical moments. In what follows, I would like to zoom in on 
Benjamin’s theory of allegory and propose to place allegory in a more central position 
in his conception of historical cognition. I intend to link and compare the 
overdetermination of modernity with that of postcoloniality by showing the role that 
allegory plays in naming this overdetermination. 
 
Benjamin’s configuration of allegory can be divided into two stages or two 
related types. One derives from his study of the Trauerspiel or the German Baroque 
mourning-play in his monograph The Origin of the German Tragic Drama, which he 
                                                 
16 I am grateful to Professors Susan Buck-Morss and Geoffrey Waite of Cornell University for 
confirming this statement.  
17 Critic Todd Kuchta, however, has taken Rushdie’s remark at face value and applied Benjamin’s 
allegory to redress what he considers as the inadequacy of other allegorical interpretations of 
Midnight’s Children—that is, their failure to account for Rushdie’s subversion of conventional narrative 
structure. Kuchta demonstrates an energetic reading of the prevalent image of the finger in the novel, 
seeing the finger as a crucial allegorical object which draws a connection between postcolonial Indian 
authoritarian government (during Indira Gandhi’s rule, in particular) and the British colonial dominance. 
Yet Kuchta’s main argument is predicated on a misreading. In addition, the fragmentary structure of 
narrative, which Kuchta champions and claims to be the single outstanding characteristic in Benjamin 
and Rushdie, is anything but new or unconventional to postmodernism- and postcolonialism-savvy 
readers. One can even argue that “fragmentation” has become such a loose umbrella term for a wide 
range of cultural phenomena and artistic expressions that it loses critical valence if no distinction is 
made between, say, postmodern kitsch and a genuine political critique.  
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finished in 1925 for his Habilitationsschrift at the University of Frankfurt. The other 
type arises from his persistent study of Charles Baudelaire, which roughly started 
around 1927 and continued until before his death in 1940.18 It is not my intent to go 
into an elaborate comparison of these two Benjaminian allegories. I also do not 
propose that his Baroque and modern allegories occupy two separate cells in his 
system—quite the opposite, they in effect inform each other vibrantly. Suffice it to say 
that an awareness of the divergence and convergence of the two allegories (especially 
the historical conditions that animate them respectively) is requisite because otherwise, 
Benjaminian terms would only serve as convenient tools for critics to comment on any 
random situation while the critical concept in question (in this case, allegory) remains 
unproblematized. As argued earlier (note 18), it is not enough to celebrate a 
postcolonial work simply because it valorizes fragmentation.19  
                                                 
18 Benjamin’s Baudelaire study includes fragmentary notes which constitute a large portion of 
Arcades Project, where Konvolut J is entirely devoted to Baudelaire while many other Konvoluts deal 
with motifs related to Baudelaire, such as the flâneur, the prostitute, boredom and eternal recurrence, 
ruin of Paris; essay “Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century”; essay “The Paris of the Second Empire 
in Baudelaire”; fragmentary notes collected as “Central Park”; and essay “On Some Motifs in 
Baudelaire.” For a detailed description of the chronological and thematic relationship between these 
works by Benjamin, see Susan Buck-Morss 48-50, 205-206. 
19 Susan Buck-Morss thinks that Baroque allegory’s political weakness lies in its risk of becoming 
myth, something that Benjamin actually intends to debunk (175). In addition, Baroque and modern 
allegories differ mainly in the historical conditions they each respond to. For instance, Baroque 
physiognomy of the “history” of nature as debased and petrified—demonstrated in a flamboyant display 
of emblematics such as the human skull and in a cult of ruins—names a desperate response to a period 
of decline (Benjamin, Origin 167-89, 226-35). Baudelairean allegory, if no less a response to the 
debasement of nature, responds primarily to a world which contains allegorical objects of its own, 
namely, the capitalist world. In Benjamin’s own words: “The devaluation of the world of objects in 
allegory is outdone within the world of objects itself by the commodity” (“Central” 34). Furthermore, 
Baroque allegory and modern allegory differ in the degree of political critique each of them delivers. As 
already mentioned in the previous chapter, modern allegory, for Benjamin, inscribes a destructive 
violence that comes to tear off the organic appearance of things, to deprive things of their aura, or to 
demolish the mythical façade of the world of objects (“Central” 35, 41; or Arcades J22,5, J55a,3, J57,3) 
[references to The Arcades Project cite the original letter and numeral codes that Benjamin designed for 
his notes]. See Buck-Morss 170-90. 
Nevertheless, it is impossible to think of Benjamin’s modern allegory without seeing traces of 
Baroque allegory that he attributes to the Trauerspiel. For example, one major thrust of Benjamin’s 
allegory is the configuration of it as an experience, a mode of expression, a historical gaze, a cultural 
dominant, and a critique all together. This feature is shared by Baroque and modern allegories. Or, the 
potential of political critique in Benjamin’s allegory derives from a strong optical basis. It is the 
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Numerous critics have addressed, respectively, the Benjaminian allegory and 
Benjaminian theory of history, the latter crystallized in what Benjamin calls the 
“dialectical image.” Yet these two concepts are usually treated separately. Here I 
would like to argue that allegory in effect bears a closer affinity to the dialectical 
image than most critics have noted.  
Benjamin configures the dialectical image as both an objective event of 
happening and a subjective event of reading. The dialectical image comes to represent 
the constellation of a historicity at the meeting point of the present and the past. On the 
other hand, it requires the historical subject to recognize the image: “The past can be 
seized only as an image which flashes up at the instant when it can be recognized and 
is never seen again”; “A historical materialist cannot do without the notion of a 
present which is not a transition, but in which time stands still and has come to a stop” 
(“Theses” 255, 262); “It is not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or 
what is present its light on what is past; rather image is that wherein what has been 
comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other words, image 
is dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the present to the past is a purely 
temporal, continuous one, the relation of what-has-been to the now is dialectical: is not 
progression but image, suddenly emergent” (Arcades N2a,3).20
Some leading scholars categorically stipulate that the Benjaminian allegory is 
non-dialectical.21 While Benjamin’s occasional rhetorical obscurity does leave room 
                                                                                                                                            
counter-gaze of the image (be it the Baroque cult of the human skull or the prostitute figure in 
Baudelaire) that materializes what Benjamin terms the “allegorical intention.”  
20 The dialectical image, no doubt, is one of the most discussed Benjaminian notions. For the 
potential of the dialectical image to offer a theory of language as “the opening of the possibility of 
relation in time,” see Christopher Fynsk. For the dialectical image’s paradoxical nature of being both 
intuitive and non-intuitive, see Susan Buck-Morss 216-21. For the dialectical image as an act of reading 
connections between things, persons, and historical eras, see Michael Jennings 114-20. 
21 See, for example, Bainard Cowan; Elissa Marder; and Christine Buci-Glucksmann. Cowan’s 
argument would make sense only when applied to Benjaminian Baroque allegory, for Cowan reads 
Benjamin as suggesting that the world of the Baroque Trauerspiel lacks a “motivation”; hence the 
pervasive melancholia (118). Marder reads Benjamin’s reading of Baudelaire’s sense of history as 
“cliché,” which, originally denoting the mechanical reproduction of letters on a page, means a ghostly 
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for multiple meanings, to completely deprive the Benjaminian allegory of its 
dialectical thrust, I claim, is misleading. For even Baroque allegory, which lacks the 
kind of disruptive force that tellingly characterizes modern allegory, proceeds 
dialectically for Benjamin. In his Trauerspiel monograph, Benjamin emphatically 
underscores the presence of a dialectical dynamic in allegory and the absence of one in 
the symbol: 
The measure of time for the experience of the symbol is the mystical 
instant in which the symbol assumes the meaning into its hidden and, if 
one might say so, wooded interior. On the other hand, allegory is not 
free from a corresponding dialectic, and the contemplative calm with 
which it immerses itself into the depths which separate visual being 
from meaning, has none of the disinterested self-sufficiency which is 
present in the apparently related intention of the sign. The violence of 
the dialectic movement within these allegorical depths must become 
clearer in the study of the form of the Trauerspiel than anywhere else. 
(Origin 165-66; emphasis mine)  
In “Central Park,” Benjamin sometimes describes allegory and the dialectical 
image in very similar terms: “Tearing things out of the context of their usual 
interrelations—which is quite normal where commodities are being exhibited—is a 
procedure very characteristic of Baudelaire. It is related to the destruction of the 
organic interrelations in the allegoric intention” (41); “The dialectical image is one 
flashing up momentarily. It is thus, as an image flashing up in the now of its 
                                                                                                                                            
repeated production of the same images. Marder’s linking this sense of history and Barthes’s 
undialectical understanding of photography is brilliant, but she ignores the function of the Benjaminian 
allegory as an ethico-political critique. Furthermore, Buci-Glucksmann’s understanding of Benjamin’s 
dialectical image (“dialectics at a standstill”) to be “anti-dialectical” is an unfortunate misreading, for 
Benjamin does not mean to divest this “still” dialectics of its dialectical thrust outright. As a matter of 
fact, Benjamin considers his “dialectical image” as a mutual critique between different times (the 
present and the past, for instance). It is this critique that gives the image its disalectical drive. 
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recognisability, that the past, in this case that of Baudelaire, can be captured” (49; 
emphasis in the original). As mentioned in the last chapter, Susan Buck-Morss 
carefully sets up an axial system to explain Benjamin’s dialectical image, emphasizing 
that, for Benjamin, these axial fields represent irreconcilable oppositions. With 
“commodity” sitting in the middle as the central trope for the dialectical image of 
modernity, the opposing axial fields, respectively, are: “natural history: fossil (trace)” 
on the upper left side; “historical nature: ruin (allegory)” on the upper right side; 
“mythic history: fetish (phantasmagoria)” on the lower left side; and “mythic nature: 
wish image (symbol)” on the lower right side (211).  
Benjamin does deploy these terms in his different ramifications of capitalist 
modernity—for example, the nineteenth-century shopping arcades, world exhibitions, 
and fashion as the culmination of capitalist fetishism in a phantasmagoric form; new 
technology (iron, glass) articulated in architecture as wish-fulfilling images; the 
figures of the collector and the detective as a human epitome of trace and the 
transitoriness of nature; and the flâneur, the prostitute, and the lesbian as 
quintessential modern allegorists. Nevertheless, the more distinctions are made 
between these terms, the more they come to resemble one another. In fact, the more 
these terms are applied, the more it seems that Benjamin entrusts allegory with a 
governing status—that is, whatever quality can be detected in other philosophemes of 
his is already an allegorical quality. Especially in Benjamin’s Baudelaire studies, 
where he extends the notion of allegory and associates it tightly with modern 
commodity, allegory emerges as a generic notion denoting anything from “the 
devaluation of the world of objects” (“Central” 34) to “the monuments of the 
bourgeoisie as ruins even before they have crumbled” (“Paris, Capital” 162), from the 
“destruction of the organic and living” to the “decline of the aura” (“Central” 41), and 
from the prostitute as commodity to writing as prostitution (40, 46). We can have a 
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glimpse of the subordination of other philosophemes under allegory in the essay “Paris, 
Capital of the Nineteenth Century,” where Benjamin gathers almost all the aspects of 
the dialectical image (dream image, fetish, allegory) into one paragraph: 
Modernity is a main accent in [Baudelaire’s] poetry. He shatters the 
ideal as spleen (Spleen et Idéal). But it is precisely modernity that is 
always quoting primeval history. This happens here through the 
ambiguity attending the social relationships and products of this epoch. 
Ambiguity is the pictorial image of dialectics, the law of dialectics seen 
at a standstill. This standstill is utopian and the dialectic image 
therefore a dream image. Such an image is presented by the pure 
commodity: as fetish. Such an image are the arcades, which are both 
house and stars. Such an image is the prostitute, who is saleswoman 
and wares in one. (“Paris, Capital” 157) 
Note the preeminent part that allegory plays in Benjamin’s summary of 
modernity here. Modernity quoting primeval history, arcades (along with the 
quintessential component in the scene of arcades, the flâneur), the prostitute figure—
all these moments and figures come to illuminate our cognition of modernity, 
Benjamin argues, through Baudelaire’s genius, which is “an allegorical genius” (156). 
As a matter of fact, Buck-Morss herself, while stipulating the separateness of the four 
axial fields that constitute the dialectical image, repeatedly emphasizes the affinity of 
Benjamin’s theorization of modernity, especially in the Arcades Project, with Baroque 
emblematics:  
The Passagen-Werk’s [Arcades Project’s] pictorial representations of 
ideas are undeniably modeled after those emblem books of the 
seventeenth century, which had widespread appeal as perhaps the first 
genre of mass publication. The gambler and the flâneur in the Arcades 
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project personify the empty time of modernity; the whore is an image 
of the commodity form; decorative mirrors and bourgeois interiors are 
emblematic of bourgeois subjectivism; dust and wax figures are signs 
of history’s motionlessness; mechanical dolls are emblematic of 
workers’ existence under industrialism; the store cashier is perceived 
“as living image, as allegory of the cashbox.” (228)22
 All the above elaboration is not meant to suggest that allegory, for Benjamin, is 
tantamount to the dialectical image. My governing point is to identify the virtual 
predominance of allegory among all the Benjaminian philosophemes. I argue that, 
while all these philosophemes are primarily imagist—which by itself is already an 
insightful innovation on Benjamin’s part—allegory stands out in that it poses a 
critique of the phenomenon from which the allegorical object arises. As critic Terry 
Eagleton maintains, for Benjamin, “If there is a route beyond reification, it is through 
and not around it” (20). Allegory has the potential to cut across the history that awaits 
redemption in that allegory is, first and foremost, an expression of the 
overdetermination of history. 
 Benjamin’s rendition of modern allegory singularly seeks a dialogue with 
Baudelairean modernity. Why, then, is Benjamin relevant to Rushdie? For one thing, 
Benjamin’s allegory provides an entry into the double gaze of historical cognition: the 
allegorical object (such as the prostitute), which at first sight epitomizes a historical 
event or phenomenon (such as mass production), can turn the gaze around and expose 
the petrification of all the phantasmagoria surrounding the historical phenomenon.23 
Rushdie’s historical cognition, I propose, is marked by a similar doubleness. Moreover, 
                                                 
22 Nevertheless, Buck-Morss also distinguishes dialectical images from allegorical images in terms 
of the former’s “objective” meaning and the latter’s “subjective” character (241). 
23 “Women in Baudelaire: the most precious spoils in the ‘Triumph of Allegory’—Life, which 
means Death. This quality is most unqualifiedly characterised by the whore” (“Central” 39; Arcades 
J60,5). 
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Benjamin’s allegory promises a way to look at the dynamic between the visual image 
and the word in historical understanding. In Konvolut N in the Arcades Project, where 
Benjamin elaborates his imagist reading of history (his configuration of the 
relationship between “what-has-been” and “the now” as imagist-dialectical instead of 
historicist-temporal), he intriguingly suggests that the place where one encounters 
dialectical images is nothing other than language (N2a,3).   
Critic Christopher Fynsk has suggested considering the “recognition” of the 
dialectical image as an agreement taking place in the structure of speech: 
The possibility of speaking/acting in the present—the possibility of 
speaking truth in the present, of speaking the truth of the present—
comes out of the past. To begin to speak truly in the authentic historical 
time of the present is to realize a contract with the past to which one 
has necessarily already agreed. The contract is the condition of speech: 
to “recognize” the contract is to have assumed it; otherwise there can 
be no true act of recognition. With the dialectical image, to speak is to 
have recognized the past in its recognizability, to have recognized the 
past’s binding gift. Every time we speak (truly) we have contracted 
with the past. (123-24; emphasis in the original) 
The harmonious pact between the present and the past that Fynsk describes 
here comes across as linear and historicist and henceforth non-Benjaminian—as I 
understand it, the “recognition” of the dialectical image involves a mutual critique 
between the present and the past. Yet I agree with Fynsk and another major Benjamin 
critic, Michael Jennings, that the dialectical image should be understood as a reading 
or a critique. As for how Benjamin’s “imagist” language can be materialized in the act 
of recognizing the dialectical image, I propose that textual allegory plays an effective 
part here in that it involves a dialogic interaction between the image and the word. If 
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this is the case, Benjamin’s proposition about encountering dialectical images in 
language only reinforces the structural affinity between the dialectical image and 
allegory.  
 The historical critique—the recognition of the dialectical image—is the 
function of modern allegory for Benjamin. In Rushdie, allegorical impulse too 
emerges as a commentary on the historical moment which conditions this impulse. 
Nevertheless, while for Benjamin the political purchase of allegory depends heavily 
on the “measure of time” that sets apart the present and the past (modernity and 
primeval history) and on the mutual critique between the two timeframes, for 
Rushdie’s postcolonial subjects, the overdetermination of the historical condition is 
such that there is no mediation of time in their representation of history. Every event 
demands an immediate recognition and an immediate designation of meanings. 
 
IV. Sparing the Finger: Midnight’s Children 
If Saleem Sinai is made to see himself as “the mirror of [India]” (MC 143), the 
repository of all the allegorical intention is stored in the event—the event of a nation’s 
decolonization epitomized in a child’s birth. The date, August 15, 1947, serves as a 
differential sign that separates the present from the past. The emphasis on an 
ostensibly neutral date, however, undermines the intentionality for newness on the part 
of the postcolonial subject. 
The striving for newness and for difference is the major storyline of 
postcolonial nation-building. As India’s first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru 
articulates in his Independence speech, cited by Saleem: “At the stroke of the 
midnight’s hour, while the world sleeps, India awakens to life and freedom”; “A 
moment comes, which comes but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to 
the new; when an age ends; and when the soul of a nation long suppressed finds 
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utterance . . .” (MC 134). What Saleem does not cite is the “striving” part in Nehru’s 
speech: “[T]he past is over and it is the future that beckons to us now. That future is 
not one of ease or resting but of incessant striving so that we may fulfil the pledges we 
have so often taken and the one we shall take today. . . . And so we have to labour and 
to work, and work hard, to give reality to our dreams.”  
In the novel, this striving for difference soon turns into a struggle over 
authenticity, embodied in the rivalry between Saleem Sinai and the real son of the 
Sinais, Shiva, over their birth certificates—that is, metaphorically speaking. Saleem’s 
need to be different returns to haunt him repeatedly in the form of discovering his own 
otherness. The nation that he mirrors, too, repeatedly fails to live up to the promise of 
difference.  
My argument is that not only does Rushdie mean to critique the obsession with 
difference in postcolonial national discourse, his critique translates into the material 
aspect of the textuality. Throughout the novel, sameness recurs in all areas of plot 
details: repetition of the same images, recapitulation of “morals” of previous events, 
similitudes in characters, and so on. While critics by far have exhausted readings of 
the “conspicuous” allegorical aspects of the novel (that is, those allegorical elements 
whose interpretations are primarily anticipated and provided by the narrator-
protagonist), not many critics have elaborated on the element of sameness in the novel. 
Nor have critics been willing to look at those seemingly meaningless moments of 
image accumulation. Recurring images, at first sight, come across as a rejection of 
singularity and a tendency towards closed-ness of historical perception. Moreover, the 
dazzling array of recurrent images in Midnight’s Children strikes an impression of a 
fatigued history—and a fatigued history, to some extent, implies a secondary history. 
Yet I will argue that the instances of sameness in the narrative of Midnight’s Children, 
along with the co-presence of the meaningful and the meaningless, in effect point to a 
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profane illumination that proceeds by the bad side of history. The image of the finger 
serves as a pointed example.  
The image of the finger begins its metaphoric journey with a painting of young 
Walter Raleigh hanging on the “sky-blue wall” of baby Saleem’s room. Critic Neil ten 
Kortenaar has identified the painting in question as The Boyhood of Raleigh, painted 
in 1870 by Sir John Everett Millais (see “Ekphrasis”). In this painting, young Raleigh 
and another boy sit at the foot of an old seasoned fisherman, listening to accounts of 
the latter’s adventures abroad. The fisherman points his right index finger to the sky 
while he relates enchanting stories. As adult Saleem recalls, from the very beginning 
his destiny is tied with the finger: 
In a picture hanging on a bedroom wall, I sat beside Walter Raleigh and 
followed a fisherman’s pointing finger with my eyes; eyes straining at 
the horizon, beyond which lay—what?—my future, perhaps; my 
special doom, of which I was aware from the beginning . . . because the 
finger pointed . . . across a brief expanse of sky-blue wall, driving my 
eyes towards another frame, in which my inescapable destiny hung, 
forever fixed under glass: here was a jumbo-sized baby-snap with its 
prophetic captions, and here, beside it, a letter on high-quality vellum, 
embossed with the seal of state—the lions of Sarnath stood above the 
dharma-chakra on the Prime Minister missive, which arrive . . . one 
week after my photograph appeared on the front page of the Times of 
India.  
   Newspapers celebrated me; politicians ratified my position. 
Jawaharlal Nehru wrote: “Dear Baby Saleem, My belated 
congratulations on the happy accident of your moment of birth!” (MC 
142-43) 
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 This picture becomes disturbing because, as a child, Saleem is literally 
modeled on an English boy. His mother and ayah would dress him up in “the attire of 
the English milords”—he is so stunningly “chweet” that one time a neighbor has to 
exclaim: “It’s like he’s just stepped out of the picture!” (142; emphasis in the original). 
Moreover, the fisherman’s pointing finger in the Raleigh painting serves as a link 
between Saleem and the city of Bombay: “because if one followed [the finger] even 
further, it led one out through the window, down the two-storey hillock, across 
Warden Road, beyond Breach Candy Pools, and out to another sea which was not the 
sea in the picture; a sea on which the sails of Koli dhows glowed scarlet in the setting 
sun . . . an accusing finger, then, which obliged us to look at the city’s dispossessed” 
(MC 143-44; ellipsis in the original).24  
There is yet another primitive association with the fisherman’s finger. 
Saleem’s grandfather Aadam Aziz as a young man is befriended with the boatman and 
storyteller, Tai, in his Kasmiri hometown: “the Boy Aadam, my grand-father-to-be, 
fell in love with the boatman Tai precisely because of the endless verbiage which 
made others think him cracked. It was magical talk . . .” (MC 10). This friendship 
breaks off when Tai resentfully rejects the scientific ways of life that the German-
trained Aziz has brought back from abroad. Since then, Tai has refused to clean 
                                                 
24 Ten Kortenaar employs the technique of ekphrasis (verbal representation of a visual 
representation) and suggests that Rushdie, with the triptych formed by the Raleigh painting, the Prime 
Minister’s letter, and the window, instead of trying to rewrite the history implied in Millais’s painting, 
is mainly drawing attention to the nature of storytelling done by both the canvas and the text, by both 
the imperialist and the postcolonial (“Ekphrasis” 242). For Ten Kortenaar, it does not matter very much 
that the Sinais apparently have misread the Raleigh paining (in the sense that the parents want to put 
Saleem in the painting by dressing him up Elizabethan style, and that Saleem himself literally follows 
the direction of the pointing finger to find an uncanny Bombay). What matters, Ten Kortenaar argues, is 
that such mimicry and misunderstanding disturb the colonial pedagogy by “a reading that makes 
nonsense of obedience” (258). Kuchta, on the other hand, reads the Raleigh painting more as an 
indication of India’s status of pseudo-independence: “The finger serves as an allegorical object whose 
meaning evolves within the dialectic of Saleem’s present memory of the past. Initially a celebration of 
Saleem’s status as midnight’s child and thus of India’s independence, it implicitly reminds Saleem of 
his homeland’s colonization and its infusion by European domination and culture, and indicates India’s 
inability to sustain its poor. The finger thus undermines the notion of India’s complete independence 
from imperialism and from the problems associated with imperial rule” (217). 
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himself, and his body odors turn into “a gesture of unchangingness in defiance of the 
invasion of the doctori-attaché from Heidelberg” (MC 25-26). Tai’s admonishing 
finger is only implicit, yet the way in which the human body becomes the central site 
of allegorization throughout Saleem’s narrative, starts right here. 
As Saleem’s recollection unfolds, the image of the finger continues to 
dominate the narrative. When he is a boy, one day Saleem’s middle finger is broken 
off by school bullies at a school function. The adult Saleem categorizes this incident in 
the “active-metaphorical” mode, which he defines as “those occasions on which things 
done by or to me were mirrored in the macrocosm of public affairs, and my private 
existence was shown to be symbolically at one with history” (MC 286). The coding 
works as follows: “when I was detached from my fingertip and blood (neither Alpha 
nor Omega) rushed out in fountains, a similar thing happened to history, and all sorts 
of everywhichthing began pouring out all over us . . .” (MC 286). Here Saleem is 
referring to the political turmoil in the wake of the 1957 general elections when the 
ruling party, All-India Congress, wins the election only by a small margin, losing a 
significant number of votes to emergent Communists. At the same time, the future of 
the state of Bombay is under heated debates generated by language communalism 
(MC 265-68).  
What is noteworthy is the extent to which Saleem has come to attribute his life 
to the network of cultural coding—that is, the inevitability of the active-passive, 
literal-metaphorical connections. The fisherman’s finger in the Raleigh painting, 
indeed, emerges as the origin and master signifier in the system of coding. Yet, with a 
narrative haunted by the same finger image, an uncanny sense is provoked as the 
narrator seems to constantly meander between the conscious and the unconscious, 
between the familiar and the unfamiliar, and between the meaningful and the 
meaningless. As the demand of the master signifier looms large, the finger image, in 
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some cases, comes to disturb the master signifier not so much by a conscious play as 
by unconscious slippages. That is, the excessive use of the finger signifier overflows 
the limit of its coding pedagogy and leads to unexpected realms of historical cognition. 
This is where I depart from critics like Ten Kortenaar, who dismiss the proliferation of 
the same image as non-empowering: “The writer of a narrative, looking back in search 
of origins and signs, will always find signs ready to be interpreted. But if everything 
can be a sign, how can anything be said to have significance?” (“Ekphrasis” 247). I 
propose that the accumulation of the same image tellingly names a distinctive 
historical impulse constitutive of the postcolonial experience.  
After an anti-Partition cultural leader is murdered by Muslim nationalists prior 
to Partition, a British brigadier in his car passes by a crowd of locals who are playing 
betel spitting. When the army commander’s car knocks over the spittoon on the street, 
“[a] dark red fluid with clots in it like blood congeals like a red hand in the dust of the 
street and points accusingly at the retreating power of the Raj” (MC 45). Before 
Saleem’s birth, the business of his Muslim father, Ahmed Sinai, is threatened by local 
anti-Muslim gangsters: “the cloud of the disaster (which is also a relief) rises and 
gathers like a ball in the discoloured morning sky. See how . . . it is pointing, good 
lord, like a finger, pointing down at the Muslim muhalla near Chandni Chowk!” (MC 
82). In year 1948, racial tensions are responsible for many massacres: “They—we—
should have known something bad would happen. That January, Chowpatty Beach, 
and Juhu and Trombay, too, were littered with the ominous corpses of dead pomfret, 
which floated, without the ghost of an explanation, belly-side-up, like scaly fingers in 
to shore” (MC 159). Around the same time, Ahmed’s assets are all frozen by the 
government, and the “literal” impact on him is the freezing of his maleness: every 
night his wife could feel his shiver “as the icy fingers of rage and powerlessness 
spread towards from his loins” (MC 158).  
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At times, these images take up involuntary correspondences. For example, 
adult Saleem describes that his lover and audience, Padma, would from time to time 
“jab[] a contemptuous index finger in the direction of [his] admittedly non-functional 
loins; a long, thick digit, rigid with jealousy, which unfortunately served only to 
remind [him] of another, long-lost finger . . .” (MC 142; ellipsis in the original). The 
reference of the “long-lost finger” is curious. Right after this interruption by his lover, 
Saleem resumes his memoir-writing and proceeds to describe the Raleigh painting in 
his childhood room, along with the two other frames related to the painting. This 
chapter, furthermore, is entitled “The Fisherman’s Pointing Finger.” 
As the same image occurs repeatedly, the desire to allegorize only intensifies 
on the narrator’s part. For example, when Saleem’s mother, Amina, reads that a 
Bombay newspaper is offering an award to the mother who gives birth to a baby at the 
exact instant of the state’s birth, “Amina’s finger, jabbing triumphantly at the page, 
punctuated the utter certainty of her voice. . . . Amina announced. ‘That’s going to be 
me’” (MC 113). When Saleem discovers the mysterious phone calls his mother 
receives from her ex-husband, the same image continues to haunt his narration: 
“Electricity in the air. Heat, buzzing like bees. A mantle, hanging somewhere in the 
sky, waiting to fall gently around my shoulders . . . somewhere, a finger reaches 
towards a dial; a dial whirs around and around, electrical pulses dart along cable, 
seven, zero, five, six, one. The telephone rings” (MC 189; ellipsis in the original). 
The geography and gymnastics teacher in Saleem’s primary school, Emil 
Zagallo, always dismissing the children as “jungle-Indians, bead-lovers,” also 
contributes to young Saleem’s experience with violence. Zagallo’s Goanese mother 
being abandoned by a British decamped shipping agent, Zagallo “was not only an 
‘Anglo’ but probably a bastard as well.” However, he likes to affect a Latin accent and 
claims himself to be Peruvian. His misplaced racist furor is revealed, imaginably, via a 
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finger: “[Zagallo] hung a print of a stern, sweaty soldier in a pointy tin hat and metal 
pantaloons above his blackboard and had a way of stabbing a finger at it in times of 
stress and shouting, ‘You see heem, you savages? Thees man eez civilization! You 
show heem respect: he’s got a sword!’” (MC 275; emphasis in the original). The list of 
these invocations of the finger can go on. For example, Saleem’s younger days are 
accompanied by “the rosary-fingering presence of Mary Pereira [the woman who 
swabbed Saleem with Shiva at their birth]” (MC 304). At the high time of Indo-
Pakistani conflicts, Saleem’s Muslim family move to Pakistan, and one lingering 
memory of that country for Saleem is “the mosque’s long pointing finger” (MC 394). 
When air raids during the Indo-Pakistani war in 1965 kill most of Saleem’s family 
members, the image of the finger, uncannily, serves its purpose one more time as a 
ghostly object: “the fingers of the explosion reaching down down to the bottom of an 
almirah . . .” (MC 409). During the time when Indira Gandhi (referred to as “the 
Widow” in the text) imposes a State of Emergency (years 1975-1977 in real history), 
Saleem is captured and castrated at the “Widow’s Hostel” in Benares. Critic Todd 
Kuchta rightly suggests that Saleem’s chopped finger at age eleven figures and 
foreshadows his later castration by the Widow, and that all these images of castration 
(literal and metaphorical) point to “the impeded maturation of Indian politics” (219).  
In Kuchta’s (mis-)application of Benjamin to Rushdie (see note 18), Kuchta in 
effect insightfully suggests that not every “leitmotif object” in Rushdie’s novel has an 
inherent meaning. Yet Kuchta himself cannot help but turn to the conventional 
allegorical mode of interpretation by selecting only a handful of “useful” images of the 
finger from the novel. Moreover, Kuchta’s reading, in the final analysis, fixes the 
reading of Midnight’s Children at one historical pivotal point: “The allegorical 
structure of Midnight’s Children demands that we read Indian national history through 
the perspective of Indira Gandhi’s Emergency regime and thereby attempt to ‘attain to 
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a conception of history’ that subverts ‘the “state of emergency” in which we live’” 
(221). What is lacking in Kuchta’s well-intended perspective, however, is an attention 
to those “insignificant” moments of coding in the novel. I will return to this at the end 
of this chapter. 
 
V. How the Postcolonials Survive Numbers: The Satanic Verses 
 In The Satanic Verses, Rushdie once again demonstrates how postcoloniality is 
an overdetermined inscription—a motif forcefully figured in the haunting sameness in 
the textual materiality and in the constant interruption of the ethos of newness.  
The Satanic Verses opens with a grave historical inquiry concerning the 
ideology of newness: “How does newness come into the world? How is it born? Of 
what fusions, translations, conjoinings is it made? How does it survive, extreme and 
dangerous as it is? What compromises, what deals, what betrayals of its secret nature 
must it make to stave off the wrecking crew, the exterminating angel, the guillotine? Is 
birth always a fall? Do angels have wings? Can men fly?” (SV 8). This passage not 
only reminds one of the promises and failures of newness in Midnight’s Children, but 
also sets the tone for The Satanic Verses. Historical and cultural cognition in the 
postcolonial condition continues to pivot around the obsession with newness, with the 
striving for difference.  
 The two protagonists, Indian-born Gibreel Farishta and Saladin Chamcha, at 
some point of their lives both believe that they shall find newness in Britain. Gibreel, 
before relocating incognito in London, makes his way to super-stardom in India best 
known for his portrayals of deities in a movie genre called “theologicals” (SV 157). 
Saladin, son of a snobbish capitalist, against whom he has long held grudges, receives 
his education in Britain upon his father’s insistence and later chooses to embrace his 
adopted country in all loyalty. In contrast to Gibreel, whose career and entire existence 
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are marked by a visual relationship with gods (his filmic embodiments of gods and, 
later, his dreams of being the archangel), Saladin is a talented voice mimicker 
acclaimed for a television show called Aliens. The fates of the two begin to intertwine 
when the plane they take from Bombay to London (Saladin on his way back to 
London after a disappointing hometown visit, and Gibreel on a self-exile trip) is 
hijacked and later exploded in the air. Both surviving the crash, each after his fall 
gradually becomes aware of another being present inside him: being the archangel 
and/or being the devil, with the two beings interchangeable with each other. The 
journey towards newness, thus, is interrupted by postlapsarian twists and turns. 
 Their search for newness is echoed in many other episodes in the novel. Rosa 
Diamond, the old English lady who rescues Gibreel after his fall, is once married to an 
Anglo-Argentine gentleman during the Empire’s declining years. Her sole reason for 
moving to that “immensity” called Argentina is “to be new” (SV 145; emphasis in the 
original). A more political twist to the idiom of newness is related to Margaret 
Thatcher’s hegemonic rule:  
What she wants . . . is literally to invent a whole goddamn new middle 
class in this country. Get rid of the old wooly incompetent buggers 
from fucking Surrey and Hampshire, and bring in the new. People 
without background, without history. Hungry people. People who 
really want, and who know that with her, they can bloody well get. 
Nobody’s ever tried to replace a whole fucking class before, and the 
amazing thing is she might just do it if they don’t get her first. (SV 270; 
emphasis in the original) 
Or, the most radical attempt to break from oldness is to eliminate history or time 
outright—an idea tapped by the nameless Imam: “History is the blood-wine that must 
no longer be drunk. History the intoxicant, the creation and possession of the Devil, of 
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the great Shaitan, the greatest of the lies—progress, science, rights—against which the 
Imam has set his face” (SV 210). 
Nevertheless, the striving for newness, for difference, and for a radical break 
from the past, is constantly depressed and rendered impossible by the interpolation of 
repetitions or similitudes. And all this impossibility of difference has to do with the 
postlapsarian history. It is after the fall, literally and metaphorically, that the first 
symptom of sameness emerges—between Gibreel and Saladin, between the angel and 
the devil, between the human and the superhuman, and between the end of one history 
(Gibreel and Saladin’s fall) and the inception of another one. As the narrator spells it 
out, “Gibreelsaladin Farishtachamcha, condemned to this endless but also ending 
angelicdevilish fall, did not become aware of the moment at which the processes of 
their transmutation began” (SV 5). 
Or, the authority of the original newness is constantly short-circuited by the 
multiple intrusions of others into the origin, including temporal interferences. Take, 
for instance, the episodes of dreams in the novel. The governing storyline, that of the 
modern Gibreel and Saladin, is realistically situated in the Thatcherite Britain. Yet, the 
most controversial episodes in the novel, those allusive to the founding prophet of 
Islam, unfold in the twilight zone between (the rewriting of) history and the dream 
world of Gibreel, himself living in the twilight zone between the literal archangel, 
Gibreel’s literal embodiment of the angel, and the dreaming of his embodiment of the 
angel. Temporal interpenetration shows how the subject lives through the 
overdetermined postcoloniality with an intimacy with the sense of time. Time, in other 
words, is not just an abstract concept; time in effect has a solid materiality.   
 Another major symptom of sameness is detected in the scene of naming. 
Gibreel bears the name of the archangel, and his full name Gibreel Farishta literally 
means “Gabriel the angel.” His original name Ismail Najmuddin furthers the excess of 
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meaning: “Ismail after the child involved in the sacrifice of Ibrahim, and Najmuddin, 
star of the faith” (SV 17; emphasis in the original). The narrator’s comment here poses 
an uncanny prophecy: “he’d given up quite a name when he took the angel’s” (SV 
17).25  
The redundancy of signification in Gibreel’s name, later, is to collide with a 
rebellion against precise referencing occasioned by his “angelicdevilish” nature. This 
dubious duality of his has a literal origin, though, for his mother used to call him by 
the name of the devil: “his loving mother . . . has a different name for him, Shaitan, 
she calls him, just like Shaitan, same to same, because he has been fooling around 
with the tiffins to be carried into the city for the office workers’ lunch . . . , has been 
putting Muslim meat compartments into Hindu non-veg tiffin-carriers, customers are 
up in arms. Little devil, she scolds, but then folds him in her arms, my little farishta, 
boys will be boys” (SV 91). Critic Joel Kuortti suggests reading this episode via what 
Jean-François Lyotard describes as the naming ritual a parent imposes on a child: 
“even before he is born, if only by virtue of the name he is given, the human child is 
already positioned as the referent in the story recounted by those around him” (qtd. in 
Kuortti 137). Gibreel’s stories, however, rewrite this suspicion of referencing. When 
he begins to dream of himself becoming God’s arch-messenger, Gibreel resents 
having such an improper proper name: “Gibreel, when he’s tired, wants to murder his 
mother for giving him such a damn fool nickname, angel, what a word, he begs what? 
whom? To be spared the dream-city of crumbling sandcastles and lions with three-
tiered teeth, no more heart-washing of prophets or instructions to recite or promises of 
                                                 
25 Spivak validly points out the allusion to Ismail in Moby Dick in Gibreel’s original name. Spivak 
argues that this reference emphatically enhances the motif of male bond in The Satanic Verses (Outside 
223-24). There are, however, other biographical readings. For example, Brennan, based on friends’ 
suggestions, maintains that the Gibreel character refers to the Bombay super movie star Amitabh 
Bachan (153)—a reference that does not seem necessarily useful for the understanding of the novel. 
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paradise, let there be an end to revelations, finito, khattam-shud” (SV 122; emphasis in 
the original). 
 Saladin, too, suffers from an excess of the naming affair. According to critic 
Feroza Jussawalla, possible historical references of “Saladin” (the word literally 
denotes “the religious savior”) include Saladin of the Holy Wars, Saladin the medieval 
founder of Palestine, as well as the Saladin in The Divine Comedy, the only Muslim 
praised by Dante (107). Furthermore, Saladin’s Anglicized family name Chamcha, 
shortened by himself from “Chamchawala,” ties him with a strong Indian rootedness. 
Literally meaning “a spoon,” “chamcha” in the Bombay slang means “groupie, camp 
follower, gutless, and even sometimes as homosexual” (SV 107). Rushdie himself, 
already employing the term in Midnight’s Children (MC 467), explains the cultural 
connotations of “chamcha” as follows: 
A chamcha . . . is, in fact, a spoon. The word is Urdu; and it also has a 
second meaning. Colloquially, a chamcha is a person who sucks up to a 
powerful people, a yes-man, a sycophant. The British Empire would 
not have lasted a week without such collaborators among its colonized 
peoples. You could say that the Raj grew fat by being spoon-fed. Well, 
as we all know, the spoon-feeding ended, or at least ceased to be 
sufficiently nourishing, and the British left. But the effects of the 
Empire linger on. (qtd. in Aravamudan 14) 
This (subversion of the) overdetermination of the signifier qua the name in the 
naming incidents is coupled with numerous naming accidents. While the stories 
meander through various historical times, characters from different time eras appear as 
namesakes, with the “original” oftentimes a historical figure. A sense of uncanniness 
aroused by recurrences is more than palpable. Moreover, the signifying matrix 
constituted by various formulae of signification, the literal and the allegorical among 
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them, lurks everywhere, ready to interpolate in the scene of naming. Ayesha, the first 
wife of Muhammad the founder of Islam in history, in one episode of the novel is the 
name of the favorite wife of the Prophet figure in the novel, Mahound; in another 
episode she becomes the mysterious Indian Muslim prophetess who leads villagers of 
Titlipur (Butterfly Town) onto a walking pilgrimage to Mecca across the Arabian Sea; 
and in yet another episode she turns into a vicious goddess who eventually is crushed 
by the Imam. Hind, the virulent wife of the Grandee who once defeated Mahound 
before the victory of Submission (the literal meaning of “Islam”), in the modern-day 
episodes becomes the wife of a Bangladeshi restaurant owner in London. On the other 
hand, the modern-day namesake of the Grandee, Abu Simbel, is an African black-
power activist wrongly executed for accusations of serial murders in a racially tense 
immigrant neighborhood in London. Gibreel’s lover, Alleluia, bears the surname Cone, 
an alteration from Cohen made by her Jewish Polish émigré father as a protest against 
their victimized past under the Nazi terror; on the other hand, the hill where 
revelations dawn on Mahound is called Mount Cone. When Gibreel later persuades 
himself to take up the role of the archangel and take revenge on the soulless city 
London, he is convinced that Alleluia, nicknamed Allie, has degraded into an 
embodiment of betrayal, Al-Lat, the namesake of one of the three pagan goddesses 
that Mahound has set out to destroy in order to establish his monotheism. Or, the 
proper name of London, in the tongue of outsiders, is translated into “Ellowen 
Deeowen” or “Babylondon,” as a corrupt form of Babylon, which itself is already a 
sign of human corruption, Babel: “There is no Proper London: not this improper city. 
Airstrip One, Mahagonny, Alphaville. He [Gibreel] wanders through a confusion of 
languages. Babel: a contraction of the Assyrian ‘babilu.’ ‘The gate of God.’ 
Babylondon” (SV 459). 
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The list can go on. If these names are not necessarily “images of a single 
troubled mind freely associating” (Brennan 155), the scene of naming does turn into 
an overwhelming obscenity. Critic Brian Finney rightly suggests that, in the naming 
scene, Rushdie is using language to highlight the lack of distinction between the 
material world and the imaginative world (85). To be sure, Rushdie also foregrounds 
the very materiality of language, for naming becomes the forefront where “similitudes 
between the idioms of betrayal and loyalty” (Suleri 192) are acted out literally and 
nakedly. As mentioned above, naming in the hands of poststructuralist theories such as 
Lyotard signifies the floating scenario of signification, the discrepancy between the 
name and its referent. I argue that while the naming scene in The Satanic Verses to 
some extent flirts with this kind of poststructuralist reasonable doubt, it does not settle 
there. Instead, through all the negotiations between proper and improper naming, or 
between chance and historical necessity, The Satanic Verses points towards a 
realization that addresses not so much a call for difference as the reality of sameness. 
Naming, thus, can be seen as a postcolonial dialectical image in the Benjaminian sense, 
an image that helps illuminate the necessary elements for our historical understanding. 
 The questioning of difference is further posed in the novel by way of several 
magic numbers. Take, for instance, the numeral 420, the flight number of the hijacked 
and exploded plane. One of the most popular Hindi movies produced in Bombay in the 
1950s is entitled Shri Charsawbees, denoting “Mr. 420.” Not only is the movie 
referred to in The Satanic Verses (SV 407, 440), the novel makes palpable the status of 
“Mr. 420” as a cultural index when a tune from the movie is sung by Gibreel during 
his fall: “‘O, my shoes are Japanese,’ Gibreel sang, translating the old song into 
English in semi-conscious deference to the uprushing host-nation, ‘These trousers 
English, if you please. On my head, red Russian hat; my heart’s Indian for all that’” 
(SV 5). Furthermore, section 420 in the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure originally 
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established by the colonial British empire, refers to “small-scare fraud and confidence 
tricks,” echoing the connotations of the name “Chamcha.” Indira and Sanjay Gandhi’s 
rule of India is also indexed because a famous graffiti at that time mocks Sanjay’s 4-
point program and Indira’s 20-point program as “4+20=420” (Aravamudan 6-7). What 
is noteworthy is that, in effect, the cultural allusions to the number 420 already happen 
in Midnight’s Children (MC 235, 259, 519). 
Numeral 96 and numeral 111 in the novel further figure as the struggle 
between monotheism and polytheism. According to Srinivas Aravamudan, the sura in 
the Qur’an that records the first revelation (when Muhammad is asked to accept Allah 
as the only God) is sura 96. In the novel, the year that Saladin leaves for Britain is year 
1961 (which also happens to be the year Rushdie himself went to Britain for the first 
time in his life). The cunning of 1961 is immediately recognized by the narrator of the 
novel: “a year you could turn upside down and it would still, unlike your watch, tell 
the same time” (SV 42). Not only does this number suggest the gnomic logic of 
reversibility, “1961” can also be seen as “96” surrounded by two “1”s, representing 
Muhammad’s monotheist hegemony (Aravamudan 15). The numeral 111, on the other 
hand, is first of all the number of days the airplane is controlled by hijackers. 
Moreover, “111” “one one one” names the repeated insistence on monotheism the 
Prophet figure, Mahound, comes to represent. In one episode, Mahound rescues a 
slave from the latter’s master when the slave insists that there is only one God in the 
universe: “One one one.” Mahound’s enemy, the Grandee, recalls this scene later and 
is appalled by Mahound’s “terrifying singularity” (SV 102). Yet, when three onenesses 
stand side by side, the possibility of polytheism arises automatically. Aravamudan puts 
it well: “Mahound’s reply to the temptation of polytheism is ‘one one one,’ hinting at 
the paradoxical space for polytheism created by repetition of a ‘one’ which cannot be 
identical with itself, even as it alludes back to the three goddesses in question” (15-16). 
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Sara Suleri suggests that the hegemony of oneness is disturbed by the number 
“two”: “the text’s tautological insistence on at least two central protagonists, at least 
two nations on the verge of crisis, at least two prophets to embody the centrality of 
doubt to the structure of religious discourse” (195). Suleri has sought to read religious 
fidelity into the novel’s ostensible blasphemy in the midst of the fatwa controversy, 
yet her reading seems to flirt with the definitive oneness as well. For instance, she 
contends that Mahound stands for a discursive necessity for the nationalist imagination 
of history (“the prophet figures as the one body cognizant of the intransigent idea of 
nation” [200]), or that “history happens with less fuss when it is impelled by the 
modernity of a unitary narrative” (199). Furthermore, after foregrounding the motif of 
doubleness, she goes on to dismiss the number “two”: “By linking his narrative to the 
structure of a necessary tautology, Rushdie both crucially revises the unitary myth of 
Islamic culture and continues that obsessive tale of Anglo-India, which can only 
sexualize colonial exchange in terms of an aborted homoeroticism” (195). In other 
words, Suleri views Rushdie’s novel as mimicking the typical homoerotic/ 
homophobic paradigm of colonial discourse. While such an eroticized version of 
history can be suggestive, Suleri’s reading is coupled with a sense of nostalgia for the 
“singled-minded commitment to the pragmatics of prophecy” figured by Mahound 
(200). The episode of the satanic verses, wherein Mahound mistakes the devil’s verses 
for godly messages, is construed by her as “a proleptic figure for the seductions of 
cultural difference that obtain in the Indian subcontinent” (201). The reader is hard-
pressed to decide on the destiny of such seductions in the critic’s swaying.  
 
VI. De-fetishizing Magic Numbers 
If the narrative teemed with proliferated images in Midnight’s Children names 
the impossibility to break from the cultural pedagogy, the instances of naming, 
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numbering, doubling, and multiplying in The Satanic Verses further strengthen the 
ethos of sameness and figure as the overdetermined condition of postcoloniality. One 
wonders now whether the postcolonial subject can ever escape from the manipulation 
of the cultural pedagogy. 
In the midst of postcolonial national narrative’s fear of sameness, evinced in 
Midnight’s Children, the trace of “culture” lingers and plays an essential part without 
the postcolonial subject’s knowledge. Towards the end of his memoir, Saleem believes 
that his body is about to fall apart. At that moment, he hears his baby son utter his very 
first word ever, Abracadabra. The amazed Saleem hastens to explain that 
“Abracadabra” is not an Indian word at all; it derives from the Jewish cabbalistic 
tradition and denotes the number 365: the number of the days of the year, of the 
heavens, and of the spirits emanating from the god Abraxas (MC 547-48). The fact 
that this Indian Muslim baby starts his cultural journey in the world via a concept 
outside of his “original” culture already says a lot about the inherent difference or 
otherness in tradition. In addition, in the utterance of this series of syllables 
“Abracadabra,” both senses and senselessness come into play. There are indeed a set 
of predetermined signifieds attached to this word. Yet at the same time, this series of 
sounds “Abracadabra” can literally refuse any overdetermination. After the 
Abracadabra-baby talk incident, Saleem and his son accompany Saleem’s aged snake-
charmer friend, Picture Singh, on a trip to challenge a younger charmer who has stolen 
Singh’s championship title—yet another example of the struggle for difference. On 
board the train, it occurs to Saleem that the sound of the train’s engine resembles “A-
bra-ca-da-bra.” While this association reveals once again the limitation of Saleem’s 
imagination, which ostensibly cannot escape culturally-charged signs nor the impetus 
to interpret, what is noteworthy is that the signifying act accidentally swerves in the 
production of these syllables “A-bra-ca-da-bra.” The associating and moderating 
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power of the magic number melts down into nothing but a few sounds that help the 
postcolonial subject sustain a physical relationship with the world. So it seems that 
what faces the postcolonial subject, at the end of the day, is the need to de-fetishize 
other overpowering magic numbers inscribed in the postcolonial existence, such as 
“1947.” 
 
 
            
 CHAPTER FOUR 
Time and the Other: 
Haunted Writing in Theresa Hak Hyung Cha 
 
This formulation of the paradox and of the impossible therefore 
calls upon a figure that resembles a structure of temporality, an 
instantaneous dissociation from the present, a différance in 
being-with-itself of the present. 
   --Jacques Derrida, Aporias  
 
From the ontological inquiry grounded in my study of Rushdie, I will begin 
exploring the question of ethics in the postcolonial context. If Rushdie’s works 
demonstrate the profaneness of immediacy in the representation of history—a 
profaneness that constitutes the postcolonial experience—Theresa Cha’s work brings 
into light the impossibility of exorcizing the haunting ghost that lingers around from 
the past or from the unpresentable realms. It is in this impossibility, as her work 
suggests, that an ethical experience is rendered possible. In this chapter, I also address 
the limits of identity politics in a close-up way when I discuss Cha’s position in Asian 
American studies in the latter’s self-positioning as a minority discourse.  
 
Historian Dipesh Chakrabarty in his 2000 book, Provincializing Europe: 
Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, launches a heavy-duty intervention 
into postcolonial studies by proposing ontological considerations of political 
discourses and social thought. His project seeks to broaden the critique of historicism 
by bringing into light the global impact of historicism, whose underpinning 
assumption holds that “to understand anything it has to be seen both as a unity and in
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its historical development” (6). While this argument is not drastically unprecedented,1 
Chakrabarty distinguishes his approach from previous ones by cautiously negotiating 
for retention of certain universals which, though normally associated with historicism 
and European modernity such as modern politics and social justice, are to be of great 
use for postcolonial communities.  
What is more noteworthy is that Chakrabarty here has attempted to veer from 
the model of the Indian Subaltern Studies group which he has been actively involved 
with.2 The effort to resuscitate the subaltern class’s historical consciousness and 
agency that has informed the Subaltern Studies’ founding principle is now deemed 
inadequate by Chakrabarty. It is inadequate, according to him, mostly because the 
historian, however well-meaning, cannot overcome the secular conditionality of 
history as a discipline. That is, the evidence-driven discursivity of historical narratives 
renders it impossible to approach, for instance, the supernatural element in historical 
events. Commenting on the methodology of Ranajit Guha, the founding father of the 
Subaltern Studies, Chakrabarty points out that Guha’s interpretation of the nineteenth-
century Santal peasants’ rebellion against the British colonialization fails to 
accommodate in the historian’s narrative the Santal’s claim that God was the real 
instigator of the insurgence. Yet, the alternative that Chakrabarty proposes, instead of 
completely abandoning the disciplinarity of historical narratives, in effect aims to add 
an extra dimension to it: 
                                                 
1 Chakrabarty himself has pointed out that Western thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Fredric 
Jameson, and Lawrence Grossberg, among others, have either questioned historicism or attributed the 
decline of historicism to the logic of late capitalism. Chakrabarty departs from them by arguing for the 
rootedness of “late capitalism” in the Third World.  
2 Founded by Ranajit Guha, the Subaltern Studies involves a group of now established scholars 
who approach Indian colonial and modern history by focusing on the subaltern classes. Many of these 
scholars are now based in the United States, including Dipesh Chakrabarty himself, Partha Chatterjee, 
and Gyan Prakash. 
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We can . . . treat [the Santal] as a signifier of other times and societies. 
This gesture maintains a subject-object relationship between the 
historian and the evidence. . . . But the Santal with his statement “I did 
as my god told me to do” also faces us as a way of being in this world, 
and we could ask ourselves: Is that way of being a possibility for our 
own lives and for what we define as our present? Does the Santal help 
us to understand a principle by which we also live in certain instances? 
This question does not historicize or anthropologize the Santal, for the 
illustrative power of the Santal as an example of a present possibility 
does not depend on his otherness. Here the Santal stands as our 
contemporary, and the subject-object relationship that normally defines 
the historian’s relationship to his or her archives is dissolved in this 
gesture. To stay with the heterogeneity of the moment when the 
historian meets with the peasant is, then, to stay with the difference 
between these two gestures. One is that of historicizing the Santal in the 
interest of a history of social justice and democracy; and the other, that 
of refusing to historicize and of seeing the Santal as a figure 
illuminating a life possibility for the present. Taken together, the two 
gestures put us in touch with the plural ways of being that make up our 
own present. The archives thus help bring to view the disjointed nature 
of any particular “now” one may inhabit; that is the function of 
subaltern pasts. (108; emphasis mine)  
 By calling the Santal our contemporary, the historian does not mean to 
appropriate the past in the interest of the present; nor does he content himself with the 
marked difference between the Santal and the modern subject in the spirit of cultural 
relativism. Moreover, the historian makes it crystal clear that the last thing he would 
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consider is to see the Santal as a radical other (“the illustrative power of the Santal as 
an example of a present possibility does not depend on his otherness” [110]). Instead, 
Chakrabarty foregrounds the probable otherness of the present with itself—“other” 
because what separates the Santal from the present only brings into light and calls into 
question the existence and justification of boundaries such as the modern, the non-
modern, the rational, and the religious. By calling the Santal our contemporary, then, 
the historian reminds us that the Santal in effect has always lingered alongside “the 
present,” even “if only as that which exists as the limit or the border to the practices 
and discourses that define the modern” (110). 
 Chakrabarty represents an unusual example among current postcolonial-theory 
practitioners in his extension of postcolonial issues beyond political parameters into 
the ontological horizon. By calling the Santal our contemporary, he is modeled on two 
seemingly incongruous philosophical discourses: the Heideggerian temporalization of 
Dasein (which Chakrabarty defines as a forever lack in the realization of the “now”), 
and Derrida’s figuration of a disjointed time whose name is “the present.” For 
Chakrabarty, a “good” history is one that takes into consideration the “ontological 
now,” the kind of temporality that presupposes a plurality of times co-existing with 
one another—in other words, “a disjuncture of the present with itself” (113, 109). The 
“contemporaneity” of the past with the present, as Chakrabarty views it, serves as a 
Derridean “supplement,” for this contemporaneity renders history possible and at the 
same time helps show what the limits of history are as a discipline. 
Chakrabarty does not elaborate on why he groups Heidegger and Derrida 
together—after all, the latter’s figuration of disjointed time is in effect meant to 
critique the former’s obsession with presence. Yet, Chakrabarty’s attempt to 
ontologically revamp the discipline of history is notable. His entire project, as he 
repeatedly stresses, is informed by a dual vision: to draw on the analytical, 
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universalizing heritage represented by Marx’s “good” historicism3 on the one hand, 
and the hermeneutic, affective tradition represented by Heidegger on the other hand. 
In different phrasing, he distinguishes these two traditions by calling those “elements 
that are congenial to reproduction and reinforcement of the logic of capital” History 1 
and the hitherto marginalized life possibilities History 2 or the “subaltern history” (62-
71). Nevertheless, Chakrabarty’s subaltern history emphatically centralizes the idiom 
of labor—the most conspicuous move is his essentialization of “real labor” as the 
subaltern and, conversely, the subaltern as “real labor.” One, then, wonders if anybody 
fits into his subaltern history, especially those who are outside the pale of use value 
such as the mentally ill and the homeless, since Chakrabarty himself has clearly stated 
that “a madman’s narrative is not history” (98).4 Even his indebtedness to Heidegger 
or the affective heritage falls short of recognizing the absolutely unrepresentable. For 
his ultimate bottom line is still drawn at the edge of political modernity, however 
pluralized he has configured it to be: “For me, provincializing Europe has been a 
question of how we create conjoined and disjunctive genealogies for European 
categories of political modernity as we contemplate the necessarily fragmentary 
histories of human belonging that never constitute a one or a whole” (255). 
 
Opening this chapter with a critique of Chakrabarty’s alternative history, I 
hope to situate the primary subject of this chapter, Korean American writer/artist 
Theresa Hak Kyung Cha’s Dictée, in a broader context. Chakrabarty’s theoretical 
practice has remarkably pushed the envelope in postcolonial studies not only by 
questioning the methodology of progressive anti-Eurocentric discourses such as the 
Subaltern Studies, but also by attending to the rationally inaccessible such as 
                                                 
3 As mentioned above, Chakrabarty does not intend to discard all elements in historicism. Rather, 
he proposes to retain certain abstract universals so as to effect productive critiques of social injustices.  
4 I am indebted to Professor Timothy Watson of Princeton University for this observation. 
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religiosity. As argued above, however, in endeavoring to reconfigure the ethics of 
postcolonial historical narration, Chakrabarty eventually draws a clear-cut line at the 
front of political modernity, which, in the final analysis, is deeply grounded within the 
parameters of rationality. If Derrida is right in stipulating that all ontologization is met 
with some moment of mourning (Specters 9), Chakrabarty’s ontologization seems to 
flirt with a sense of plenitude and a politically charged teleology. It seems that every 
historical subject, be it religiously informed or not, is considered, first and foremost, as 
a political subject in Chakrabarty’s theorization; every historical subject, be it the 
proper subject of historical narratives or not, is presumed to welcome institutional 
modernity and social justice as the primary imperative in life. That is why, at the end 
of his book, Chakrabarty no longer mentions Derrida but, instead, chooses to land at 
Heidegger’s hermeneutics—a hermeneutics of presence, as Derrida would have it.  
To read Dictée, I will argue, is to draw attention to the ontological dimensions 
of postcoloniality by attending to the absolutely un(re)presentable. To say the least, 
the “subjects” that Dictée addresses are by no means containable in Chakrabarty’s 
putatively all-inclusive category of labor (as mentioned above, Chakrabarty 
essentializes the subaltern as “real labor” and “real labor” as the subaltern). 
Furthermore, of central importance to my project has been to contest the primacy of 
difference substantiated by a “manageable” Self-Other dynamic—“manageable” in the 
sense that both the Self and the Other appear to be locatable via their mutual 
positionings. In Dictée, the most radical possibility of the Other qua death emerges to 
challenge this scheme of manageability. Alongside the (unpresentable) presence of 
this radical Other is the figure of haunting. If, in Rushdie, the overdetermination of 
postcoloniality is materialized in a narrative structure haunted by the same images, in 
Cha, repetition of history that informs ontology turns into a potentially ethical move. 
That is, the postcolonial, post-diasporic subject in Dictée survives the violence of 
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colonial and contemporary imperialisms not by resisting the haunting of the 
formidable Other (in this case, history or radicalized history qua death), but by 
yielding herself to multiple others in a community that does not necessarily have a 
name.  
The primary inspiration for my inquiry into these ontological and ethical 
possibilities of postcoloniality is Derrida’s 1993 work, Spectres de Marx, where he 
deliberates on the conjunction between haunting, difference, and ethics. As argued in 
the previous chapter, postcolonial historical cognition oftentimes proceeds within an 
obscene immediacy—that is, there is usually little possibility to keep a dignified 
critical distance with a historical event. Hence the senseless repetition of the same 
allegorical impulse. In this chapter, I would like to further this thought by proposing 
that postcolonial history very often “makes sense” only retroactively in the midst of 
recurrent, repeated, and haunting tropes. This retroactive cognition, moreover, can 
point towards an ethical reception of history in the sense of shifting attention away 
from power relations to the sense of responsibility for the other. That is why, as 
Derrida has suggested, one should not try to exorcise ghosts too hastily.  
But first, I would like to examine Cha’s position in Asian American literature. 
In the same spirit as my analysis of Chakrabarty above, I would like to address the 
limitation of progressive identity politics in current Asian American studies so as to 
foreground the significance of Cha’s proposition—even though Cha in effect has 
served as a useful exemplar for this progressive politics. This critical engagement is 
timely in that postcolonial discourse, to a great extent, has been regarded or has 
regarded itself as being congenial to minority discourse—the former has absorbed a 
great deal of anti-hegemonic, anti-ethnocentric momentum from the latter, to say the 
least.5 Yet the strategics of identity politics informing minority discourse, I argue, can 
                                                 
5 See Introduction, note 1. 
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be restraining in the consideration of the current postcolonial exigency vis-à-vis the 
transforming configuration of national and cultural identification. 
 
I. Cha and Asian American Literature 
Cha’s Dictée, first published in 1982, emerges at a time when Asian American 
studies has just begun to gain currency in academia. When identity politics 
predominates the critical scene and when sociological approach to literature is 
normative,6 the unconventional texture of Dictée predetermines its negligence by 
critics. It is not until the 1990s, when critical attention in the field itself begins to shift 
from identity politics to more global concerns,7 that Dictée is revamped as an 
interrogation of the ideological nature of Asian American studies. Most directly 
responsible for mass attention to Dictée are editors and contributors of the collection 
Writing Self Writing Nation: Essays on Theresa Hak Kyung Cha’s Dictée, including 
Elaine H. Kim, Norma Alarcón, Hyun Yi Kang, Lisa Lowe, and Shelley Sunn Wong. 
For these critics, Dictée stands out as an important work for advancing a paradigm 
shift in Asian American studies, though the prospect of the shift differs from critic to 
critic. If, for Shelley Wong, Dictée rewrites Asian American configuration by 
refracting earlier identity politics of representativeness and authenticity into difference 
and mediation (104), what concerns Elaine Kim and Hyun Yi Kang, on the other hand, 
remains a mainstream ethos of representativeness. Both Kim and Kang call from their 
personal experiences for more attention to Korean and Korean American histories in 
                                                 
6 See, for example, the work of one of the founding scholars of Asian American literary studies, 
Elaine Kim (Asian American; “Defining”), which focuses primarily on the evolution of Asian American 
consciousness and self-image expressed in literature and on the way in which literature elucidates the 
social history of Asians in the United States. 
7 For example, some critics propose to consider Asian American identities not vis-à-vis the concept 
of America, but in relation to Asia or the global. The marriage of postcolonial concerns and ethnic 
studies, thus, becomes more than desirable. For such debates, see Lisa Lowe (“Heterogeneity”; 
“Decolonization”); Rachel Lee; Jinqi Ling; Shu-mei Shih (“Nationalism”); and Sau-ling Cynthia Wong. 
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mainstream arenas, and both commend Dictée for having enhanced visibility of 
Korean and Korean American subjects.  
 Shelley Wong’s approach appears to differ drastically from Kim’s and Kang’s. 
Wong painstakingly seeks to posit Dictée as a radical alterity in Asian American 
discourse and to locate Dictée’s political valence in this very alterity. The display of 
multiple positions in Dictée, Wong contends, disturbs the model of identity politics 
championed by ethnic minority discourse in general and Asian American cultural 
nationalism in particular. Wong very lucidly lays bare the myth of the American 
Bildung in relation to ethnic identification—a paradigm that prescribes the ultimate 
assimilation of all immigrant groups into a big American family. With the American 
Bildung, then, the individual’s growth epitomizes the typology of development in the 
interest of the ideology of multiculturalism: “a structuring discourse of wholeness 
reads difference primarily as the prefiguration of final identity” (129). By way of its 
nonrealist language, in contract, Dictée launches a trenchant critique of “identity and 
foundational discourses” (130), that is, discourses that valorize the sociological 
representativeness of a narrative, the authenticity of a literary representation, and the 
typology of wholeness. 
 Wong’s distrust of identity politics, however, has a certain limit. In place of the 
earlier ethos of representativeness, Wong calls for nothing but more room for a 
growingly diversified demography:  
In the face of a radically recompositioned constituency, Asian 
American cultural nationalism became less and less able to specify a 
common political agenda and cultural identity around which the entire 
Asian American population could cohere. The respective needs—
economic, social, political, cultural—of an increasingly diverse 
population which included fourth-generation Japanese American 
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professionals as well as first-generation Hmong farmers could hardly 
be addressed or accommodated within a single oppositional program. 
(132) 
Wong’s complaint about critic Stephen-Paul Martin, for instance, focuses on the fact 
that the latter omits Cha’s Korean name in his work—a negligence of “matters of race 
or nationality” (135). Yet, at the same time, Wong strongly questions the “ethnicity 
paradigm” as well as the male-identified nationalism inscribed in mainstream ethnic 
discourse. The line that is to be drawn between critical categories (race, nationality, or 
ethnicity) is vague if not irrational. Moreover, if a male-identified nationalism is 
undesirable, why is a nationalism promulgated by a Korean American female 
immigrant ought to be automatically sanctified? 
 It all seems that, while noting the political poetics of “unnaming” in Dictée 
(118), Wong is appealing for nothing but more names and sub-categories for 
minorities: woman, the religious subject, the colonial subject, the postcolonial subject, 
and so on. In this light, even if she does not subscribe to an ethos of wholeness, 
Wong’s wish to incorporate every emergent subjectivity into the political agenda, to a 
great extent, resembles conventional identity politics. For both operate along the line 
of specificity qua representativeness. While Dictée demands an attention to “those 
persistent clamourings of difference which threaten always to spill over the pristine 
foundations of the once-upon-a-time” and henceforth resists absorption by an 
American identity (136), Wong’s reading, in the final analysis, has it that Dictée be 
read as a reference to “the difference of the Korean American immigrant woman” 
(135). Eventually, it is a politics of difference longing for identity politics. It is also a 
localizing project in its valorization of a specificity as an example of a generality; it is, 
in other words, a mathematical rule of adding more minority differences to the 
equation.  
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 Lisa Lowe’s reading echoes Wong’s in stressing the “aesthetic of infidelity” in 
Dictée that defies the ethos of commensurability in national and cultural discourses 
(“Unfaithful” 37). The recurrent dictation and translation exercises in Dictée, as Lowe 
acutely points out, serve to question the ideology of equivalence substantiated in 
imperialist and nationalist idioms. Lowe concludes by calling for a marriage of 
identity politics and politics of difference and by commending Dictée for exemplifying 
such an engagement. Lowe here sees identity politics and politics of difference as two 
separate enterprises. Yet these two, more often than not, prove to be two sides of one 
coin in today’s minority political struggles in the sense that the appeal for 
heterogeneity and multiplicity always comes down to a politics of identity. I will 
return to the limits of difference-driven identity politics again when I discuss current 
identity issues in Taiwan in the next chapter. Suffice it to say here that this kind of 
identity politics/politics of difference eyes political gain at the expense of attention to 
the radically un(re)presentable. 
 Critic Shu-mei Shih has also provided a perceptive reading of Dictée, 
especially of the text’s positing of the universal female figure in opposition to 
teleological, patriarchal nationalism. Yet Shih’s reading, too, is trapped in a kind of 
identity politics due to its essentialization. She applies the category of “1.5 
generation,” which has been popularly employed in the Korean American community, 
to the reading of Dictée. The 1.5 generation, according to her, capitalizes certain 
demographic generalities and can avoid the stiff divisions between the first, second, 
and third generations:  
Born in Asia but emigrating at an early age, the 1.5 generation comes to 
America and grows up often as fully acculturated as second generation, 
but there is usually a less adamant rejection of the Asian country from 
where the family emigrated. Though not always bilingual, they are 
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often bicultural, and they maintain a profoundly ambiguous relationship 
to both the country in which they grow up and the country of their birth. 
They are simultaneously the immigrant whom American-born Asian 
Americans may despise and attempt to alienate, and the acculturated 
American who shares the language and experience of the American-
born. Hence they are in a sense neither “Asian,” “American,” nor 
“Asian American,” while at the same time being all of these. 
(“Nationalism” 145-46) 
Shih means to substitute the notion of “1.5 generation” for concepts like “in-
between” and “interstitial”—the spatial figuration of the latter, she argues, falls short 
in accounting for the simultaneity that certain immigrant subjects occupy. This 
sensitivity to the inadequacy of the above concepts is commendable, yet to replace 
these terms with a concrete sociological generalization seems anything but rigorous. 
Similarly, her attention to the importance of universalism in Dictée eventually gives 
way to her realistic localization of Theresa Cha the author. 
 These affirmative readings all foreground the anti-nationalist, anti-
representative, and non-identitarian installations in Dictée to bring into light the 
desirable paradigm shift in Asian American literature away from conventional identity 
politics. I argue that these Dictée promoters’ fine readings have their limitations in the 
sense that they all insist on a difference-substantiated identity politics in the final 
instance—that is, they all seek their ultimate teleology within political parameters. My 
reading in these pages would like to focus on the ontologization of politics instantiated 
by Dictée. In particular, I would like to look beyond the localizing scope, which 
mostly reads Dictée as an illustration of an Asian American female writer’s specificity. 
The primacy of historical specificity stressed by critics, I suggest, is tantamount to a 
more refined identity politics. If earlier identity politics is primarily invested in 
 
 129
representativeness, progressive identity politics, such as that of Wong, Lowe, and Shih, 
aims to re-represent the non-identical subject. What is missing, however, is the 
un(re)presentable. 
 As previewed above, I will address the question of haunted history in Dictée 
by reading Cha in tandem with Derrida. An accompanying reason for engaging 
Derrida here is to probe into some critics’ generalized application of what is 
commonly termed “poststructuralism.” For one thing, Derrida’s signature notion 
différance has served as a master signifier in many minority discourses and certain 
postcolonial discourses. Shelley Wong, for instance, contends that Dictée resists 
absorption by an American identity by way of constantly positing “surplus” or 
“excess.” The way in which the “stain” of the syntax of Dictée spills on the language 
of the cultural center, to be sure, resembles the moment of mimicry Bhabha has 
championed. Drawing on Derrida, Bhabha proposes a “supplementary” sentiment—
that is, the postcolonial, if unable to “add up,” at least can disturb the calculation by 
“adding to” the cultural pedagogy (155). The problem with this proposition is that it 
risks perpetuating the equivalence between the postcolonial subject and the Other in 
cultural signification. Rushdie’s novels have demonstrated that the “postcolonial = the 
other-ed” formula is not necessarily the best approach to postcoloniality, at least not to, 
say, “metropolitan postcoloniality” portrayed in many of Rushdie’s works. 
Furthermore, the kind of postcoloniality that is predicated upon universality and a 
yielding to the other(s), illustrated in Dictée, will show that a new way of configuring 
the postcolonial subject can be fruitful. 
 
II. Ghostly History 
Commenting on Derrida’s Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the 
Working of Mourning, and the New International, Fredric Jameson invites attention to 
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the dense materiality and the formative valence of figuration in Derrida’s 
philosophical inquiries. It is also in this regard that Jameson finds a point of 
convergence with the deconstructionist—that is, Derrida’s concentrated figuration is 
deemed as a certain formalism, something that grounds a significant portion of 
Jameson’s own theoretical corpus: “a certain formalism . . . offers the opportunity to 
change the valencies on the problem, to adjust the lens of thought in such a way that 
suddenly we find ourselves focusing, not on the presumed content of the opposition, 
but rather on the well-nigh material grain of its arguments, an optical adjustment that 
leads us in new and wholly unexpected directions” (“Marx’s” 40-41). 
Critics in general read Derrida’s theorization of the spectral image in Specters 
of Marx as a dwelling on one’s relationship with the past—Jameson, among others, 
urges the reader to examine why the conceptuality of the spectral can serve as a 
possible solution to “the false problem of the antithesis between humanism (respect of 
the past) and nihilism (end of history, disappearance of the past)” (“Marx’s” 41).8 A 
more relevant reading, on the other hand, is Pheng Cheah’s proposition that considers 
Derridean spectralization as a radical finitude or an inscription of death within life, 
viewing the relationship between the “proper body of the living nation-people” and the 
bourgeois postcolonial state as a “living on with, in, and through a certain kind of 
death.” Cheah concretizes the “death” figuration as variations of technicity affecting 
the living nation such as the formative role of modern knowledge, organization in the 
genesis of the nation, public reason, as well as other monitoring and manipulating 
technics of the state in the service of capital (Spectral 420-21; also see a similar 
version in “Living On”). His reading, in a sense, echoes Chakrabarty’s return to the 
                                                 
8 Ghostly Demarcations, edited by Michael Sprinker, contains responses to Specters of Marx by 
some of the most publicized critics of the time including, Antonio Negri, Pierre Macherey, Fredric 
Jameson, Warren Montag, Terry Eagleton, Aijaz Ahmad, and Tom Lewis. These critics mostly focus on 
the long-awaited rendez-vous between deconstruction and Marxism. 
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ontologized version of Marx’s critique of capital, with Marx’s category of labor 
translated into “the subaltern” in Chakrabarty and “living nation-people” in Cheah.  
My engagement with Derrida aims to extend the consideration of political 
conditions beyond the pale of labor, capitalist technē, commodity, and so on, and 
confront nothing other than death in its literality in the postcolonial context. Only in 
this way, I argue, can one reach the mistiest area in the consideration of the Other. 
Derrida’s writing on Marx restates the importance of treating issues of politics 
ontologically, however impossible the discourse involved may appear. In addition, as 
Jameson has suggested, it is worthwhile to examine the density of figuration in 
Derrida’s theoretical discourse. What is particularly noteworthy is Derrida’s ability to 
bring into light not only the relevance of certain figural images but, more significantly, 
the repetition of them in the philosophical tradition. Moreover, Derrida’s configuration 
of the relationship between temporality and ethics—especially his proposal of 
rendering “justice” to the absolute singularity of a “pre-” condition (whatever comes 
first)—will serve as a useful point of intervention into future postcolonial thinking.  
Derrida’s engagement with Marxian discourse in Specters of Marx, an 
extension of a plenary address he delivered at the “Wither Marxism? Global Crises in 
International Perspective” conference held in Irvine, California in 1993, to a great 
extent marks deconstruction’s self-repositioning vis-à-vis the perennial “crisis” of 
Marxism. The latter seems to have been predestined at the outset as Marx and Engels 
themselves already talk about their own possible “aging” and their “historicity” (qtd. 
in Derrida, Specters 13). So is it possible that the nature of Marxian discourse 
irreducibly makes it more susceptible to age while the nature of deconstruction does 
the opposite? Can this very difference of discursive nature have occasioned this 
overdue deconstructionist engagement with Marxism? Aijaz Ahmad reads Derrida’s 
reference to the disavowed Hamlet, the governing trope in Specters of Marx, as 
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Derrida’s own “mourning” that it is the neo-liberal rightists instead of 
deconstructionists who have inherited the legacy of Marxism after the collapse of 
historical Marxism (“Reconciling” 92-94). I hesitate to endorse this allegorization, but 
I argue that the collapse of historical Marxism is very likely the condition of 
possibility for a deconstructionist (re)connection with Marxism: a Marxism divested 
of goal-oriented politics in the real world appears to be a serener dialogue partner with 
deconstruction. 
If one of Derrida’s signature moves is to conduct a linguistically driven 
reasoning, his brilliance rests in his knack for making historical and conceptual 
connections within and beyond linguistic realms. In Specters of Marx, Derrida first 
links the spectral image in Marx’s thinking with the fatherly ghost in Hamlet, citing on 
the side thinkers who have drawn on the same figure, including Paul Valéry and 
Maurice Blanchot. From Hamlet’s famous line, “The time is out of joint,” Derrida 
returns to his mother tongue, examines various translations, and spells out the 
legitimacy of pondering on disjointed time in conjunction with ethics. Gide’s 
translation of “The time is out of joint”—“Cette époque est déshonorée” (“this age is 
dishonored”)—as Derrida maintains, demonstrates a valid transit from the 
“disadjusted” to the “unjust.” Derrida’s ultimate move, furthermore, is to name this 
temporal disadjustment as the condition of justice (19-20). This linguistic connection 
between the disadjusted and the unjust also finds an echo in Heidegger’s interpretation 
of Dikē (as joining, adjoining, adjustment) and Adikia (as disjointed, undone, twisted, 
and out of line) (23). Dissatisfied with Heidegger’s residual obsession with presence, 
however, Derrida stipulates that genuine justice—in opposition to juridical justice and 
morality—rests in the self’s opening up to the absolute singularity of the coming one 
(arrivant).  
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This kind of linguistically driven reasoning extends into what eventually 
becomes a key player in his critique of Marx: the concept of conjuration. Picking one 
line from The Manifesto of the Communist Party, “All the powers of old Europe have 
joined into a holy hunt against this specter [communism],” Derrida suggests playing 
with the French word “conjuration,” which, as he lays out, can mean the conspiracy of 
those who swear together, the invocation or convocation of a spirit, as well as 
conjurement or magical exorcism (40-48). His final word on Marx laments that the 
latter is too hasty in conjuring away many ghosts without attending to the 
philosophical and existential possibilities provided by the linguistic possibilities of the 
word conjuration. 
What I would like to focus on for my postcolonial inquiries is the relationship 
between ethical thinking and the sense of time. More than twenty years prior to the 
publication of Specters of Marx, the Derridean ethics is articulated primarily with the 
originary status of the other and differance in his radical (anti-)ontology called 
grammatology: “There is no ethics without the presence of the other but also, and 
consequently, without absence, dissimulation, detour, differance, writing” 
(Grammatology 140). In Specters of Marx, time, dramatized in the specter figure, sets 
in to complicate the equation. Derrida himself has attempted to preempt doubts about 
the indiscriminate universalization of “the time is out of joint”—that is, whether or not 
the Denmark prince’s time also speaks for every temporal juncture in history. 
Derrida’s answer is primarily prompted by grammatical cues: “In a predicative 
proposition that refers to time, and more precisely to the present-form of time, the 
grammatical present of the verb to be, in the third person indicative, seems to offer a 
predestined hospitality to the return of any and all spirits, a word that one needs 
merely to write in the plural in order to extend a welcome there to specters” (49-50). 
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Despite the banality of this answer, when he reiterates his configuration of time 
in conjunction with his alterity-grounded ethics, the exigency of time becomes more 
palpable. First of all, from his citation of Gide’s translation of “The time is out of 
joint,” it is already notable that Derrida encourages an association between disjointed 
time and dishonored time. Moreover, he is in effect proposing that every present is 
inscribed by a vulnerability to ethical treatment as the following sequence renders 
clear: “No differance without alterity, no alterity without singularity, no singularity 
without here-now” (31). His main contention is that, as every moment of here-now 
presumes a “non-contemporaneity” with itself, it is ethically and politically necessary 
and practical to face the alterity in each present. Every present, in other words, is 
inherently disjointed; every ethical call begins at a disjointed juncture. 
The question is: why does every moment of here-now predestine a non-
contemporaneity with itself? How can his proposition not be deprived of its ethico-
political urgency? Following up on Jameson’s comment, I argue that it is in his 
meticulous attention to figuration that Derrida illuminates the ethical relevance of the 
here-now. One may even venture to say that only a language of figuration seems 
capable of configuring this relationship between time and ethics. 
The fatherly specter in Hamlet is not any other figure—that is, its alterity does 
not derive primarily from its radical difference from the self. On the contrary, the 
blood relationship and the presumed responsibility of inheritance magnify the anxiety 
in the son figure that he himself may very well inherit this spectral uncanniness. That 
is why the here-now does not guarantee a fresh start. If the son refuses to inherit, 
however, another imperative will be upon him, namely, an imperative for revolution, 
“a violence, a decision of rupture.” This is one of “Marx’s three voices” that Blanchot 
identifies: the political voice, the voice of the revolution not as a final necessity but as 
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“imminence” or as an opportunity in time to be lived as ever-present demand (qtd. in 
Derrida, Specters 33). 
This is the catch-22 confronting the one who comes after. If he decides to take 
up the responsibility of continuing the line, he faces the uncanny spectrality of his 
father and also of his own. On the other hand, if he resists the unnaturalness of natural 
heritage, the impulse for imminence or the urge to provide a new revolutionized time, 
will always be in order—that is, a kind of Nietzschean impulse to modernize will fall 
upon him one moment after another. Either way, the present emerges as less than an 
immanence; either way, the present makes its imprint as a singular instance; and either 
way, the existence of the ghost bespeaks a finitude. Hence “no singularity without 
here-now.” As Jameson puts it well, what spectrality says is not that ghosts exist nor 
that the past is still very well alive, but rather that “the living present is scarcely as 
self-sufficient as it claims to be; that we would do well not to count on its density and 
solidity, which might under exceptional circumstances betray us” (“Marx’s” 39). 
Derrida’s radical ethics then demands that the one who comes after grant hospitality 
towards the uncompromisable other qua time. Repetition of the spectral figure in 
Marx’s thinking bespeaks the conditionality of futurist or revolutionary thinking—that 
is, a thinking of time is always already intertwined with ideological identification. 
Another important feature in Derrida’s spectral ethics is that the specter figure 
comes to disturb the commonly held relationship between subject and object. The 
“visor effect” created by the specter, the “thing” which looks at me without me 
knowing what it is, paralyzes the kind of power relationship generally attributed to the 
subject-object dichotomy. That is, in the encounter with the specter, the one who is 
looking at us is not necessarily the object while the one who inherits is not necessarily 
the subject. Put otherwise, the “subject” is not necessarily the one who has power.  
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Yet the spectral ontology (“hauntology” in Derrida’s coinage) is further 
complicated when Derrida gets to the multiple meanings accorded to the specter in 
Marx. On the one hand, as in The Manifesto of the Communist Party, communism is 
described as a specter haunting Europe. An abstract idea, at once present and futurist 
awaiting its fulfillment into lived reality, communism as a specter exudes such a threat 
that even Marx and Engels themselves appear to fear the development of history 
coming to haunt them from a future time. On the other hand, Marx repeatedly refers to 
the past experiences as ghosts that need to be conjured away to the benefit of the 
revolutionaries of today. Thirdly, the whole process of idealization, including the 
production of exchange-value, the ideologization of the commodity logic, as well as 
capitalist socialization, is emphatically described as spectralization. All in all, a sense 
of anxiety lingers in Marx’s choice of figuration: “It is as if Marx and Marxism had 
run away, fled from themselves, and had scared themselves” (Derrida, Specters 105). 
 Derrida’s ultimate critique of Marx (also of Freud and Heidegger) targets at 
Marx’s hasty attempt to exorcise ghosts outright or to let the past be past for good: 
. . . Marx, das Unheimliche, perhaps should not have chased away so 
many ghosts too quickly. Not all of them at once or not so simply on 
the pretext that they did not exist . . . or that all this was or ought to 
remain past (“Let the dead bury their dead,” and so forth). All the more 
so in that he also knew how to let them go free, emancipate them even, 
in the movement in which he analyzes the (relative) autonomy of 
exchange-value, the ideologem, or the fetish. Even if one wanted to, 
one could not let the dead bury the dead: that has no sense, that is 
impossible. Only mortals, only the living who are not living gods can 
bury the dead. Only mortals can watch over them, and can watch, 
period. Ghosts can do so as well, they are everywhere where there is 
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watching; the dead cannot do so—it is impossible and they must not do 
so. (174-75; emphasis in the original)  
 Here Derrida first bemoans Marx’s eagerness to have the past locked into the 
past (“to let the dead bury their dead”). The next moment, however, this move to let 
the dead bury their dead emerges as the example par excellence of the impossible, the 
possibility of which, to be certain, names Derrida’s definitive idea of “despairing 
‘messianism’” or “absolute hospitality”—that is, his ethics (169):9  
That the without-ground of this impossible can nevertheless take place 
is on the contrary the ruin or the absolute ashes, the threat that must be 
thought, and, why not, exorcised yet again. To exorcise not in order to 
chase away the ghosts, but this time to grant them the right, if it means 
making them come back alive, as revenants who would no longer be 
revenants, but as other arrivants to whom a hospitable memory or 
promise must offer welcome—without certainty, ever, that they present 
themselves as such. Not in order to grant them the right in this sense 
but out of a concern for justice. Present existence or essence has never 
been the condition, object, or the thing [chose] of justice. One must 
constantly remember that the impossible (“to let the dead bury their 
dead”) is, alas, always possible. One must constantly remember that 
this absolute evil (which is, is it not, absolute life, fully present life, the 
one that does not know death and does not want to hear about it) can 
                                                 
9 Earlier in the same chapter, Derrida compares his notion of “absolute hospitality” with the pre-
determined, theological, Abrahamic messianism and with the quasi-transcendental capitalist 
messianism: “One may deem strange, strangely familiar and inhospitable at the same time (unheimlich, 
uncanny), this figure of absolute hospitality whose promise one would choose to entrust to an 
experience that is so impossible, so unsure in its indigence, to a quasi-‘messianism’ so anxious, fragile, 
and impoverished, to an always presupposed ‘messianism,’ to a quasi-transcendental ‘messianism’ that 
also has such an obstinate interest in a materialism without substance: a materialism of the khôra for a 
despairing ‘messianism’” (Specters 168-69). 
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take place. One must constantly remember that it is even on the basis of 
the terrible possibility of this impossible that justice is desirable: 
through but also beyond right and law. (175; emphasis in the original) 
 My understanding of these passages is that they are not as much contradictory 
with each other as addressing two separate key points. Derrida remains consistent in 
his radical ethics in the sense that he grants unconditional priority to whatever seems 
impossible. On the other hand, drawing on the multi-meaningful French word 
conjuration, Derrida reminds us to acknowledge the existence of ghosts and to treat 
them as absolute others that deserve absolute hospitality. Marx himself has realized 
this ethical move perfectly when he analyzes the “(relative) autonomy of exchange-
value, the ideologem, or the fetish,” but he has wrongly sought to chase away these 
spectral entities all at once. As is shown above, inheritance per se already prescribes 
the prospect of haunting while haunting, in turn, intimates the possibility of the son’s 
own uncanniness.  
 
III. Haunted Writing in Dictée 
To conjure away the fatherly specter would mean to get rid of oneself; 
repetition or recurrence of the same spectral figure indicates an impossibility to break 
from oneself or from one’s own inheritance. In Dictée, what figures as this 
impossibility of breaking from one’s inheritance is the repeated act or image of 
speaking, uttering, along with the difficulty of such acts.  
Without a governing plot line or any central character, Dictée consists of 
several clusters of poems, dictation and translation sequences imitating language-class 
exercises, fragmented recounts of the history of modern Korea from the colonial 
period to the time of the Korean War and through the contemporary, allusions to St. 
Thérèse of Lisieux, personal memoirs in relation to diasporic experience of Koreans, 
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historical photographs, Chinese calligraphy, maps, inscriptions, and images of body 
organs. The book is divided into nine chapters, each named after one of the nine muses 
in the Western literary tradition, although one of the muses “Euterpe” is substituted for 
by a muse that Cha herself invented: “Elitere.” The epigraph attributed to Sappho at 
the beginning of the book, according to some critics, is also Cha’s own invention.10 
Although the text rejects straightforward storytelling, and although the text 
materializes the difficulty of authentic historical writing, the centralization of the 
erstwhile other-ed subjects seems unmistakable. The allusion to Sappho, the recurrent 
reference to Diseuse (a professional female reciter who performs in ancient rituals), 
the recounting of a young female anti-Japanese martyr’s story, of a colonial diasporic 
female’s experience, and of a female saint’s religious piety—all this seems to 
instantiate a kind of female rewriting of history whose anti-patriarchal, anti-colonial, 
and anti-nationalist tropes are more than palpable. As a matter of fact, this kind of 
reading—that is, to read Dictée as a critique of male-dominated nationalism and its 
paraphernalia—is generally shared by critics who champion Cha’s position in Asian 
American literature, as elaborated above.  
What has not been paid much attention to is the dynamic between images and 
words in Dictée, a text that is keen on employing different representational media. 
Considering that Cha was also an installation and media artist, I propose here to place 
images in Dictée in a more central position in order to obtain a more sophisticated 
reading of Dictée’s poetics, ethics, and politics.  
The chapter entitled “Clio/History” opens with the photograph of the young 
Korean anti-Japanese revolutionary, Yu Guan Soon, followed by an epitaphic note 
indicating the dates of her birth and death, which then is followed by two big 
calligraphic Chinese characters denoting “female” and “male” on either side of two 
                                                 
10 See Shelly Wong. 
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facing pages. The written text of this chapter relates how Guan Soon, at age sixteen, 
leads an anti-Japanese demonstration in the year of 1919. The first noteworthy thing is 
that Dictée in effect does not exclude nationalist sentiments outright. The opening 
epitaph, for instance, appeals to an ethos of single origin: “She is born of one mother 
and one father” (25). Elsewhere in the text, the narrator assertively spells out the 
sanctity of nationalism: “There is no people without a nation, no people without 
ancestry. There are other nations no matter how small their land, who have their 
independence. But our country, even with 5, 000 years of history, has lost it to the 
Japanese” (28). The enunciating subject here speaks from an overdetermined 
nationalist discourse. 
Another thing that deserves attention is the way in which Guan Soon’s death is 
at once evoked and shunned in the account of her brief life. The opening epitaph 
mentions that she dies on October 12, 1920, which is roughly one and a half years 
after her anti-Japanese demonstration takes place. Later in the text, the narrator 
describes the martyrdom as such: 
The march begins, the flags are taken out, made visible, waved, every 
individual crying out the independence the freedom to the people of 
this nation. Knowing equally the punishment. Her parents leading the 
procession fell. Her brothers. Countless others were fired at and 
stabbed indiscriminately by the enemy soldiers. Guan Soon is arrested 
as a leader of the revolution, with punishment deserving of such a rank. 
She is stabbed in the chest, and subjected to questioning to which she 
reveals no names. She is given seven years prison sentence to which 
her reply is that the nation itself is imprisoned. (37) 
 The reader, at this point, should be noticing that, according to the epitaph, 
Guan Soon dies before her presumable seven-year prison sentence is completed. Yet, 
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aside from the epitaph, throughout the narrative up to the end the chapter, the narrator 
has not literally mentioned Guan Soon’s death again. Not only does the narrator avoid 
a direct mention of the child martyr’s death, the narrator in effect attempts to 
immortalize her: 
   Some will not know age. Some not age. Time stops. Time will stop 
for some. For them especially. Eternal time. No age. Time fixes for 
some. Their image, the memory of them is not given to deterioration, 
unlike the captured image that extracts from the soul precisely by 
reproducing, multiplying itself. Their countenance evokes not the 
hallowed beauty, beauty from seasonal decay, evokes not the inevitable, 
not death, but the dy-ing.  
   Face to face with the memory, it misses. It’s missing. Still. What of 
time. Does not move. Remains there. Misses nothing. Time, that is. All 
else. All things else. All other, subject to time. Must answer to time, 
except. Still born. Aborted. Barely. Infant. Seed, germ, sprout, less 
even. Dormant. Stagnant. Missing. (37-38) 
 The narrator apparently has in mind two different images of death. The first 
one is not subject to deterioration or to time, an image that evokes not death but “the 
dy-ing.” The other image is the “captured image that extracts from the soul precisely 
by reproducing, multiplying itself,” an image that evokes a hallow beauty and the 
inevitable qua death. From the flow of the narrative, it should be reasonable to assume 
that Guan Soon’s image falls into the first category, the image that does not age. While 
all others are subject to time and must answer to time, she does not. She is the absent 
referent in truncated phrases like “except.”  
What, then, can be an example of the image that evokes death as the 
inevitable? 
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 At the end of the chapter is another historical photograph. No reference 
provided, this photograph appears to be a scene of execution of three adult men by 
Japanese soldiers. While Guan Soon’s death is not spelled out in the narrative 
regarding her martyrdom, the chapter ends with the most straightforward 
representation of death. In comparison with the photograph of Guan Soon wherein she 
stares audaciously at the camera, the three men in the execution scene are blindfolded 
in their becoming the object and evidence of historical brutality. If the execution scene 
suggests the inevitability as well as the “hallowed beauty” of death, the narrator seems 
to suggest that the photograph of Guan Soon, involving a virtual face-to-face contact 
between her gaze and the camera/spectator, translates as the “dy-ing.” The gaze 
renders possible a temporal relay from a specific moment in history (the moment when 
the camera caught her image) all the way to the moment of spectatorship—not only of 
the here-now but also of always and everywhere insofar as the spectator is caught by 
the photographic subject’s staring. The story of the child martyr as the relay for other 
revolutionaries, then, can be relayed repeatedly in time because of the direct gaze of 
her in the photograph and because of the materiality of the photograph.11
Roland Barthes towards the end-point of his life chooses to reflect on death 
through considerations of the ontology of photography. In Camera Lucida, he 
suggests that a historical photograph usually evokes two senses of time which take 
place almost simultaneously: first, the spectator is reminded that the photographed 
being “is going to die,” and in the next moment the spectator comes to the awareness 
that the photographed “is dead.” The platitude of death, in Barthes’s terms, is 
                                                 
11 Shu-mei Shih’s reading, in contrast, focuses on the impossibility of words in historical 
representation where violence is imposed: “Yu Guan Soon’s photograph, along with the photograph of 
Koran martyrs crucified in a graveyard awaiting execution by Japanese soldiers, visually addresses the 
impossibility of historiography (words) to capture history’s concrete, material, physical, and above all 
bloody reality, one filled with ‘decapitated forms’” (“Nationalism” 150). 
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inscribed in the inevitability of this procession of time. In Dictée, however, Guan 
Soon’s story is told in such a way that the instantiation of her death sentence is 
carefully deferred. It is not that the story about the end of her life is unavailable in 
history (although it is not unlikely that the image of her death is inaccessible). Yet 
what is more important here, I argue, is that by opening this chapter on Korean 
colonial history with the image of this young girl and closing this chapter with the 
image of inevitable death in an anti-colonial history, by putting Guan Soon’s name 
explicitly in the position of the absent in the syntax of historical discourse (those 
truncated sentences where her name can very well follow “except”), Dictée seeks to 
render Guan Soon’s sacrifice an ontological meaning that other ensuing nationalist 
revolutions, such as the localized anti-colonial movements represented by the 
execution scene, can rely on. Unlike the “unworking” or platitude of death in 
Barthes’s conception of photography, which apparently frustrates ontological 
cognition, the imagistic writing in Dictée in effect has put dy-ing, if not death, to work. 
The chapter “Calliope/Epic Poetry” opens with a photograph of a young Asian 
woman. The written part of the chapter, presumably based on the diary of Cha’s 
mother, is the narrator’s dialogue with her mother as an eighteen-year-old Korean girl 
living in Manchuria in 1940. The narrator of the here and now thus addresses her 
mother: “Mother, you are eighteen years old. You were born in Yong Jung, Manchuria 
and this is where you now live” (45; emphasis mine). This second-person address 
creates a simultaneity for various temporalities: not only the narrator’s enunciative 
present, and not only the present of the mother in her youth, but also the present of us 
as the readers of the here and now. The young woman in the photograph facing us the 
readers, and the text physically adjacent to the image, also facing us, together with the 
written words addressing the reader as “Mother,” as well as the reversed position 
between the narrator’s mother who actually wrote this diary at a specific historical 
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moment and the narrator now speaking in the permanent present tense to her mother 
before the latter becomes a mother—all the multi-layered temporalization reminds one 
of seventeen-century artist Velàsquez’s painting Las Meninas, which Foucault has 
famously analyzed in The Order of Things.  
In Las Meninas, the position occupied by the actual spectator happens to 
coincide with the position occupied earlier in historical time by the actual painter 
Velàsquez as well as with the position occupied by the object of the artist figure within 
the painting, namely, the king and queen, whose images are reflected in the mirror far 
away from the audience. These multiple temporalities—that is, both the fictional 
moment (the act of painting within the painting) and the metafictional moment of 
artistic representation (the relationship between Velàsquez and his own art)—are 
being subordinated by this vanishing point that is this void we as spectators are 
occupying here and now. All this anachronism, for Foucault, serves as a perfect trope 
for the Classical system of order: a space “that is opened up inside representation 
when representation represents itself, that area where being and the Same reside” 
(209). 
 Put otherwise, Las Meninas bespeaks a self-referentiality that defines a certain 
episteme. While the dynamic between words and images in the “Calliope/Epic Poetry” 
chapter of Dictée appears to resemble this self-referentiality, a closer look will reveal 
that Cha’s work in effect promises a more ethical potentiality than, say, Camera 
Lucida’s use of images. 
In Camera Lucida, which shows two dozes of well-captioned photographs, the 
most important photograph showing Barthes’s mother as a five-year-old girl (the 
“Winter Garden” photograph) is intriguingly missing. Barthes has read this 
photograph as the umbilical cord that provides maternal comfort not only for his final 
reflection on life but also for the possibility of this little monograph on photography. 
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He writes that “I studied the little girl [in the “Winter Garden” photograph] and at last 
rediscovered my mother” (69). He also writes that photography gives him a Proustian 
involuntary memory: “a sentiment as certain as remembrance, just as Proust 
experienced it one day when, leaning over to take off his boots, there suddenly came 
to him his grandmother’s true face” (70). What is perplexing is that the Barthes who 
has named the platitude of photography and who has named the forever absence of the 
photographed being, here attributes a fullness to photography. Moreover, he chooses 
to represent that fullness of photography not by showing the very photograph in 
question, but by resorting to his own words.  
The narrator in Dictée, on the other hand, opts for the second-person present 
tense to retell her mother’s story. Each time when the story is being read, the reader in 
effect occupies not only the position of the Mother as the narrator’s addressee, but also 
the position that was previously occupied by the narrator’s mother writing the diary, as 
well as the position of the narrator herself reading her mother’s diary. At the same 
time, the reader also catches the immediate moment of writing as if the events of 
storytelling, writing, and reading are always ongoing simultaneously. Unlike Las 
Meninas or Camera Lucida, however, Dictée is not as much about self-referentiality 
as about an act of relay in historical representation amongst shifting enunciative and 
cognitive positions. In the prefatory section, the narrator writes of a professional 
woman reciter in ancient rituals called Diseuse: “She allows others. In place of her. 
Admits others to make full. Make swarm. . . . The others each occupying her. . . . She 
relays the others. Recitation. Evocation. Offering. Provocation. The begging. Before 
her. Before them” (3-4). The narrating subject does not imagine the others as self-
consolidating others. In the relays of storytelling, others’ stories take place in her. The 
present tense used in “Calliope/Epic Poetry,” then, attests to the “event-ness” of the 
taking place of others’ life possibilities. 
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Towards the end of this chapter is the story of a Korean woman’s return to her 
motherland after she has obtained American citizenship. The chapter closes with a 
photograph of an old Asian woman, which, once again, forms an intriguing dialogue 
with the text. In the text, the narrator foregrounds carnal images in the woman’s 
returning to her origin country: “You see the color the hue the same you see the shape 
the form the same you see the unchangeable and the unchanged the same you smell 
filtered edited through progress and westernization the same . . . speech, the same” 
(57). Then the narrator describes how at the customs, the maternal rooted-ness that this 
returned woman is seeking has been neutralized: “Not a single word allowed to utter 
until the last station, they ask to check the baggage. You open your mouth half way. 
Near tears, nearly saying, I know you I know you, I have waited to see you for long 
this long. They check each article, question you on foreign articles, then dismiss you” 
(58). In contrast to the emphasis on visual perceptions in the text (“You see the color 
the hue the same you see the shape . . .”), the photograph shows the old woman having 
her lips tightly shut and eyes turned away from the camera, positing a extension of the 
words in the text. 
To say that Dictée is solely for the valorization of “the difference of the 
Korean American immigrant woman” (Wong, Shelley 135) is to neglect its 
universalizing attempt.12 If anything, Dictée tends to couple political messages with 
universalizing moves. In the following passage, for instance, the critique of the 
language crisis in postcoloniality (“broken tongue,” “cracked tongue,” or “pidgin 
[“pidgeon” in the text]) turns into a non-political pathos lamenting the difficulty of 
speech: 
One by one. 
                                                 
12 Shu-mei Shih has already noted Cha’s evocation of female universalism in the effort of narrating 
the self (“Nationalism”).  
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The sounds. The sounds that move at a time 
stops. Starts again. Exceptions 
stops and starts again 
all but exceptions. 
Stop. Start. Starts. 
Contractions. Noise. Semblance of noise. 
Broken speech. One to one. At a time. 
Cracked tongue. Broken tongue. 
Pidgeon. Semblance of speech. 
Swallows. Inhales. Stutter. Starts. Stops before 
starts. 
About to. Then stops. Exhale 
swallowed to a sudden arrest. 
Rest. Without. Can do without rests. Improper 
to rest before begun even. Probation of rest. 
Without them all. 
Stop start. 
Where proper pauses were expected. 
But no more. (75) 
 In the “Urania/Astronomy” chapter where this passage is found, two images of 
the human body in Chinese acupuncture are placed at the beginning of the chapter 
while pictures of the human respiratory system along with English explanatory terms 
are inserted in the middle of the chapter. The textual part of this chapter consists of 
sequences of seemingly random utterances in French and its English counterparts 
juxtaposed side by side. While the images present a neutral anatomy of the human 
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body, the inarticulate text—at first sight neutral and meaningless—reveals a pathos of 
trauma precisely in the repetition of the same words: 
I heard the swans 
in the rain I heard 
I listened to the spoken true 
or not true  
not possible to say. 
 
There. Years after 
no more possible to distinguish the rain. 
No more. Which was heard. 
Swans. Speech. Memory. Already said. 
Will just say. having just said. 
Remembered not quite heard. Not certain. 
Heard, not at all. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
There. Later, uncertain, if it was 
the rain, the speech, memory. 
Re membered from dream. 
How it diminishes itself. How to Dim 
inish itself. As 
it dims.  
 
To bite the tongue. 
Swallow. Deep. Deeper. 
Swallow. Again even more. 
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Just until there would be nor more of organ. 
Organ no more. 
Cries. (67, 69) 
 Nothing “represents” trauma more tellingly than recurrent broken memories 
and repeated fragmented utterances. My argument is that Cha inserts this chapter 
between the chapters on Korean colonial history (“Clio/History,” “Calliope/Epic 
Poetry”) and the chapter on Korea’s partition into two (“Melpomene/Tragedy”) in 
order to posit an other-than-political interrogation of these political events. 
Inarticulation wrapped in repetition materializes the impossibility of breaking from 
one’s inheritance.  
Dictée meanders through numerous stories and enunciative positions. Very 
often the only connection between diverse historical occurrences is rendered possible 
by nothing other than material syntactical articulation. Or, words very often function 
as images. In the chapter of “Erato/Love Poetry,” the narrative fragments move 
between the story of a broken marriage and the story of St. Thérèse’s “marriage” to 
Jesus Christ. The autobiography of St. Thérèse, Story of a Soul, lends itself to 
interpretive suggestiveness in the homophones soul/Seoul and Theresa (Cha)/ Thérèse. 
But more importantly, what links the seemingly unrelated events is the figure of 
victimhood that recurs in the text, a linguistic image materialized and highlighted by 
the capitalized word “VICTIM.” In other words, the text very often relies on the 
naming of an event for historical representations. Moreover, the text also relies on 
images for its articulation. The chapter opens with a picture of a Western woman 
standing in a garden with a sword in her hand and closes with a close-up shot of a 
woman in agony from the 1928 movie The Passion of Joan of Arc, thus literalizing the 
victimhood presented in the textual part. The function of images in-between words, 
then, is to punctuate the syntax of naming. 
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Paradoxically, the one indexical metacommentary in the book is a passage 
without any punctuation marks. At the end of the prefatory section are these lines: 
From A Far 
What nationality 
or what kindred and relation 
what blood relation 
what blood ties of blood 
what ancestry 
what race generation 
what house clan tribe stock strain 
what lineage extraction 
what breed sect gender denomination caste 
what stray ejection misplaced 
Tertium Quid neither one thing nor the other 
Tombe des nues de naturalized 
what transplant to dispel upon (20)  
These lines can be a series of questions or a series of exclamatory phrases, but 
there is not a single punctuation mark inserted. It seems that questions, exclamations, 
and statements have all become and inscribed each other’s possibility. Translated into 
my own jargon: if exclamations suggest the overdetermination of postcoloniality, 
Dictée is trying to show that this overdetermination can be called into question. The 
three phrases on the opposite page further suggest the contingency of identification as 
naming seems to determine everything: “IN NOMINE [in (family) name] / LE NOM 
[the (given) name] / NOMINE [in name only]” (21). Yet, just as Rushdie’s novels turn 
the conditionality of postcolonial overdetermination into a redemptive move, Cha’s 
Dictée also finds ethical potentiality in the very overdetermination of 
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postcoloniality—that is, the arbitrariness of naming is redeemed by the ethical move 
of telling. And whereas historiographical representations are impossible, the act of 
making storytelling take place in the enunciative subject can break the cycle of being 
trapped in “dead time” while at the same time acknowledging the inevitability of 
haunting. In the “Elitere/Lyric Poetry” chapter, where the opening image of an eager 
crowd of Koreans suggests another political protest in the high time of political 
turmoil, the juxtaposed words articulate the ethical function of the female reciter 
Diseuse in the face of political traumas: 
Dead time. Hollow depression interred   invalid to resurgence, resistant 
to memory. Waits. Apel. Apellation. Excavation. Let the one who is 
diseuse. Diseuse de bonne aventure. Let her call forth. Let her break 
open the spell cast upon time upon time again and again. With her 
voice, penetrate earth’s floor, the walls of Tartaurus to circle and 
scratch the bowl’s surface. Let the sound enter from without, the bowl’s 
hollow its sleep. Until. (123) 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
The Ethos of Simultaneity: 
Writing, Death, and Community in Taiwan Writer Dancing Crane1
 
No democracy without the death drive. Now, there’s a thought. 
         --Simon Critchley, Ethics—Politics—Subjectivity 
The fact that must constitute the point of departure for any 
discourse on ethics is that there is no essence, no historical or 
spiritual vocation, no biological destiny that humans must enact 
or realize. This is the only reason why something like an ethics 
can exist, because it is clear that if humans were or had to be 
this or that substance, this or that destiny, no ethical experience 
would be possible—there would be only tasks to be done. 
  --Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community 
To write is perhaps to bring to the surface something like 
absent meaning, to welcome the passive pressure which is not 
yet what we call thought, for it is already the disastrous ruin of 
thought. Thought’s patience. Between the disaster and the other 
there would be the contact, the disjunction of absent meaning—
friendship. 
  --Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster
                                                 
1 For Chinese names and words, pinyin romanization will be employed in cases where the author’s 
own practice of romanization is unavailable; otherwise the author’s own romanization will be adopted 
with its pinyin counterpart provided in the Works Cited section. Also, unless an author publishes in 
English and arranges his/her name in the English way, Chinese names will be presented in accordance 
with the regular practice, with the family name preceding the given name. In the Works Cited section, a 
work originally published in Chinese will be thus indicated. 
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In this chapter, I will continue my inquiry into the ethical dimension of 
postcoloniality as a potential conception of non-identitarian community. My case 
study focuses on Taiwan for its multi-layered history and the exigency of the 
“identity” issue on the island in relation to race, ethnicity, regionalism, and 
nationalism. The writer I study presents an unusual reaction to the overflow of 
identities by proposing to return to the naked being. His conception of community, in 
brief, is instantiated by the simultaneity of singularities sharing the same time and the 
same space. 
 
The UK-based journal Postcolonial Studies, in a rare event in non-Asian 
Studies fields in Western academia, devotes its July 2003 issue to the study of the 
globalized condition of Taiwan. In her introduction entitled “Globalization and the 
(In)significance of Taiwan,” the guest editor of the issue, the UCLA professor Shu-
mei Shih, stipulates that for a place like Taiwan (“too small, too marginal, too 
ambiguous, and thus too insignificant” [144]), the deployment of Western theoretical 
idioms becomes a required move:  
To put Taiwan on the map, so to speak, necessitates the deployment of 
Western-centric critical idioms. . . . For non-Western powers such as 
China, discursive resistance to Western-centric idioms and ways of 
knowing and organising the world is expected and given due respect. 
But for a marginal site such as Taiwan, discursive resistance would 
simply fall on deaf ears. (145; emphasis mine) 
In this proposition, Shih apparently takes the liberty of essentializing the relationship 
between a place’s geopolitics and its discursive capacities as she assumes that 
countries like China are naturally entitled to, inclined to, and equipped with discursive 
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resistance while an essentially “illegible” place like Taiwan automatically begs for 
assistance from idioms of globalization. 
A pragmatic undertone resonates in Shih’s argument in the sense that, for her, 
only when a place obtains the position of superpower can it begin to articulate its 
specificity: “In view of tensions with China, for Taiwan to have an increasingly 
globalised economy is to keep ahead of the development game, and to have a more 
globalised culture is to displace Sinocentric influence and invent new forms of trans-
culture” (146). Besides, Shih is convinced that globalization will help launch a more 
lively multiculturalism in Taiwan: “Not that each ethnic community has equal access 
to the fruits of globalisation, but at least each can use globalisation for its own 
purposes, such as the aboriginal tribes using transnational networks to view their 
oppression in a comparative perspective and seek redress on the international level, 
sexual minorities forming transnational alliances, etc” (146). In other words, the 
penetration of globalization will make Taiwan “universal,” a process that downplays 
the specificity of any ethnicity or community inside Taiwan and yet can help promote 
the specificity of Taiwan in the international community. 
Aside from an ostensible (anti-Chinese) essentialism, Shih’s argument leaps 
problematically from a descriptive level (“This urgency for globalisation, and its 
offshoot Japanisation, is perhaps indicative of a new culture—periphery dynamic in 
the new international division of labour” [146]) to a prescriptive level (“Nowhere do 
we see such an intimate conjunction of ideological, economic, political and discursive 
rationales for globalisation as in Taiwan. For Taiwan, globalisation has to be, period” 
[146]). In addition, she apparently confuses the phenomenon or prospect of 
globalization with the discourse on globalization and, as a result, preempts the need 
for globalization to be scrutinized by theory. 
 
 155
What is useful, however, is that Shih’s proposition promises a sophisticated 
configuration of the dynamic between the local and the global—that is, to view the 
relationship between the local and the global not as hostile conflicts nor as 
incompatible alterities to each other, which is commonly assumed in globalization 
theory, but as a dialectic in which transformations can occur to both the local and the 
global. It can even be argued that this argumentation has been advanced tremendously 
by postcolonial studies.2 That is, major-scale transformations of the local by global 
superpowers have transpired in colonization, and the superpowers, likewise, undergo 
changes through their encounters with the colonized local cultures (Chen Kuan-hsing, 
“Decolonization” 75-76). It is, therefore, too hasty and unwise to suggest that 
postcolonial studies has been superseded by the theory of globalization as the new 
idiom for contemporary cultural inquiry. 
Instead of granting positivity to globalization a priori as Shih does, I propose 
that globalization be considered as one component in the exigency of the current 
cultural and political condition of Taiwan, which I will read as Taiwan’s 
postcoloniality. I would like to depart, however, from critics who take advantage of 
what Slavoj Žižek calls the “radical contingency of naming,” which lets “naming itself 
retroactively constitute[] its reference” (Sublime 95). By the latter trajectory, I refer to 
critics who, appropriating the idioms of mainstream postcolonial studies, generalize 
Taiwan’s national character as colonial throughout its entire history in order to 
champion the resistant or anti-colonial paradigm in modern Taiwan literature.3 This 
reading ignores the literature of mainlanders by essentializing Taiwan literature as 
Taiwanese literature and Taiwanese literature as anti-colonial literature alone. The 
                                                 
2 For insightful discussions on postcoloniality and the local/global dynamic in Taiwan and Asia, see 
Chen Kuan-hsing, “Decolonization,” “Imperialist”; Liao Chaoyang, “Comments,” “Hybrid”; and Liao 
Ping-hui, “Applying,” “Problems.”  
3 Two major representatives of this approach are Chen Fangming and Qiu Guifen.  
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postcoloniality of Taiwan, as I view it, includes its overdetermined aspects such as the 
colonial experience, the process of its modernization, the ideology of modernity (the 
imperative to radically break from the past manifested, for instance, in Taiwan 
modernist poetry), postmodern cultural elements, and the phenomenon of 
globalization. Of central importance is the identity issue, which has developed around 
several axes: around racial differences (Aborigines versus the Han people as 
mainlanders, Hoklo-speaking Taiwanese, and Hakka-speaking Taiwanese all belong to 
the Han lineage); around ethnic divisions (between the Aborigines, Hoklo-speaking 
Taiwanese, the Hakka, and mainlanders); or around regional distinctions (Hoklo-
speaking Taiwanese and Hakka-speaking Taiwanese as opposed to mainlanders).4 
“Postcoloniality of Taiwan,” then, does not point to a definitive referent nor suggest 
the arrival of a new era entirely clear of the “colonial” influence. Rather, 
“postcoloniality” serves as a contested signifier here in the sense that the problematic 
of the postcolonial in theory and the actual manifestations of the postcolonial 
constantly dialogue with or revise each other while at the same time being subject to 
reshuffling occasioned by the entry of new elements such as globalization.  
Furthermore, by listing the above differences along racial, ethnic, and regional 
lines, I am not suggesting that these identity options define Taiwan’s postcoloniality 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that “native Taiwanese” (benshengren [“people from this province”]), in 
general, does not refer to the Aborigines on the island (who are now politically correctly called 
yuanzhumin [“indigenous peoples”]). Rather, the term usually refers to the Hoklo-speaking population 
(Hoklo is a dialect originally from the Southern Chinese province of Fujian) and, occasionally, to the 
Hakka as well. Hoklo, for a long time, is considered to be the Taiwanese dialect and Hoklo-speaking 
population the native Taiwanese, as opposed to Chinese mainlanders who went to Taiwan with the 
Chiang Kai-shek military around 1949, usually dubbed as waishengren (“people from other provinces”). 
It is not until recent years, after the lifting of the martial law in 1987 followed by the loss of ruling 
power of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) to the opposition, Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP), first in local elections and climaxed in the presidential election in 2000, that 
the meaning of the term “native Taiwanese” or “Taiwanese” begins to undergo drastic transformations. 
Its new ramifications include serving as a neutral term for Taiwan citizens and residents, or as an 
emotional indicator for people who “identify with” Taiwan. For the sake of clarity, the term “Taiwan,” 
when used as an adjective in this chapter, indicates things or people of or from Taiwan the place, while 
“Taiwanese” indicates either the Hoklo dialect or the native Taiwanese population. 
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for sure. Rather, I propose to assess the limits of identity-driven politics popularized in 
present-day Taiwan and to address the question of community where “community” 
has long been equated with nothing but political identities. In this chapter, I would like 
probe into the possible conjunction between postcoloniality and an ethical community 
by reading Taiwan writer Wu He or Dancing Crane, placing his writing in a dialogue 
with Levinas’s and Nancy’s thinking as laid out in Chapter One. If progressive 
thoughts of, say, Spivak’s and Derrida’s have demanded that attention be paid to the 
absolute singularity of each being, Levanis and Nancy (especially the latter) propose 
to formulate a concept of community grounded precisely in absolute singularities. 
Their proposals challenge the usual conceptions of subjectivity, including that of 
psychoanalysis (which has already noted the constitutive lack of the subject) and that 
of politics of difference (which, in the final analysis, always lodges itself in a certain 
identity as the reference point for its political efficacy).  
 
I. From (Anti-)Sinocentric to the Global to the Local 
The introduction of postcolonial theory to the intellectual and academic circles 
in Taiwan in the late eighties and early nineties provides useful idioms for articulating 
the political exigency in relation to national and cultural identification in literary 
representations.5 Previously, the focus of literary criticism centered around 
presupposed struggles between Chinese Nationalism and non-Sinocentric ideologies. 
In literature of the fifties and sixties, aesthetic and generic choices between, say, 
                                                 
5 Postcolonial studies in Taiwan starts out primarily in the form of heated debates among literature 
scholars. They include arguments between Qiu Guifen and Liao Chaoyang regarding the applicability 
of postcolonial theory to the case of Taiwan in 1992 (see Qiu, “Discovering,” “We”; and Liao, 
“Comments,” “Hybrid”); debates initiated by a pro-Chinese scholar on the cultural and political choice 
between China and Taiwan in 1995 (see Chen Zhaoying, “Localization,” “In Search,” “Discovering”; 
Chen Fangming, “Colonial”; Zhang Guoqing; and Liao Chaoyang, “Victimhood,” “Hollow”); and 
finally a series of debates between Liao Chaoyang and Liao Xianhao (see their articles appearing in 
Chung-Wai Literary Monthly in the years of 1995 and 1996).  
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nostalgic reminiscences of childhood and military life in mainland China as well as 
explicit anti-communist works on the one hand, and conscious imitation of Western 
modernism on the other hand, are commonly read as political gestures. The 
elusiveness of modernist poetry, for instance, is usually interpreted as an escapism into 
metaphoricity or a silent protest under the authoritarian governance of the then-ruling 
Chinese Nationalist Party, Kuomintang (KMT), notorious for their large-scale 
crackdowns on ideological differences.6  
Another landmark event fell on the mid-seventies, when a series of disputes 
around the social function of literature took place during the periods of 1973 and 
1977-1978, respectively. Usually dubbed xiangtu wenxue lunzhan (“the Nativist 
Literature Debate”), these arguments (especially the second round) between the so-
called “nativist” camp and their critics marked a critical point in the perception and 
anticipation of Taiwan literature. The nativist camp itself later split into two major 
cliques, one embracing a pan-Chinese ideology (represented by Chen Yingzhen) while 
the other equating “nativist” with either “realist” or “Taiwanese” (represented by Song 
Zelai, Wang Tuo, Yang Qingchu, and Ye Shitao) (see Yu Tiancong). What is loosely 
shared by these cliques, nevertheless, is their categorical demand for anti-imperialist, 
anti-capitalist, nativist, and nationalist consciousness from writers—though the 
nationalism of the pan-Chinese clique, naturally, differs from that of the Taiwanese 
clique. One major significance of this critical move is that, at least in the Taiwanese 
nativist clique, nativists’ appeal marks the first collective attempt in the post-1949 era 
to position Taiwan literature within the context of an internal-external conflict—that is, 
China is no longer viewed as an internal problem, but as an externally imposed 
                                                 
6 It is not until recent years that evaluations of literary production from the fifties on begin to 
address aspects other than political ideologies. Critic Sung-sheng Yvonne Chang, for instance, 
painstakingly argues that the pursuit of modernism marks not so much writers’ anti-oppressive 
escapism as their countering move against bourgeois kitsch (Transformations 7-36, 196-210). 
 
 159
violence. Critic Sung-sheng Yvonne Chang calls the literary ideology of the nativist 
camp a literature of resistance very similar to the third-world literature 
(Transformations 15). As mentioned above, even when modernists from the fifties 
onward assertively adopt Western aesthetics, their works, more often than not, are 
considered in relativist terms as being born of an anti-Chinese pathos. The Nativist 
Literature Debate, however, accelerates the conceptualization of Taiwan literature in 
conjunction with global geopolitics—aside from communist China’s threat and the 
KMT government’s authoritarian rule as an outsider regime, the first-world cultural 
and economic hegemonies have now also joined the equation.  
Another significant corollary of the Debate is that, since then, more bentu 
(“localization”) movements are encouraged, among which include efforts to restore 
and reassess anti-colonial literature produced during the Japanese colonial rule (years 
1895-1945). While the call for nativist Taiwanese consciousness, along with the 
attention to literature from the colonial period, for the most part, borders on the 
establishment of a native-Taiwancentrism to be pitted against literature produced by 
mainlanders, what should not be neglected is that all these moves render possible a 
literary genealogy pivoted on the conflicts and connections between the local and the 
global, that is, a genealogy beyond the earlier pro-Chinese or anti-Chinese parameters. 
 The concept of the “global” demands qualifications. First of all, drawing 
attention to the emergence of global horizons in the consideration of modern Taiwan 
literature by no means valorizes the superiority of such parameters. Rather, I focus on 
the significance of the move away from the Sinocentric scope to other possibilities in 
Taiwan literature’s self-positioning. Secondly, the relationship between the local and 
the global varies and acquires complexity with time. In the seventies, for instance, 
nativist writers appeal for engagement with the native and the local vis-à-vis Japanese 
and Western imperialism as well as the hegemony of communist China. Later on, as 
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Taiwan literature begins to manifest various ramifications of global influences 
(concrete examples include aesthetic adoption of magic realism and metafiction, 
thematic fascination with urbanism, cosmopolitanism, minority identity politics, 
feminism, environmentalism, and queerness), the “global” register in Taiwan literature 
comes closer to what is generally understood as “globalization” today. Yet, as argued 
above, the dynamic between the local and the global is not to be viewed mechanically 
as a permanent conflict between the two. Instead, as postcolonial studies has 
demonstrated in multifarious forms, the specificities of the local can strike back to 
rewrite the colonial power, and yet on the other hand are equally susceptible to the 
incorporation into the grand system of globalization sanctified by the colonial or 
imperialist power. Former colonial powers, in turn, are also subject to transformations 
brought about by their encounter with the local.  
Thirdly, in the wave of globalization, literary creation does not merely 
“reflect” the heuristic aspects of a globalized economy and culture in contemporary 
Taiwan, but, more significantly, also articulates spontaneous responses to the 
phenomenon of globalization in intellectual and artistic circles. That is, cultural 
initiatives in present-day Taiwan, more often than not, arise out of the elite’s contact 
with foreign influences (see, for example, Liou Liang-ya for the direct impact of 
global gay, lesbian, and queer movements on Taiwan’s gay activism). Also, the 
Western theoretical discourses and trends introduced to Taiwan by Taiwan’s literary 
academics, most of whom receive advanced education in the West, to a great extent 
contribute to reconfigurations of intellectual momentum and activist politics on the 
island. 
 Last but not least, the incorporation of global horizons at the critical level, in 
effect, enhances the reconsideration of Taiwan’s self-positioning. Unlike previous 
inquiries into the relationship with China, however, the new idioms are complicated 
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because of the intertwining of multi-layered temporalities. The most predominant 
intellectual engagement in the post-KMT era is the inquiry into national, cultural, and 
ethnic zhutixing (“subjectivity”), shenfen (“identity”), and rentong (“identification”), 
with all these keywords borrowed from outside of Taiwan.7 In this move of Taiwan’s 
self-enunciation, “China” has not lost its status as a cultural imaginary or as an empty 
signifier (the big Other). Yet the post-KMT status of Taiwan renders possible attempts 
of self-positioning around axes including but not limited to the old issue of 
unification/independence. The China issue has always involved questions of what 
constitutes the condition for unification or independence: whether it is national/racial 
origins (“We are all of the Chinese origin”), cultural nationalism (“We Taiwanese for 
four hundred years have developed a distinctive cultural character and history from the 
mainland Chinese”), liberalism or pragmatism (“The foundation of a nation can be 
something other than racial/national essence—for instance, a commonly identified 
goal such as the protection of human rights and the pursuit of freedom”). Now, with 
the vitality of localization movements, more visibility of minority discourses, 
susceptibility to Japanese and American influences, and economically entwined 
relationship with China, the question becomes much more complicated. 
 With multifarious discourses contesting the politically and historically correct 
position, what should be noted is that the majority of these discourses operate with 
terms of conventional identity politics in the sense that the mechanism of “differing” 
has to be turned on in order to distinguish “us” from “them.” Even though demands 
for “community” (a more popular term is mingyun gongtongti [“body/entity of the 
                                                 
7 Relevant documents are too numerous to cite. Aside from discussions in the literary circles (see 
note 5), for a sampling of intellectual engagements in this issue in social sciences, see Institute of 
Modern History; Zhang Maogui; Foundation for Modern Academic Research; Xu Xinliang; Shao 
Zonghai; Shi Zhengfeng; as well as journal Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Sciences (especially 
Issues 17, 18, 21, 23, 25, and 26); and journal Isle Margin (Issue 8). For a critical summary of related 
discussions, see Jiang Yi-huah. 
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same fate”]) are vocalized everywhere, each discourse group very often posits its own 
political agenda as the condition for commonality with the following logic: “As long 
as you identify with our goal, you are more than welcome to join our discussions 
about community.” The problem is that mechanism obsessed with what exactly 
constitutes a community (be it race, nation, nation-state, or ethnicity) always risks 
being trapped in the myth of (in)authenticity. In this case, “authenticity” and 
“inauthenticity” virtually are nothing but two sides of a coin because any attempt to 
define “Taiwanese” as “X and X only” is most likely to invite queries such as “What 
precisely is X?”—which, then, can lead to infinite similar queries on the components 
and subcomponents of X, and so on and so forth.  
 
II. Whither the Subject amongst National Identities? 
 It is in the midst of vehement contests for authenticity that someone pen-
named Taiwanren (“Taiwanese”) puts forward the idea of the “fifth” ethnic group in 
Taiwan, called “the fake Taiwanese”: 
Fake Taiwanren do not possess any subjectivity or essence; nor can 
they form any center or be represented/re-presented. They are a group 
without ethnic history or tradition, a (post)modern group constituted by 
broken, fragmented, and chaotic signs and experiences. What are you? 
Taiwan mainlanders? Taiwan Hakka? Taiwan Aborigines? Taiwan 
Hoklo people? Why so lame? Why don’t you join us and become the 
fake Taiwanren? We are having anal sex, we are dancing, we are 
shitting and peeing wherever we like, we are farting, we are making 
trouble, we are stealing public properties, we are fooling around, we are 
hanging around, we are doodling. . . . (What about you?) We (all) are 
fake Taiwanren. (45) 
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Apparently tired of the self-righteousness of current discourses on identity, Taiwanren 
suggests jettisoning all the grandiose jargon along with the difference-generating 
identity politics proposed by the jargon. 
A less sarcastic proposal is put forth by major literature scholar Liao Chaoyang. 
Inspired by Lacanian psychoanalyst Slavoj Žižek, Liao suggests conceiving 
subjectivity as a hollow site which is open to any transplant of “substance” and yet is 
not to be occupied by any given content substance perennially. The problem with 
current discourses on identity, Liao contends, is that once a sign enters the site of 
subjectivity and assumes itself to be the “substance” of the subjectivity rather than 
merely a sign at the formal level, what usually ensues is the self-absolutization of this 
sign into a superego (“Victimhood” 118-21; “More” 105-09; “Question” 120-23). 
Liao’s proposition can help dissolve the logical tension between essentialism and 
constructionism: the placeness of this subjectivity and its necessity to be filled by a 
“substance” can be regarded as the “strategic essence” of the subject while, on the 
other hand, the constant moving in and out of the substance constitutes the 
construction of a subjectivity. 
Liao’s argumentation, however, is not so much an appropriation of Žižek as his 
own creation. In the Žižek passage that Liao claims to draw on, the chapter on Kant 
and Hegel in Tarrying with the Negative (9-44), Žižek is in effect elaborating on the 
inherent splitting constitutive of the Enlightenment and modern “subject” from 
Descartes, Kant, to Hegel and Marx, a configuration that finds its climactic 
articulation in Lacan. The pivotal point in Žižek’s theorization rests in his deepening 
of the Lacanian conception of the barred subject ($). Žižek’s departing and ending 
point is that Lacanian psychoanalysis provides an intelligent way to “reconcile” the 
classic problem of the relationship between the individual and society by laying bare 
the very splitting that constitutes both: “I can communicate with the Other, I am 
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‘open’ to him (or it), precisely and only insofar as I am already in myself split, 
branded by ‘repression,’ i.e., insofar as (to put it in a somewhat naïve-pathetic way) I 
cannot ever truly communicate with myself; the Other is originally the decentered 
Other Place of my own splitting” (31; emphasis in the original). In other words, the 
individual and society (as the big Other) not only share a structural similarity (“the 
very splitting that runs through both of them” [30]), but also hold a metonymic affinity 
(as society marks the site of the individual’s originary splitting).  
In this light, one can say that the problem with most of the discourses on 
identity in Taiwan (their insistence on authenticity in its commonplace sense, as 
mentioned above) lies in their inability to displace their conceptions of authenticity 
with, say, Heideggerian notion of authenticity insofar as the latter indicates an 
originary impossibility to get to the “true” kernel of the subject as its constitution. In 
Žižek’s words, the sign of the subject’s survival of the Law of the World is that the 
Other intervenes in the subject’s act of externalization or self-objectivization so that 
the subject cannot achieve a complete identification with the act. For a “successful” 
self-externalization (that is, a thorough transformation of the subject into a thing) 
would entail the collapse of the inside and the outside (“the Law of my Heart” and 
“the Law of the World”) and would henceforth render the subject radically out of 
touch with “reality” (31-32). In this reasoning, discourses on identity which enunciate 
from the position of a self-claimed “authentic” identity substance would obtain what 
Žižek describes as a radical self-externalization and could only be apprehended and 
consumed inside their own acts. 
What is confusing in Liao’s proposition is the metaphor he employs, 
hollowness: “In the process of constructing cultural identities, the real a priori subject 
is in effect is to be a blank without any substantial content” (“Victimhood” 118)—a 
metaphor very different in both denotations and connotations from the 
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psychoanalytical “lack” with which he equates his “hollowness” (119). To say the 
least, “hollowness” connotes a blankness awaiting the (positive) filling of meanings 
without necessarily implying any relationship between the subject and the Other or the 
Lacanian Real, while “lack” indicates the inaccessibility to originary wholeness 
constitutive of the subject. The modern subject does not really emerge as a blank. 
Quite the contrary, the subject is overdetermined by constant interventions of 
signifiers from the outset; its lack, in other words, is mediated and informed by these 
interventions. Moreover, the configuration of this “hollow subjectivity” seems 
ambiguous. Liao’s conception, on the one hand, indicates a spatial form which allows 
the coming and going of any identity substance. Yet on the other hand, it also points to 
an agency which is responsible for the moving in and out of the identity substance, 
and which is at the same time the very receiver of this substance.  
In addition, although he does not deny the significance of irrational elements, 
Liao’s notion of hollow subjectivity basically does operate at the rational and 
representable level (even though he unclearly stipulates that the very hollowness of the 
subjectivity can transcend rationality to become the support of rationality 
[“Victimhood” 118]). Finally, Liao places an accent on the autonomy of the subject-
agent in deciding on the substance of identification (“Victimhood” 119; “More” 105), 
neglecting the possibility of the subject-agent’s being interpellated by the ideological 
mechanism of the Other. My argument is that, instead of being a blank from the outset, 
the modern subject in effect emerges as a traversed subject precisely because of some 
“originary” content substance constitutive of its entity, including the primary lack 
occasioned and mediated by the subject’s separation from the Mother Other, the 
supply of “meanings” proffered by other ramifications of the big Other, as well as 
ideology—ideology not as a false consciousness or fantasy, but as something filtered 
by a series of noumenal, rational, and perceptual mechanisms on the part of the subject 
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and accepted by the subject as part of its “consistency” (for this perception of ideology, 
see Žižek, Sublime, ch. 3). 
Liao’s proposal of hollow subjectivity is singled out here for detailed scrutiny 
not really because he is a leading critic in Taiwan, but because what he addresses here 
is exactly the point of intervention that my research has intended to posit and advance. 
Liao is able to see the impasse of identity-politics-oriented trajectories in current 
cultural inquiries. Without articulating it, his theory puts forth a possibility of 
conceiving political identities through returning to the “originary” level of existence in 
subject formation, namely, the level where the ontological, the phenomenal, the 
noumenal, and the apperceptional can be considered altogether. The lack of 
elaboration on this invention, however, makes his proposition a little vague to imagine. 
Moreover, that his notion of hollow subjectivity intimates a collective, rational, and 
free agent also invites doubts about how far his proposal eventually departs from 
identity politics. 
To follow on my argumentation in the previous chapter, I propose that what 
should be contested at this moment are the stakes of confining the conception of the 
Self-Other dynamic solely to rational and political dimensions even if, indeed, the 
central issue appears to be a political exigency such as the identity issue in Taiwan. 
One of the major problems of identity politics or politics of difference has  been that 
each identity group demands a representative/represented position in the system based 
on a set of essences or constructs—the difference between the two is virtually slim as 
constructs may very well turn into fetishized essences for a given identity group. The 
impasse of such politics, then, lies in the irreconcilable interests among different 
identity groups. While it may be true that at the empirical level, political conflicts seek 
solutions through questioning, critique, judgment, antagonism, contestation, and 
struggle (Critchley, Deconstruction 236), political antagonisms, more often than not, 
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are resolved by a certain kind of “violence”—if not totalitarian silencing of differences, 
then the power of the majority in democratic votes. My argument is the advantage of 
politics also names its greatest limitation—that is, questioning, antagonism, 
contestation, and struggle always have presumed a Self-Other conflict.  
It is precisely this situatedness in a political exigency that invites 
considerations of parameters beyond political rationality.8 The aim of this chapter, 
then, is to explore ethical thinking for a politically-mediated condition and seek 
communications between politics and ethics. In Chapter One, I have analyzed 
Levinas’s ethics and Nancy’s notion of community, hoping to address the limits of 
postcolonial identity politics via their thinking. Yet if there is anything inconvenient 
about their writing, it’s the abstraction. In my textual analysis that follows, I would 
like to demonstrate that the writing of Dancing Crane comes very close to articulating 
what Nancy and Levinas have deliberated on. Like Rushdie and Cha discussed in 
previous chapters, Dancing Crane’s configuration of the postcolonial community is 
best instantiated in the material characteristics of writing—this time, a writing of 
contemporaneity or simultaneity.  
 
                                                 
8 What deserves a mention is that major cultural studies scholar Chen Kuan-hsing in effect has 
already addressed the question of ethics within the context of Taiwan (see both “Imperialist” and 
“Decolonization”). Chen points out that the problem with scholarly discussions of postcolonial identity 
in Taiwan since the nineties lies in the confinement of the new imaginary to the question of unifying 
nationalism versus pro-independence nationalism. Chen proposes a “critical syncretism” to be coupled 
with the concept of “post-nation,” which he brilliantly translates as po guojia (“broken nation”). Unlike 
Bhabha’s “hybridity,” which registers elitist postmodernism and lacks a political intentionality, Chen’s 
emergent postcolonial syncretism is a project of “becoming others,” that is, to “internalize the selfhood 
or subjectivity of the colonized as (minoritarian, not majoritarian) others, to internalize females, 
aborigines, homosexuals, bisexuals, animals, the poor, the black, the African, etc., to integrate various 
cultural elements into the subjectivity” (“Decolonization” 107). He calls this move an ethical principle. 
While I agree with Chen on his critique of nativism and identity politics, I have reservations about his 
figuration of “internalizing others into the emergent subject.” For the subject here remains the center of 
cognition, political choices (it decides what is to be internalized), and production of cultural imaginaries. 
A less “violent” project than most practices of multiculturalism (if the latter indicates the hegemonic 
group’s collecting of minority cultures for a triumphant display), Chen’s proposition, at least at the 
figurative level, still pivots on the traditional concept of subjectivity.  
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III. Writing Simultaneity: Remains of Life 
First published in the seventies, Wu He or Dancing Crane disappeared from the 
literary circles for over ten years before resuming publication in the early nineties. 
Emerging from a time when the Nativist Literature Debate is at its most heated, 
Dancing Crane’s writing is often evaluated against the two major literary trends 
dominating the critical forum at that time: modernism and nativism. Major critic Ye 
Shitao, for instance, calls him a “born Taiwan(ese) writer” (254-55) while another 
leading critic, Yang Zhao, contends that Dancing Crane’s is a “nativist modernism” 
and that he has never strayed away from “the “modern(ist)-native(ist) trajectory” (169-
78). Dancing Crane’s writing, however, proves the dichotomy between nativism and 
modernism tremendously shaky not by incorporating both trends in his work, as Yang 
Zhao claims, but by ignoring the necessity of such a predetermined demarcation (Wu 
He and Yang 131). Readings like Yang’s, in particular, expose the limits and problems 
of imposing the same critical framework repeatedly upon Taiwan writers in the last 
five decades.  
Yu sheng or Remains of Life, according to the author, is inspired by a small 
memorial stone called “Remains of Life” set up by residents of the now Lushan and 
former Musha, the site of an aboriginal conflict with Japanese colonizers in 1931. 
Unlike the official monument memorizing the incident, this “Remains of Life” stone 
“is of the height of an average healthy elementary school kid, exuding no angry protest 
against injustice nor glorious celebration, only a self-effacing attitude almost to the 
point of humility” (Wu He, Remains 185; “Go On” 93).  
 According to official records, on October 27, 1931, the chieftain of the 
Mahebo sub-tribe of the Atayal tribe, Mona Rudao, led approximately three hundred 
warriors from six sub-tribes to attack the Japanese residents and soldiers in Central 
Taiwan, killing one hundred and thirty-four of them. In revenge, the Japanese 
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mobilized nearly seven thousand fully armed soldiers and policemen to hunt down 
their attackers. Up to November 11, over six hundred tribesmen from the six rebelling 
sub-tribes—approximately half of the entire population—either were killed in the 
battles with the Japanese or committed suicide, the chieftain included. This is known 
to be the Musha Incident. Some five-hundred-odd tribespeople surrendered in the 
uprising and were detained by the Japanese. Nearly half a year later, another mass 
killing took place. A sub-tribe that was believed to be the enemy of the six rebelling 
sub-tribes attacked these detainees and killed nearly two hundred of them. The 
remainder of the survivors were later relocated in Chuanzhongdao or Riverisle,9 where 
the author found the unassuming “Remains of Life” stone monument.10
 The official history rarely mentions the “Second Musha Incident.” Even when 
it does, the Japanese’s secretive encouragement is usually said to be responsible for 
the Second Incident. It is the insignificance of the Second Incident that stimulates 
Dancing Crane’s curiosity. Major critic Wang Der-wei suggests that it is through 
probing into the Second Incident that we can “release the subject-position of the 
Aborigines’ cultural memory” (32). This is a similar reasoning as Ranajit Guha’s in 
the latter’s study of the Indian peasant rebellions during the British colonial rule. 
Seeking to write histories for the historically marginalized subaltern classes, Guha as 
the leader of the influential Subaltern Studies Group strongly believes in the 
restorability of the “will and reason” or consciousness of the allegedly religiously-
motivated rebels (46). This confidence in the retrievability of the formerly silenced, 
however, is questionable. As Spivak acutely points out in her seminal study of the sati 
sacrifice in colonial India, what should be questioned is the legitimacy of questions 
                                                 
9 The only English translation available of Remains of Life is an excerpt translated by Michael 
Berry. All translations in this chapter will be mine unless otherwise noted. I will, however, follow 
Berry’s translations of most of the names and places. 
10 For an English account of the Musha Incident, see Leo Ching.  
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posed on the legitimacy of the sacrifice, including the British imperialist’s voice of 
morality and humanism vis-à-vis the repression of women, as well as cultural 
relativists’ discourse on the sati widow’s “agency.”11  
Similarly, what should be questioned is whether or not it is possible to 
“release” the “subject-position” of the Aborigines in the Musha Incident. Some critics 
have suggested reading Remains of Life in line with conventional identity politics of 
representation (Liou Liang-ya, “Possibility”). I argue for the contrary. What is 
foregrounded in the novel is in effect valorization of a non-identitarian and non-
representational moment in the midst of all the clamorous demands for identitarian 
definition. While such valorization is already manifest in the novel’s ultimate call for 
humanism (respect for human life) and ecologism (respect for nature), what is more 
noteworthy is how this non-identitarian, non-representational community is 
materialized in the act of writing, especially when this writing highlights a kind of 
simultaneity. Dancing Crane claims that Remains of Life sets out to write (not to 
“represent,” but to “write”) three things: first, the accuracy and legitimacy of the 
Musha Uprising led by Mona Rudao as well as the real “cause” of the second Musha 
Incident; secondly, the “search” journey of the Girl living next to the narrator/author 
when he is staying in the tribe village for his research; and thirdly, the “remains of 
life” the narrator/author witnesses in the village. The author stipulates that he has 
sought to toss, turn, and write about these three things repeatedly, not for the sake of 
the artistic time in novelistic writing, but, rather, because the three things all exist in 
“the simultaneity of the ‘remains of life’” (Afterword 251). My argument is that the 
very act of writing as manifest in the novel realizes the kind of pre-subjective, 
originary community qua “being-with” that Nancy proposes (comparusion or “co-
appearing”). Even though this writing, to a great extent, does center around “political” 
                                                 
11 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Subaltern,” Critique 198-311. 
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issues such as conflict with the colonizer, the novel pays more attention to the 
significance of looking back to the “prior” moment in the configuration of community, 
the moment when what is “in-common” is based not so much on political alignment as 
on the very fact of being finite beings at the same time and in the same place.  
The choice of the narrative language in the novel already suggests a non-
identity-politics move. The very word that Dancing Crane reiterates—“simultaneity 
(tongshi xing)”—is anything but the authentic language of the Aborigines. It exudes an 
intellectualism if not artificialness.  
 Secondly, the narrative sequencing is noteworthy in its creation of a sense of 
concurrence. Over two hundred pages written as one single paragraph with few 
sentence breaks,12 the first-person point-of-view narrative meanders through what is 
being encountered, seen, heard, and reflected upon during the narrator’s stay in the 
little village of Riverisle. Although in Chinese writing the comma can also serve as a 
sentence break, I venture to think that Dancing Crane uses complete-sentence periods 
limitedly for a particular reason. Sparseness of sentence breaks can enhance the 
figuration of simultaneity in writing. For one thing, the storytelling never seems to 
end; the enunciation takes place as the present of the story being narrated.13
 The possible historical, psychological, and emotional motivations behind the 
Musha Incident trigger the narrator’s probing. What he does is to let different voices 
be presented as they are instead of occupying a central position of enunciation. The 
narrator’s first encounter is Girl: 
                                                 
12 Berry points out that the excerpt he has translated, approximately one-sixteenth of the entire 
novel, consists of only three complete sentences, which complete the first theme the author intends to 
deliver (102). 
13 My translation tries to duplicate this characteristic by using limited sentence breaks. Moreover, 
to foreground the “simultaneity” as both a thematic and structural thrust in the novel (the “present-ness” 
of the original text is forcefully enhanced by the lack of verb conjugation in Chinese grammar), my 
translation will use the English present tense for the most part. 
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Winter 1997, one day the Girl living next door to the place I rent in the 
village says to the misty mountains in the distance, “I am the 
granddaughter of Mona Rudao,” Girl’s door is always left half open, 
the spirits of the ancestors can arrive at Riverisle following the twists 
and turns down Valleystream, during those difficult times, the spirits of 
the ancestors keep them company every day, Girl believes that as long 
as one follows the valley upstream, one can arrive at a Mystery 
Valley—the place where her ancestors jumped off a cliff to their death 
one after another. . . . (Remains 43) 
Girl’s self-claimed genealogy is questionable as all of Mona Rudao’s descendants are 
believed to have died in the conflicts except for his daughter Mahong. Girl’s 
appearance, however, would materialize the narrator’s role as a relay for others. For 
Girl’s dream (“One day I will set out and look for . . .” [44; ellipsis in the original]) 
later would be taken up by the narrator. The trope of “setting out and looking for,” 
with the ultimate goal of the “looking for” unknown, further names the drive behind 
the narrator’s writing. 
The question of “legitimacy” around the Musha Incident turns complicated as 
the narrator comes across more and more accounts. Two Atayal intellectuals, for 
instance, reject the idea of “uprising” and see the Incident as nothing but a traditional 
ritual of chucao (“headhunting”). The official history politicizes the headhunting 
practice to sanctify the anti-Japanese discourse, according to the two intellectuals: 
“There is no ‘massacre’ in the primitive vocabulary” (47). On the other hand, one of 
the elders alive insists on the heroism of Mona Rudao and regards the Incident as a 
resistance to oppression out of the Aborigines’ pride. The elder considers the Incident 
in a most “civilized” manner. He even wishes that Mona Rudao could have “waited 
for civilization for fifteen more years” so that his descendants would not have to 
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relocate and live in an ugly tourist spot, which is what the Riverisle has turned into 
today: the famous hot spring resort Lushan (53-54).  
Later, the narrator comes across a self-exiled wanderer who claims to have met 
someone who calls himself the grandson of Mona Rudao and the son of Mahong, 
Daya. The story of Atayal women’s committing suicide or abandoning their own 
children during the Incident comes to the fore. According to official historiography, 
Atayal mothers, during the anti-Japanese battles, gave up on themselves and their 
children in order not to burden the warriors. Mahong allegedly dropped two sons off 
the cliff. The Daya in the story claims that he survived being abandoned by being 
miraculously rescued by a church minister, who later sent him to South America to 
avoid persecution. Mahong herself, survived too, could not forgive herself for not 
having died with her father and brothers, and often disappeared in the deep woods in 
the remains of her life. In the narrator’s retelling of the wanderer’s retelling of Daya’s 
telling of his and his mother’s survivor stories, the irrationality of these mothers’ 
abandoning their children is foregrounded as a contrast to the female wisdom and 
loyalty stressed in official historiography: “The mothers of Mahebo stampeded with a 
fear for death in the misty thick woods, the first mother hanged or dropped her child, 
followed by the second, the third, out of a kind of collective hysteria, which ultimately 
led to a collective suicide with people jumping off the cliff together . . .” (70). By 
giving away the enunciative authority, the narrator steers from the righteous undertone 
implied not only in official history but also in subaltern-concerned historiography such 
as Wang Der-wei’s attempt to retrieve the subject-position of the Aborigines. On the 
other hand, by relaying a multi-layered story, the narrator lays bare not so much a 
personal trauma (Mahong’s or Daya’s) as a collective narrative whose pathos lies in 
the lack of a definitive authority. 
 
 174
As mentioned above, the narrator/author sets out to write about the legitimacy 
of the Musha Incident, the Girl’s journey, and the “remains of life” that he witnesses 
among the exiled Atayal descendants in that these three, for him, exist in “the 
simultaneity of the ‘remains of life’” (Afterword 251). Dancing Crane himself is not 
clear as to what exactly constitutes this simultaneity. If anything, he has emphatically 
voiced his concern with history-writing. For him, there is no writing history from the 
temporal perspective of the historical event in question; each history, rather, is a 
writing by dangdai (“the contemporary”) (Wu He and Zhu 28-33). Dancing Crane’s 
wording in Chinese can be ambiguous and polyphonic. He says that there is no lishi de 
lishi (which can be read as “history of history,” “history by history,” “history written 
in historical time,” or “historical history”); there is only dangdai de lishi (“history of 
the contemporary,” “history by the contemporary,” or “history written in the 
contemporary”) (Wu He and Zhu 28-33; Wu He and Yang 148, 154-55).14  
In the novel, the “contemporary” is present not as a static temporal marker or a 
time-indicating element in the syntactic structure, but as an independent “enunciative 
subject,” which I read here as both the subject of the enunciated and the enunciating 
subject:  
. . . the entire mountainous village is submerged in endless silence after 
the cockcrow, if [only] Mona Rudao could have waited for fifteen years, 
the “contemporary” asks why Mona Rudao could not have waited for 
fifteen more years, facts cannot wait for “if,” the inquiry posed by 
contemporary history is either a humorous question or a wrong 
                                                 
14 One can compare Dancing Crane’s view with Dipesh Chakrabarty’s proposal of  holding two 
gestures simultaneously on the historian’s part (see the opening section of the previous chapter): one is 
to historicize the subject in the historical event “in the interest of a history of social justice and 
democracy,” especially if the historical subject is from subaltern classes; the other gesture is to reject 
the temptation to historicize the historical subject and, instead, to see the historical subject as a figure 
“illuminating a life possibility for the present” (Chakrabarty 108). 
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question, the contemporary must “contemporarize” history, 
contemporary history examines history from contemporary multiple 
angles, but does not have the right to raise senseless questions, it can 
listen but need not inquire the third time of the cockcrow at dawn 
(sic) . . . . (55) 
 
. . . in fact, I thought about conducting research on the Gigantic Stone 
Cave of Mahebo and the legendary Mystery Valley, but betraying Girl 
and focusing on research only is out of my elements, and the 
“contemporary” will not agree, although the “contemporary” stresses 
research and development . . . , it has its principles, the number-one 
principle being “respect for life” or “respecting life” . . . . (119) 
 
. . . the contemporary tells contemporary history to remind me not to let 
a suspicious or controversial event be a bygone as a permanent “past 
tense”; instead, it has to be dug out and exposed under the 
contemporary sun until it becomes the “present tense,” the past history 
would, thus, become alive as part of contemporary history, the 
“contemporary” is so breastfully abundant or hipfully abundant that it 
is worth the name of “contemporary,” therefore “contemporary Musha 
Incident” or “Musha Incident in the contemporary” is not bogus, it is 
not only the core of the novel but also an appropriate historical 
view . . . . (85) 
The “contemporary” is presented here as an enunciative position other than the 
narrator “I.” As a mobilizing agent in the syntax, the figure of the “contemporary” 
pointedly marks a departure from the traditional, particularly Cartesian, concept of 
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subjectivity (the subject that comes to being because of its cognitive ability of 
differentiating itself from the object). Making a time marker the enunciative subject, 
Dancing Crane’s novel depresses the possible violence of a know-all, represent-all 
human agent. 
The ethos of “contemporary writing” or “writing of simultaneity” is also 
poignantly materialized in the present-centered enunciative manner of the storytelling. 
As mentioned above, Girl’s journey of search soon emerges as a major trope for the 
narrator’s journey insofar as the latter includes not only his personal life experience 
but also his journey in search of the “contemporary” sense of simultaneity. Such a 
shared yet separated journey is literalized in the simultaneity of storytelling. In the 
following passage, Girl/the narrator reveal Girl’s experience of prostitution in the city: 
. . . she holds tight the warm bills in her hand and condemns two aged 
on-looking prostitutes, she then goes into the office to give the pimp’s 
balls a good treat of Sedeq [a sub-tribe of Atayal] kicking . . . “Fuck it! 
I target at his balls when his ass is poking upwards,” Girl turns her head 
and winks at me with her bright eyes, while the balls are in great pain 
and choked by human juice, Girl escapes “in an instant of silence,” and 
it is already dawn when the cab taking her back to the village arrives, 
“Aiii, such a lame story of a good woman fallen into prostitution,” I am 
as upset as helpless, “Indeed,” Girl straightens her back in the seat, 
“Why would I be written in such a vulgar and lousy novelistic 
episode,” . . . I return to my house to make coffee . . . I sip from the big 
flowery bowl until the afternoon, doing no thinking whatsoever, except 
feeling confounded as to why the novel would let such despicable and 
ugly reality “directly apply to” Dreamy Girl returning to her hometown. 
(78) 
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What takes place here, I would like to argue, is not exactly avant-garde metafiction. 
Rather, it is a materialization of an intimate relationship between the narrator and 
other enunciative subjects, along with the narrator’s anxiety over the ethics of 
storytelling. 
Simultaneity is further manifest in numerous instances where the narrator’s 
encounters with others trigger his “involuntary memory.” Wang Der-wei has astutely 
pointed out the dual meanings of the word yu in the title Yu sheng: in Chinese, yu can 
mean “extra” on the one hand and “leftover” or “remainder” on the other hand, one 
indicating redundancy and the other insufficiency. Both possibilities, Wang contends, 
imply a lack in history, in community, as well as in the individual subject (Preface 8). 
In the novel, the narrator tries to drive home the message that many people, including 
urbanites, are in effect leading a kind of yu sheng (“extra/leftover/ remaining life”). 
When he shows eagerness to understand the Musha Incident from remaining 
tribespeople, one girl retorts that the Han people (the racial majority of the Chinese 
and Taiwanese population) are perhaps a much better topic for research. The narrator 
later ponders upon the difference he has thought to exist between his people and the 
descendants of the Musha Incident survivors: 
. . . now it has occurred to me that in the contemporary moment many 
urbanites still live a post-war yu sheng, “You Han people have much 
more to be researched on,” all of a sudden I remember the words of 
Girl’s cousin, indeed, from the end of the [anti-Japanese] War to the 2-
28 Incident to the White Terror of the fifties15 . . . I am glad that history 
                                                 
15 Two months after the Japanese surrender to the Allies marked the end of World War II in 1945, 
the Chinese Nationalist Party, the KMT, sent Chen Yi to Taiwan to prepare for the reunification of the 
island with mainland China. It is generally believed, however, that Chen Yi’s administration 
disappointed the Taiwanese tremendously for its corruption and lack of discipline. On February 27, 
1947, the police killed an onlooker while attempting to check on suspicious cigarette traffic in Taipei. 
The next day, angry people gathered in front of the administrator’s residence calling for reform. The 
governor responded by ordering a police crackdown, killing dozens of people. Soon, uprisings took 
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offers a Musha Incident so that I have a chance to come to Riverisle, to 
enjoy this small hot pot in warmth, solitude, and tranquility, this night I 
fall asleep despite the absence of Girl’s nocturnes [Girl likes to play the 
music of Chopin], in the dream world are the hurried footsteps of 
Mahong in the depth of the woods . . . I wake up in the midst of the 
third cockcrow to a chicken-noisy, chicken-chatting world, can they be 
discussing last night’s dream? the footsteps in the dream have run for 
the entire night into sole-dragging steps, trailing outside the curtained 
dream-frame, while a child I also woke up to the chicken noise in the 
backyard, this kind of waking experience lasted until teenage, when 
Mother was no longer able to raise livestock after falling ill . . . if I had 
never come to the foot of the mountain in Riverisle lying in bed 
amongst the earful of chicken noise, I might never remember the 
chicken in the backyard of our old house . . . . (74-75) 
The others’ stories turn into the narrator’s dreams which, in turn, initiate 
memories of his own past. Hence there is a very different ethos from what critic Chen 
Kuan-hsing has proposed as the project of “becoming others,” of internalizing 
marginalized others into the subject (see note 8). With an aim to steer away from self-
centered identity politics and nativism, Chen’s proposal still posits the cognitive 
subject as the predicate of ethico-political possibilities. In Remains of Life, however, 
neither the narrator nor his story provider is foregrounded as the central site of 
enunciation; the narration proceeds in such a way that the subject of the enounced and 
the enouncing subject are constantly shifting, without any implication of hierarchy.  
                                                                                                                                            
place around the island. They met, however, with the KMT’s large-scale crackdowns starting in early 
March. With no accurate numbers available, ten to twenty thousands Taiwanese are believed to have 
been killed in the crackdowns. This is what is later called the “2-28 Incident.” The KMT’s rule of terror 
continued into the fifties, a period usually termed the “White Terror” for its stringent ideological control. 
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Furthermore, what the above passage shows is not merely universalistic 
empathy (that everybody is leading a survivor’s life). I argue that the writing here 
tellingly figures as the kind of community that Nancy has in mind: an ontological 
togetherness that is not predetermined by communion or communicative directness. It 
is a naked being shared by all. In Nancy’s language, this kind of “inoperative 
community” is first and foremost registered in the co-existence in time and space:  
“Togetherness” means simultaneity (in, simul), “at the same time.” 
Being together is being at the same time (and in the same place, which 
is itself the determination of “time” as “contemporary time”). “Same 
time/same place” assumes that “subjects,” to call them that, share this 
space-time, but not in the extrinsic sense of “sharing”; they must share 
it between themselves; they must themselves “symbolize” it as the 
“same space-time” without which there would not be time or space. 
The space-time itself is first of all the possibility of the “with” [in 
“Being as being-with”]. (Nancy, Being 60-61; emphasis in the original) 
Dancing Crane’s writing, in effect, also helps illuminate an ambiguous but 
crucial part in Nancy’s scheme, without which Nancy’s thoughts can come across as 
stubbornly mystic and ignorant of the work of, say, the symbolic order put forth by 
psychoanalysis. When addressing the relationship between the Real and the symbolic, 
Nancy writes, “What happens to us . . . is the stripping bare of social reality, the very 
reality of being-social in, by, and as the symbolicity that constitutes it” (Being 57; 
emphasis in the original).16 At first sight, the “reality of being-social” appears to be 
subordinate to symbolization. Critchley’s interpretation emphasizes the etymological 
origin of sumbolon as the joining together of what is broken, and therefore returns to 
                                                 
16 “la mise à nu de la réalité sociale—du réel même de l’être-social—dans, par et comme la 
symbolicité qui la constitue” (Être 79). 
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Nancy’s ultimate claim that “the manner in which social being faces itself, symbolizes 
itself, is as comparution” (Subjectivity 245; emphasis in the original). My 
understanding of Nancy here is rather that being-social (which amounts to the 
fundamental ontology of “being-with”) is indeed prior to being-political or being-
Taiwanese, etcetera. Yet on the other hand, the priority/anteriority of such being 
cannot be revealed except in the form of symbolicity, which very likely emerges in a 
“perverse” form such as spectacle, communication, commodity, and technology 
(Being 57). The above passage from Remains of Life, for instance, attests to the naked 
being prior to the inscription of politics and yet at the same time names the fact that 
the naked ontology can appear only in the already-inscribed being—inscribed by 
politics and capital, among others.  
In this light, the relationship between ethics and politics can also be further 
clarified. Ethics proposed by Levinas, Nancy, Derrida, as well as my proposition in 
this dissertation, is not born of a naïve ignorance of politics. Rather, ethics brings into 
light the fundamental imperative underlying all political activities, that is, the fact of 
our naked being and our being together. The writing in Remains of Life, as I have 
argued, exemplifies this ontology by a writing of the same time and the same place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
                 
AFTERWORD 
 
In these pages, I have sought to conduct an epistemo-ontological inquiry into 
the stakes of difference in relation to postcolonial configurations of community. 
Seeing current postcolonialism’s “homo-phobia” as a limitation, my study has 
examined writers who address the impossibility of difference and treat this 
impossibility as a postcolonial condition that promises a reconciliation between the 
postcolonial subject and history. In particular, I have chosen to focus on the material 
characteristics of these writers’ writing—“writing” in these texts turns into an ethical 
moment when the subject explores what it means to be in common with others. My 
argument has been that one cannot locate the conceptualization of postcoloniality 
within the rhetorical parameters that have driven modern colonialist enterprises, 
namely, the problematics of difference.  
With a wide variety of authors discussed, I have hoped to foreground the 
relevance among them through a gradual reasoning development. The chapter on 
Baudelaire, for instance, sets the tone for subsequent chapters not only because of the 
representativeness of Baudelaire for modernity’s self-contradiction, but also for 
another reason. Baudelaire’s lesbian figure has been named by Walter Benjamin as the 
allegory of the historical condition of modernity and, at the same time, the allegory of 
the critique of this condition. Such a duality, central to Benjamin’s messianic 
conceptualization of history, has central relevance to the following chapter, where I 
have examined a similar hopeful, if not messianic, moment in Rushdie’s allegorical 
understanding of history. 
 Benjamin à la Baudelaire redefines the ethico-political and epistemological 
aspects of allegory—that is, allegory names both a historical impulse and a 
commentary. For Benjamin, allegorical critique is possible primarily because allegory
    181
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involves a temporal difference. Yet, what faces the postcolonial subject is anything but 
a temporal distance from their colonial past, as is manifest in Rushdie’s works. 
 In Rushdie, the impossibility for postcolonial to be different from the colonial 
past is often materialized in a narrative structure haunted by the same images. In 
Theresa Hak Kyung Cha’s work, Dictée, similar ethos prevails. I have argued that, in 
Dictée, the typical theme of earlier Asian American writing (namely, displacement 
occasioned by the duality of cultural register) is redefined as an ontological reflection 
on postcoloniality. The postcolonial, post-diasporic subject in Dictée survives the 
violence of colonial and migrant history not by resisting the haunting of the 
formidable Other (in this case, history), but by yielding herself to multiple others in a 
community that does not have a name. I also have proposed that the numerous 
moments of inarticulation in Dictée, instead of naming a resistance to cultural 
translatability, as many critics have contended, in effect shows an ethical experience 
as the subject seeks to reconcile with the Other whose name is incomprehensibility. In 
that chapter, I have engaged Jacques Derrida’s writing on haunting and difference in 
my examination of time difference in postcolonial historical cognition. My proposition 
is that, for the postcolonial subject, history very often makes sense only retroactively 
in the midst of recurrent, repeated, and haunting metaphors. I see this temporal 
dimension as crucial to a positive configuration of postcoloniality, and I identify such 
a temporal sensitivity in all the writers I have discussed thus far. 
 Relevantly, in Taiwan writer Dancing Crane, I have maintained that his work 
approaches the possibility of community not only in relation to time but also in 
relation to the end of time. Finitude of the commodity, of the nation, and of the 
individual becomes the thread that makes a community possible. I conclude my study 
by proposing that the recognition of the finite community prevails in all the writers I 
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have examined, and that this recognition confirms the positivity of reading sameness 
into postcolonial community. 
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